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Abstract

This study is developed in conjunction with the Center for Applied
Phenomenological Research at the University of Tennessee and the Bulgarian
Academy of Sciences, Sofia, to examine how the editorial pages of The Times of
London sought to provide a collective understanding of the events of 9/11
during the first year after the attacks. Leaning on the methods of historiography,
phenomenology, and rhetorical analysis, this study offers an interdisciplinary
approach to discovering meaning translated through the interrelated processes
of conjuring historical memory, inventing novel, figurative terminology, and
building narrative structures to frame our understanding of events. This study
considers how cultural memories of traumatic, public events are created,
arguing that the shaping of collective memory and the development of
historical narrative are tightly interconnected through the language we share
and create with others. Results indicate that these editorialists cultivated an
awareness of time that was steeped in culturally-salient narrative traditions,
staging an historical drama in The Times, and were therefore always highly
conscious of the interaction between the editorials as story and readers as
audience.
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Preface

This dissertation is part of a larger study undertaken between the Center
for Applied Phenomenological Research at the University of Tennessee-Knoxville
and the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia on the editorial response in
American and European newspapers to 9/11 during the first year after the
attacks. As an international project, the newspapers studied represented a large
swatch of the Western response to the event, coming from North America and
Western and Eastern Europe. In North America, The New York Times and The
Washington Post were selected, representing the cities most immediately
affected by the attacks. In Western Europe, The Times of London and El Mundo
were chosen, both because the governments of the United Kingdom and Spain
were close NATO allies of the United States, and also because both countries
had long histories of dealing with terror, from the IRA in the United Kingdom and
ETA in Spain. In Eastern Europe, Russia’s Izvestia was selected for several reasons,
ranging from Russia’s long-standing rivalry with the West to its own battles with
terrorism in Chechnya, to its long war in Afghanistan, and to its burgeoning, postCold War friendship with the United States. Finally, from Bulgaria, home to part of
the study and a transitioning former-Eastern bloc state itself, the newspaper,
Sega, was selected as a voice new to Western affairs, but with NATO and EU
membership in sight and a border with Muslim Turkey, a voice intimately
concerned with the welfare of the West. This core of newspapers, it was

vii

contended, should provide a solid understanding of how the West (Eastern
Europe included) coped with 9/11 and its aftermath.
To that end, this project on The Times of London will be interwoven with
certain results of that larger study. In particular, early results coming from The
Times bore an intriguing resemblance to stylistic results that emerged from a
study of The New York Times, namely, a significant, rhetorical framing of each
paper’s response to the attacks. Noted in the most reflective editorials from The
New York Times (Pollio, et al., In Press, and Lule, 2002) was their epic structure, a
retelling of an ages-old conflict of heroes fighting invaders from the outside
attacking a great city and center of civilisation. In New York, though never
referenced directly, this structure took on an Illiadic tone, in which a surprise
attack from a kind of Trojan horse struck a critical blow against the city in a long
war between rival civilisations that had festered for many years. In the UK,
meanwhile, results suggested that The Times saw 9/11 as a Shakespearean
historical drama, a retelling of the themes in Henry IV and Henry V. With that in
mind, this project began to take a specific shape.
As is the case in each of the studies in the ongoing project, this study of
The Times includes a close, phenomenologically and historically-based reading
of editorials, or leading articles, dealing with 9/11 and the subsequent War on
Terror. In this reading, the study considered the implications of the content of the
editorials, the historical references The Times included, the novel figures of
speech that were rated as salient, and the themes that built upon the concerns
of content, historical referencing, and salient figures, and that took into account
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their impact on the reading audience. In addition to close reading, however,
this study also takes into consideration the rhetorical situation of The Times to
account for its literary forebears. Since the literary structure in The Times
appeared to be dramatic in nature, and since the rhetorical situation in The
Times was at the heart of this study, it was an easy next step to take a Burkeian
approach to the rhetorical analysis.
To that end, this dissertation begins with an overview in Chapter 1 that
includes a discussion of relevant psychological, linguistic, historical, rhetorical
theory and a framing for the focus of the project. Methods are then developed
in Chapter 2, including an explanation for the ways in which this study departs
from previous studies in the overall project. Next, Chapter 3 presents results for
the study of The Times of London for content, historical references, salient figures,
and themes, as well as early rhetorical characteristics. In Chapter 4, a discussion
of the results then begins that contemplates the impact that British historical and
literary awareness has on the coverage of 9/11 and its aftermath in The Times.
This discussion focuses mainly on the legacy of three central figures—Clausewitz,
Churchill, and Shakespeare—who appear to provide The Times with an
underlying frame for the ways in which writers understand events. Finally, in
Chapter 5, conclusions, suggestions for further research, and limitations of the
study are proposed.
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Words and Images Scorched onto the Collective Consciousness, Replayed in
Flashback
Chapter 1: Introduction

Overview

Ask nearly any citizen of a Western nation about September 11, 2001 and
the answer provided will likely include a description of that day as a historyshaking event, one that altered what the early part of the 21st century would be
like. Indeed, many of us now describe the political culture in which we live as
pre- or post-9/11, in just the same way time was demarcated in the 20th century
as pre- or post-World War II. Part of this thinking comes from our construction of
the event as it parallels others in our collective memory. In other words, the
historical references we choose to give the figure of 9/11 a grounding allow us to
begin to comprehend and make sense of it. Perhaps nowhere does this happen
with the speed of the newspaper editorial, a medium in which the news of the
day gets a running commentary, and where, from these first metaphors we use
to describe an event, editorial writers develop larger thematic narratives that
help order the disorder of a changing world.
Examining how the editorial staff at The Times of London developed
textual, historical, and metaphorical themes in leading articles about terrorism in
the first year after 9/11 becomes an exercise in understanding how a collective
conscious can be framed and formed. Since the paper enjoys a high level of
prestige, it is therefore a paper likely to be at the center of an emerging debate,
1

politically, rhetorically, and linguistically-charged. The political, public policy
debate itself centers on a seemingly obvious question—how should the West
develop its response to the post-9/11 world? However, the more subtle rhetorical
and linguistic debates are more hazardous. In those first days, when everyone—
government officials, the media, and ordinary people on the street—knew very
little, and often seemed paralyzed by the impact of the collapse of the Twin
Towers, the public discussion had yet to coalesce, a fact that is paradoxically
both part symptom and part cause of that paralysis. But once the West began
to recover its bearings, the debate started to take shape. The New York Times,
for example, which on September 12th referred to New York City as a kind of
modern-day Pompeii, a city that is only remembered for having been
completely inundated by volcanic ash, abandoned that historical metaphor in
favor of a far more hopeful one: the struggle of New York City was the newest
version of the timeless clash between epic heroes and villains (Lule, 2002; Pollio,
et al., In Press). The Times of London, meanwhile, picked up Prime Minister Tony
Blair’s assurance that the United Kingdom stood “shoulder to shoulder” with the
people of the United States, invoking similar imagery drawn a half-century before
in the language of Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin
Roosevelt. By invoking historical metaphors, the paper gave shape to its readers’
understanding of events, gently reminding them of other great struggles, trying to
instill them with a will to endure.
In this sense, the papers demonstrate that memory, language, and history
share a classic connection which is extremely useful when attempting to explain
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complex, present events. We understand our histories (individual and collective)
through our memories, which are shaped by our experience—our
phenomenological being-in-the-world—and our connections with others through
conversation and dialogue. When we contemplate that connection with others,
the relationship between memory and history becomes more complex, shaped
by the culture and language shared between participants. In effect, memory
and history in the presence of language—our means of connecting with others—
becomes memory and history in the presence of metaphor, rhetoric, and
narrative. And if those symbols and stories are particularly evocative, they
become translated further, ultimately shaping our collective memories and
community identities, our historical traditions and social rituals. The result of that
process allows us to recognize who we are now by reminding us where we came
from, and through that past and present, what projections our futures might hold.
Therefore, the large research questions I hope to consider are (1) How does
language act as both symbolic action and collective therapy in these leading
articles, and how are those two functions interrelated? and (2) How do
metaphor, memory, and narrative intersect to create meaning?

Narrative Reality in Time

Key to this arrangement is the connection between the narrator, the
narrative in question, and the intended audience receiving that narrative. Both
psychologically and rhetorically, that connection marks an ever-important link
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between how various sources frame events unfolding around us, and how we
come to understand them. Ricoeur (1984a) argues that this is especially true
since narrative is the primary means we have of making sense of time and its
events. He even goes so far as to note that “time becomes human to the extent
that it is articulated through a narrative mode,” as though the very basis for what
humanizes experience is a narrative that reorganizes, reassesses, and retells
experiences (p. 52). Narrative lends time a manageable structure, a sense of
before, now, and to come, that allows us to understand time by understanding
our place in time. Once we locate ourselves in time, we can begin to piece our
narratives together. Baydala (2003) explains this further by noting that a
narrative provides both a meaning and a means of referencing human action,
as though when we provide a narrative for our experiences, we order our
connections of time, place, and specific event. In the case of 9/11, that
locating process is not only a function of understanding, but a much more
practical process as well, one that helps to identify critical sequences of events,
motivations for various actions, and perhaps to an even more important extent,
the greater causes of terror.
By locating our place in time through narrative, it helps to have linguistic
markers that help us to make sense of events themselves, even before setting
them in time. For instance, before we came to know the events of 9/11 as
“9/11,” editorial pages needed ways to mark the day as different—history
shifting. As a result, The New York Times asked us to “remember the ordinary”
(“The War Against America,” 2001), or the life we lived before that September
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morning. The Times of London, meanwhile, invoked the memory of “that
shattering day” (“Another Front,” 2001) or the day our lives and our
understanding of the world, its actors, and its events—in other words, the era in
which we live—were shattered before our eyes. These metaphorical descriptions
that begin the process of marking 9/11 are key to our understanding of it as a
crucial shift in our lives. But even more than that, they are key to marking a
crucial shift in our sense of time—our pre- or post-9/11 understanding of the
world—as they become an axis around which other events in time revolve. We
mark our history with metaphorical language that helps to explain not only what
happened, but just why what happened was so significant to our historical era.
Coupled with time-marked narrative, historical and metaphorical language help
provide a meaning for 9/11.
When metaphor, memory, language, and history intersect, meaning is
created, through the connection between narrator and audience. This allows us
to experience the world through the very natural human connection of dialogue
through language, a being-in-the-world through being-with-others via the
symbols we share and the stories we tell. At the outset, the connection between
metaphor and memory provides the first step in contemplating how human
beings understand the world. Pollio (1974) notes that our thinking often works in
a pattern of associations—comparisons between what we know and what we
have encountered and do not yet know. These associations happen through
figurative thought that connects present experience to the past. Pre-existing
knowledge provides the foundation for memory by selectively ordering past and
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present experience, supplying a basis for relating newly-encountered ideas to
other ideas and for modeling what might work in the future when situations
appear to be similar. At the same time, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) describe the
process through which they believe this association occurs, noting that a
substitution takes place in which we begin to substitute one idea for another
over time as novel figurative terms are introduced into our language as various
events occur. As these new figurative terms begin to freeze as the experiential
circumstances in which they were first framed fade, the once novel terms
become terms that we accept without thinking about them. From this starting
point, Pollio takes his notion of symbolic association further, arguing for the real
power metaphorical language such as this has. This 9/11 language, and
particularly the metaphorical and historical connections it makes, are not simply
associative markers, but a means of thickening language, jumping out of the
discourse, by slowing down the way we process the language in order to make
connections between the tenor and vehicle of the metaphor. They force us to
consider them, to pay closer attention, to figure out their etymological, historical,
or cultural foundations to understand completely the assertion they make now,
in the present, and at the same time, though more subtlety, their influence on
future action and thought.
When terms like “Ground Zero” or “War on Terror” become the norms
through which we name parts of post-9/11 life, our experience is shaped not only
by images of the Twin Towers reduced to rubble, the on-going war in
Afghanistan, the subsequent war in Iraq, and the myriad changes in the freedom
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of movement throughout the West. Our experience is also partly shaped by the
memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—the original, atomic Ground Zeroes—and
by the more complicated notion that we are waging a war not against a
traditionally identifiable nation-state or group as Clausewitz (1976) would define
war (a concept we do historically understand), but against an emotion, in this
case, “terror.” Through the metaphor, “Ground Zero,” we understand the events
of 9/11 to be catastrophic, relatable to the kind of destruction a great war
exhibits, most particularly to the kind of destruction an atomic bomb exacts.
And through the metaphor, “War on Terror,” we begin to understand the
dangers of the war we are waging in the post-9/11 world; terror, as an emotion,
as well as a tactic, will likely always be with us. Therefore, the danger is that as it
will have no clear boundaries or objectives in the Clausewitzean sense, this
particular war may never end. More importantly, since both of these metaphors
become easy exchanges for various events in our post-9/11 life, they have
become interlinked and part of our larger social consciousness. Because we
had a “Ground Zero,” we now have a “War on Terror.” Through those
metaphors, we begin to shape our responses to those historical acts and their
agents. We are at war. We are under attack. We live under the threat of total
destruction. But more than that, we shape all future understanding based on this
premise in the sense that these metaphors help construct the reality in which we
live. All terrorism in the Western psyche will relate back somehow to this base,
historical metaphor of “Ground Zero,” shaped on the foundational, historical
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metaphors that come from World War II, a war in which there was so much at
stake that there was no option to lose.
At this point, it becomes a little clearer that one of the ways in which the
language of 9/11 works is to establish a new concept of reality over time. Berger
and Luckmann (1967) argue that reality is socially constructed, framed by
institutions with particular world-views that negotiate events through their own
perspectives, built historically through time and place. Using the Whorf
hypothesis, we only need to take a short step from Berger and Luckmann to say
that just as reality is constructed by historical and sociological factors, so too is it
shaped by language, since the way language is used can in part determine
how we think—about ourselves, others, time, and place.
In the case of newspapers, Fairclough (1995) notes that when creating
new metaphors, the media seeks to work in the context of its audience, using
metaphors to help a public understand an event and to shape its
understanding. Therefore, the figurative language the media develops draws
upon evocative themes in popular memory and claims to share that memory
and culture. At the same time, since the media often develops that language
over a long period of time, it ultimately becomes embedded in the standard
features of discourse. In this way, the media embeds prior knowledge into
current process, creating layers of constructed knowledge which become
particularly important considering the choice of style and the nature of the
intertextual linking and renegotiation required for successful embedding. The
media, therefore, not only provides a new way to understand an issue, but also
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to push an ideology, which then directly relates to a social and linguistic
construction of reality.
Building up standard features of discourse over time reflects the ideas of
Kenneth Burke, who notes in Attitudes Toward History (1984a) that the very act of
applying names to motives shapes our understanding, orienting us for or against
people or activities; the names themselves also suggest how we are for or
against them. Some of these orientations take place at the level of metaphor
which may ultimately become the key terms of what Burke, in Language As
Symbolic Action (1966), calls “terministic screens” that structure our thinking
through language, becoming the symbols by which we understand the world
and our experience in it. The language of terministic screens reflects reality
certainly, but it also selects and deflects reality, therefore guiding, stimulating,
and narrating further action. This “language as symbolic action” that Burke first
identifies in Counter-Statement (1953) works so that individual metaphors get
taken up in metaphorical themes operating as terministic screens and become
a particular rhetoric, providing a terminology of thoughts, actions, attitudes, and
emotions that codifies experience.
In Permanence and Change (1984b), Burke observes that language of
this kind is never neutral, but loaded with judgments that take shape because it
is used by people acting together, as though the language is an adjunct of that
action, developing a continuing narrative that links action with time and motive
in an historical sensibility. Once narrative is built up, it expands, and becomes
the way through which we select our memory-as-history and the metaphors that
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come out of it, reflecting the parts of our experience we want to emphasize and
at the same time deflecting those we would choose to ignore. In other words,
out of this process of narrating our experience, having carefully cultivated the
language we choose to describe it, emerge the figures in Ricoeur’s historical
ground that take precedence in our era and which obscure those figures that
recede into history. Burke further describes this process in Attitudes Toward
History (1984a), noting that since we search for and create forms of
consciousness, those forms become our foundation, our means of negotiating
linguistically (and intellectually) our experiential frame. Prompted by a yearning
to comprehend what has happened, we promote mechanisms of acceptance
which judge our historical situation and adopt our role in relation to it.

Historical Memory and Historical Narrative

In a related context, Hans-Georg Gadamer (1976) would argue that
terministic screens constitute that person’s “historical prejudice,” and simply
frame reality by reflecting the history and experience of any one person and the
institutions that surround him or her in a given time. Such a recognition of
personal historicity, Gadamer insists, forces us to realize that anything we
understand, we understand through and because of context—both the context
of the situation and of our context as people who experience life socially,
economically, historically, and institutionally. This historical prejudice insists that
we understand our world as people of historical reality—of people in time and

10

place. History, then, immediately influences whatever decisions we make—even
dictating whatever decisions we can make. What is available to us, both
practically and creatively, provide the only tools with which we can build.
Ultimately, our historical prejudice is the means through which we infuse our
historical reality with life, since our historical prejudice will largely determine how
we perceive and understand that experience.
The “prejudices” that we bring to new experience determine how we
understand that experience since everything we do has a context, and it is
impossible to separate context from understanding. That hermeneutic framing
takes place in the realm of language, since it is through language that we can
communicate perception, understanding, and ultimately, meaning.
Hermeneutic framing through language, coupled with Burke’s notion of
terministic screens, allows us to translate the importance of “being there”
(Heidegger’s Dasein)—experience within a specific time and place—through the
dialogue of “being with” (Heidegger’s Mitsein)—or negotiating our experience,
and the meaning of that experience, with others. Basing our understanding of
the world on the time and place in which we live, the language, culture, and
tradition that influence our lives and our ways of thinking and doing become
critical foundations for any new constructs we attempt to build.
This understanding we develop of present history-in-the-shaping,
therefore, is molded by our memory of history-already-shaped. It is not surprising,
for example, that one of the first historical metaphors for 9/11 which The Times
contemplated was the legacy of Pearl Harbor—of a surprise attack from the air,
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driven by kamikaze pilots intending to die and inflict as much damage as
possible in the process. Even though that particular metaphor only lasted for a
reasonably short period of time in the discussion of 9/11, the larger metaphor of
World War II that the mention of it conjured has lasted much longer. Part of the
reason for this conjuring of memory to help explain the present is, according to
Frederic Bartlett (1954), that “in remembering, the subject uses the setting, or
scheme, or pattern, and builds up its characteristics afresh to aid whatever
response the needs of the moment may demand” (p. 196). In the sense that this
could be a specific remembering of an important historical event, Bartlett’s
analysis provides a way into the workings of historical memory and how it can
begin to develop on a wider, social level. Repeatedly stressing the importance
of psychological orientation always occurring within a specific setting, Bartlett
believes that remembering is an act of placing one set of conditions beside
another, so that the memory becomes part of a broader ground of memory
contexts.
Given Bartlett’s take on how we form memories, and, more importantly,
how we go about remembering them, the organization of historical memory
becomes a comparable process. Historian David Thelen (1989) argues that
historical memory is always collective and historicized, influenced by and
influencing culture, negotiating meaning as the historical event remembered
reflects the concerns of the people of the era doing the remembering.
According to historian Pierre Nora in Lieux de Mémoire (1996a), historical
memories are likely to be culturally powerful and pervasive, thriving “because of
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their capacity for change, their ability to resurrect old meanings, and generate
new ones along with new and unforeseeable connections” (p. 15). From this
perspective, Nora invokes the connection between historical memory and
historical narrative, the latter existing with the very intention of being retold to
new audiences in new eras and settings, with potentially far different cultural
conditions, expectations, and needs in place. The most powerful of these
collective memory narratives, Nora believes, mark “a turning point in which a
sense of rupture with the past is inextricably bound up with a sense that a rift has
occurred in memory” (p. 1). Considering that one of the most insistent themes
editorials in The Times of London adopt is a sense of irrevocable change, for all
intents and purposes a rift in time, Nora’s conjecture that a rupture with the past
actually focuses the collective memory more pointedly puts into perspective the
drive to connect the past directly to 9/11 and why it was a continuing struggle
for The Times. In terms of historical memory, 9/11 signified an event dramatically
unlike the events of our recent, collective past.
At the same time, Thelen (1989) reminds us that the way in which
collective, historical memory develops points toward how people have always
“selected and interpreted identifying memories to serve changing needs,”
searching together and negotiating meaning, and ultimately preserving and
absorbing that meaning into the present and continuing concerns of the
community (p. 1123). In this particular case, those changing needs and
concerns represent an overwhelming desire to capture the meaning of 9/11,
what place it occupies in our history, and perhaps more importantly, in terms of
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our response, what place it will occupy in the historical narratives we tell about
that day and its aftermath. Because 9/11 characterizes a terrific rupture in our
history, our need to reach back, to connect ourselves to challenges of history
during which we were successful to the great challenge suddenly thrust before
us is almost overwhelming. From our fear, anger, humiliation, and despair must
come our great triumph, just as the horrors of the Battle of Britain and Pearl
Harbor spurred the generations before us to victories over Berlin and Tokyo.
Once we capture and refit a resonant-enough collective historical memory to
our current circumstances, we lend ourselves a sense of the directions in which
we must travel to overcome present obstacles. We merge our historical horizon
with our historical past, and subsequently, our historical prejudice shifts to
incorporate old lessons—lessons we have supposedly learned—into our objective
of the present. Essentially, we negotiate the paths we choose after we have
renegotiated the meaning of our past.1
Since this negotiation happens as part of a collective historical
conversation, it becomes an aspect of public discourse. Theodore Sarbin (1993)
insists that our concept of history naturally demands storytellers who cannot exist
as “tellers of history” without narratives designed specifically for their audiences.
Any time a discourse develops between parties, some kind of dialogue is taking
place between narrators and audiences. In this sense, one individual’s
experience in that negotiation and that historical era—his or her being-in-the
world—cannot be entirely complete on its own, nor does it explain how that
Stephen Bungay, preeminent historian of the Battle of Britain, invokes some of this
argument in his Autumn, 2001 article on the war speeches of Churchill.
1
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individual comes to understand that experience. Narratives, according to
Sarbin, offer a psychological framing for making sense of events by creating
contexts ripe for encounters with the narratives and responses of other people.
Instead of acting as isolated stimulus-response exercises, the sharing of narratives
with actively negotiating audiences operates as the tellings and re-tellings of
organized stories. If some kind of dialogue develops (which it inevitably does), if
a person is the product of the heteroglossia of historical prejudice and the
negotiation of collective memory, then being-in-the-world implies being-with
others. In short, understanding cannot happen, until being-in-the-world
becomes being-with-others.
Thelen agrees, noting that the construction of historical collective memory
is never isolated, but made in conversations with others “that occur in the
contexts of community, broader politics, and social dynamics” (1989, p. 1119).
Ultimately, with great events that act as foundations (or shake foundations to the
core), the narrative-building conversations grow larger and larger, including
more and more parties and their various concerns. If the narrative becomes
substantial enough, richly steeped in collective memory, the cultural impulse to
commemorate it formally becomes that much more urgent.
Through this impulse, Nora and Nico Frijda (1997) link the urge to
commemorate to events that signify a rupture with the past. Describing a lieu
de mèmoire as a kind of artificially-embodied memory, that by definition marks
our “intent to remember,” Nora argues that observing commemoration is not just
symbolic, but an act that “disrupts time, thus consecrating memory” (1996a, p.
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14). By marking that event, we separate that moment in time from all the other
moments of all the other days in our lives that do not stand out, effectively
indicating how special that moment is in our personal or collective history. It
becomes extraordinary—an event to be remembered—and for the most moving
and life-changing events, a moment of special consideration, or consecration,
as if by consecrating, we still struggle with the unanswerable questions of the
event (Frijda, 1997). In the act of consecration, the embodied memory
becomes a substitution for a simple, shared memory, becoming instead an
historical artifact, and stops time through its very existence. The commemorative
exercise of stopping time marks the event as special, separate, and something
we choose to remember beyond the simplest acts of remembering.
Events like 9/11, which almost immediately become commemorated
events, with 24-hour news coverage, temporary cancellation of all kinds of dayto-day activities, flags at half-staff, moments of silence, and days of mourning,
Nora claims, “are immediately invested with symbolic significance and treated,
even as they are unfolding, as if they were being commemorated in advance”
(1996a, p. 18). Such events, driven by a socially-constructed meaning that strives
for a society-wide understanding and acceptance of the events in question,
despite whatever myriad small events which may comprise them, lose their
banal, everyday referents and become wholly symbolic. As opposed to the way
an individual’s memory of a given event may exist, with its focus on the details of
circumstance and happenstance in which the individual hears of, sees, or
comes to terms with the event, the socio-historical commemoration focuses on
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the larger “circle within which everything counts, everything is symbolic,
everything is significant” (1996a, p. 20). The event, in becoming historicized
memory, and especially in the age of mass media, evolves into an iconic figure
arrested in the long ground of time.2
In the leading articles of The Times of London, the 9/11 language is not just
the language of an “editorializing” discourse, one that aims solely to explain and
comment on a given political, economic, social, or community issue. Instead,
this particular editorial discourse appears to aim far beyond simple explanation
and commentary and into the realm of symbolic, historical action. The most
reflective of the editorials are obviously commemorative in their content,
focusing on 9/11 as a defining moment of our times, the moment after which
nothing will ever be the same. Life after 9/11 quite suddenly becomes life in
uncharted territory, life that begs for a new understanding and application of
history. In resisting “rapid, alien and imposed change,” according to Thelen
(1989, p. 1125), people respond by holding on to what they can, leading to the
instant commemoration Nora describes. Only when “the historical framework of
the nation has been shattered,” can national, historical memory “come into
being” (Nora, 1996b, p. 636). Only when the overwhelming need for one exists
can an icon emerge to help fix the collective vision of the nation. The icon,
separating an event from the general flow of history, makes figural not just the
event itself, but the historical past which preceded it, as a time in which life was
2 “Historicized memory” and “embodied memory” are the same, though “embodied
memory” specifically deals with something that literally becomes "embodied," as in a
place or an object that is commemorated. Nora is sometimes talking specifically about
physical places—lieux—but lieux really imply "realms" more than "places."
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normal. To commemorate an event like 9/11 is to invoke “memories of a past
that was unchanging, incorruptible and harmonious,” that people “mobilize . . .
to resist change” (Thelen, 1989, p. 1125), calling upon a past that makes sense in
the wake of an era of grave danger. Commemoration of 9/11, therefore, marks
“the abandonment of the traditional channels and modes of transmission” of
historical events (Nora, 1996b, p. 636) by marking 9/11 as an event that
transcends history.

The Iconic Image

Davis (2003) continues this theme from a psychological perspective,
arguing that to understand 9/11, we will ultimately have to understand its
symbolic images if we are to understand our historical era and what actions we
are taking in it. By “arrest[ing] images that flare up at a moment of crisis and
attempt[ing] to internalize and articulate their significance before they
disappear” (p. 128), Davis insists that we take Walter Benjamin’s3 approach to
historical consciousness and capture these images while they are still relatively
novel and their ultimate meanings are still being negotiated, before they
“disappear, perhaps irretrievably, in the predictable rush toward ideological
reaffirmations—and national healing” (p. 128). Though the process of
commemorating 9/11 and establishing images that become socially and
historically mandated icons of it may sound like one sinister forces could easily
“Theses on the Philosophy of History,” by Walter Benjamin, 1940, Illuminations, 1978, ed.
and trans. Hannah Arendt, New York: Basic.
3
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manipulate, in the case of 9/11, the earliest editorials, particularly from New York,
embody both Davis’ and Benjamin’s takes, as well as Lakoff’s (2001) description
of how the iconic images of 9/11 dramatically changed the way we would
encounter the world. Noting that any building can be symbolic of a person, with
the various features of a human body, especially the human face, existing as
figures within the larger architectural ground, Lakoff argues that “the image of
the plane going into South Tower was . . . an image of a bullet going through
someone's head, the flame pouring from the other side blood spurting out. It was
an assassination. The tower falling was a body falling” (¶ 5). So when the
editorials describe New York as a body in need of healing (Pollio, et al., In Press),
they follow along with the logical next step of Lakoff’s description.
In both cases, the language used to represent bodies in pain derives
directly from the imaginable experience of the writers. Lakoff remembers, “The
bodies falling were me, relatives, friends. Strangers who had smiled as they had
passed me on the street screamed as they fell past me” (¶ 5). The New York
Times, meanwhile, talks about the need for the “city’s revival” (“Mayor of the
Moment,” 2001), that after absorbing what amounted to “a supreme national
horror” (“Heroes Amid the Horror,” 2001), New York would “breathe for a bit”
(“The Necessary Courage,” 2001), but “would never bow” (“Mayor of the
Moment,” 2001), and instead begin the “world of consoling to be done” (“The
War Against America: An Unfathomable Attack,” 2001). Without question, the
iconic image of 9/11 is those towers collapsing, two wounded sentinels that for
30 years had characterized New York City as the center of the Western world. If
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Lakoff describes the shock and pain of 9/11, of those towers tumbling to the
ground, The New York Times, almost immediately, begins to focus on the healing
that would need to take place in a city victimized by a terrifying, unexpected
attack. Finally, Lakoff reminds us that “All those symbols were connected to
more of [our] identity than [we] could have realized. To make sense of [9/11, our]
very brain[s] had to change” (¶ 6). Buildings were no longer buildings and cities
were no longer cities; they became victims—and survivors. And even though the
most palpable effects 9/11 had on our international community resulted in the
violent deaths of thousands at the hands of the terrorists and the launching of a
worldwide war (not exactly easily dismissible effects), the more chilling success of
the attacks over time manifested itself as the more invasive and insidious
“reach[ing] in and chang[ing of] the brains of people all over” (¶ 7). That iconic
figure of the towers collapsing, and the consequences of that symbolic death,
was “replayed in flashback to a newly insomniac world,” as The Times of London
put it, until it became “scorched into the collective consciousness,” and thrust us
into our “desire to restore life to New York City,” but also left us “caught in
obscene free-fall” (“Dig Deep,” 2001).
The Times has it right. Since “image is the native language of anxiety, the
language psyche uses in an effort to mediate the emotional and psychological
impact of events” (Davis, 2003, p. 127-128), especially for an event with the
emotional and psychological impact of 9/11, is the language of iconic figures
that breaches time and forces an historical moment to stand alone as though
“scorched” into our collective memory. Because of the natural connection
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between image and metaphorical language, deciphering the language we use
to talk about terror becomes a useful tool for understanding just what terror
means and what it accomplishes, and therefore, how it affects us and our daily
lives, as well as the larger sweep of history, as evidenced by Lakoff, The New York
Times, and The Times of London. Essentially, if we can understand the images,
we can begin to understand the relevant being-in-the-world. In this sense, the
“ideological reaffirmations” Benjamin talks about that we make through
language undoubtedly drive the historical policy implications of the “War on
Terror,” while the notion of “national healing” forces us to deal with the collective
psychological and historical implications of life after “Ground Zero.”
Part of what is happening in The New York Times, is that the language—
through historical and metaphorical themes—is providing a level of collective
therapy for a general public suffering from a collective sense that something
terrible has happened. Rather pointedly, the paper recognizes immediately that
something has changed irrevocably, and that every part of our lives can
explode in a fury of jet fuel, like a modern-day Pompeii in which the most
mundane aspects of life—people getting up, going to work, walking down the
street on a crisp and perfectly clear Manhattan morning—become trapped and
suffocated in a super-heated strata of dust.
While aware that New Yorkers are reminded every moment that the city
has “suffered an urban avalanche” (“Terror for All,” 2001), across the ocean, The
Times of London busily identifies just what effects that avalanche will have.
Noting that the world has been “tempered by fire and changed” (“Terror for All,”

21

2001), The Times quickly understands that “old rivalries [have been] buried” (“Still
the Enemy,” 2001), and that world leaders are “actor[s] in a drama whose first
act is unfolding” (“With One Voice,” 2001). Arguing that “the world divides after
this tremendous event into two camps” with “no middle way” (“With One
Voice,” 2001), The Times warns that “it would be foolish, it would be immoral, to
shirk this slow, deliberate test of strength” (“Replies of Steel,” 2001). For the UK
and the rest of the world, only by “standing shoulder to shoulder” will Prime
Minister Tony Blair and others be “best placed to whisper words in the right ears”
(“The Old War,” 2001).
While editorialists in New York compassionately concern themselves with
rescue, recovery, and restoring New York and New Yorkers to health, London,
understanding that 9/11 “bring[s] to a head the struggle shadowing the West,”
focuses sharply on setting the stage for the world drama that will unfold now that
there is “no going back to life before” (“This Is a World War,” 2001). For The Times,
9/11 is but the first scene in a drama of Shakespearean importance, with nothing
less than the survival of civilization at stake. Conjuring the language and
sentiment of Shakespeare’s Henry IV and Henry V, The Times recasts the roles of
Henry and Exeter in the drama of St. Crispin and Agincourt—the great literary
metaphor for the history of Great Britain—once again, just as Prime Minister
Winston Churchill had during the Second World War.4 In one swift stroke, The
Times manages to invoke the story “the good man” shall “teach his son” of
Britain’s “finest hour.”
Churchill commissioned Sir Laurence Olivier to produce a film version of Henry V in 1944
to raise the morale of the British people.

4
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Given the importance of an iconic image of 9/11 and the narrative
elements evoked by it for The Times, both Brown and Kulick’s flashbulb memory
hypothesis (1977) and Neisser’s narrative hypothesis (1996) offer a psychological
foundation for how 9/11 managed to “reach in” and “change our brains.” The
basic mechanism for a flashbulb memory, as Brown and Kulick originally
described it, asserts that an event marked by high levels of emotion, surprise,
and consequentiality compels us to talk about the event in detail repeatedly,
yielding a coherent narrative framing the event, and therefore a high level of
memory recall. More importantly, Brown and Kulick surmise that certain
“canonical categories” (p. 23) of the descriptive memories are basic features of
any of these so-called flashbulb memories, and they remarkably mirror the basic
theory of rhetorical narrative. Brown and Kulick’s sense of “place” and “ongoing
activity” reflect narrative setting and time, as well as narrative acts, while their
concern with “informant,” a person’s own “affect” and any other particular
“affects” echo a narrative concern with character, agency, and purpose.
Finally, Brown and Kulick’s focus on the “aftermath” of the event rather plainly
emulates the narrative interest in concluding action and denouement.
What Neisser (1996; as well as Pennebaker & Banasik, 1997) concludes is
that though Brown and Kulick’s “flashbulb” metaphor supposes that the rich,
descriptive memory people have of an event forms almost on impact, that
metaphor does not take into account what more likely happens in the forming of
these memories long after the time of the event itself. Instead, Neisser believes
that these “flashbulb” memories take shape only once we understand the
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significance of the event in question, once a narrative truly has a chance to
develop. For Neisser, narrative structure explains Brown and Kulick’s canonical
forms, and is what allows the flashbulb to recall “an occasion when two
narratives that we ordinarily keep separate—the course of history and the course
of our own life—were momentarily put into alignment” (p. 47). The flashbulb
memories reflect not specifically the events themselves, but how they are
socially-constructed by media, historians, politicians and other public institutions,
and how ordinary people have come to think about their own experiences. We
talk with others about the event, how we first heard about it, and how, in the
case of an ongoing story like 9/11, it develops. Those conversations include a
terrific amount of rehearsal of the details as we think and re-think our way
through the events, and result in a concentrated search for the meaning and
significance of those events.

Language As Symbolic Action

Given Neisser’s narrative approach and the epic and dramatic narrative
themes that appear in The New York Times (Lule, 2002; Pollio, et al., In Press) and
The Times of London, Burke’s Pentad and his notion of language as symbolic
action provide a calculus for examining these editorials and the narrative
structures they present to their audiences in developing the story of 9/11. In A
Grammar of Motives (1969), Burke introduces act, scene, agent, agency, and
purpose as a means of calculating the dramatic ratios of the ways in which we
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perceive events. These five foundational elements provide a base for
understanding and evaluating any kind of narrative, as a means of defining an
act, the scene in which it takes place, the actor (agent) who carries out the act
and the means (agency) they use to do so, and also for what purpose they
undertake the act in the first place. For Burke, all action is dramatic, filled and
played out with the motives and causal relationships determined by the interplay
of elements among the pentadic ratios of the players. Taken in conjunction
Ricoeur’s (1984a) view that all human understanding is narrative at base, Burke’s
assertion that all human understanding is dramaturgical reinforces the idea that
what we know we come to know through story.
To comprehend how this understanding develops, taking a small step
back and reconsidering the ever-important psychological connection between
narrator and audience is necessary. Ricoeur insists that human thinking and
experience exist as narrative. The way we communicate with each other is
through narrative. And since our being-in-the-world and being-with-others are
steeped in narrative, the way we understand them cannot happen in any way
other than narrative. Sarbin (1993) develops this further, offering that since we
are surrounded by narrative, all human behavior is essentially dramaturgical. We
think of ourselves and those around us not just as people, but also as characters
who fit the historical events (plots) that unfold around us. Our actions cause the
plots to unfold, the times and places in which we live set the scene, and our
positions in the plots give our actions agency and purpose. Our events are not
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just events, but links between acts and agents, anchored by base, historical
metaphors, producing narratives that develop for others to understand.
Understanding human behavior as a kind of drama assumes an audience;
drama, more perhaps than any other art form, assumes an audience, whether in
terms of others actors in the drama or an audience outside the drama.
Constructed as a series of dialogues, language in drama personifies what
Bakhtin (1986) describes as a series of utterances, like links, “in the chain of
speech communication,” unable to be separated from any “preceding links”
and any “subsequent links” (p. 94). A dramatic utterance, in effect, is one very
consciously constructed, one that carefully considers possible responses, and
indeed expects responses, anticipating potential dialogues that might result.
When that happens, when the dialogue develops, speakers and listeners switch
roles as listeners become active in the conversation. At the same time, as Bitzer
claims (1992), a speaker’s audience also assumes that the speaker must address
some rhetorical exigence, something which is left unanswered or unfinished to
which the speaker addresses him or herself that organizes speech, providing the
motivating principle behind the utterance.
In our meaning-creating nexus of intersecting factors, the role of rhetoric
begins to become clear. Burke’s Pentad essentially follows up rhetorically where
Sarbin ends his psychological discussion: act, scene, agent, agency, and
purpose form a vehicle for creating order and meaning out of events, rhetorical,
psychological, and historical. For Burke, the rhetorical Pentad becomes the
means through which we interpret narrative, the way symbols can, through
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language and rhetoric, create cooperation between individuals isolated by their
own being-in-the-world and allow those narratives to have their audience, so in
that way behavior and history can have meaning for someone else.
For Burke, like Sarbin, base symbols, or historical metaphors, offer the
primary means through which we understand the world and our experience in it,
building up into narratives. Once built, they then expand (Pearl Harbor becomes
9/11) and become the ways in which we select our memory-as-history and the
metaphors that come out of it. Those metaphors, in turn, become ways of
reflecting those things about our experience we want to emphasize and of
deflecting those things we would rather like to ignore. In other words, those
metaphors constitute which figures in Ricoeur’s historical ground take
precedence, and which are obscured. Once symbols expand into narratives,
particularly into Burkeian dramas of symbolic action, the language they take up
begins to represent “modes of action” in a “matter of motives” (1969, p. xxii).
Since Burke focuses directly on the Pentad’s ability to illuminate “the strategic
spots at which ambiguities necessarily arise” (p. xviii), the motives that the
Pentad describes can become increasingly complex as the acts and actors they
motivate become more byzantine. Because Burke chooses descriptors that
highlight ambiguity, the chances for overlap are great; act and scene can
merge, becoming a scene-act ratio, and transform, becoming not just either
element alone, but both together.
The act of the terrorists on 9/11—of flying planes into buildings—becomes
the scene of 9/11—and the most powerful set of images we remember. Likewise,
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when we editorialize the event and that editorializing language becomes
symbolic action in itself, we create rhetorically a drama on our own terms,
transforming the event into a common ground of understanding, defining the
act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose that drive the collective meaning we
achieve. The end result of Burke’s rhetoric then, is that symbol plus rhetoric, in
the presence of experience, yields understanding of an event via the pentadic
calculus. The language of the historical and metaphorical themes in these
editorials does more than act as a mechanism for ordering and framing complex
events and issues, or as collective therapy. It also provides a measure of
symbolic action, involving the audience in the unfolding narrative, offering the
readership a way into the developments on the ground and in the decisionmaking processes that will affect the future of what is now known as the War on
Terror.
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The More the Evidence Is Sifted, the Clearer the Terrible Truth Becomes
Chapter 2: Method

Overview

This study is part of a larger research effort developed in conjunction
with the Center for Applied Phenomenological Research at the University of
Tennessee-Knoxville and the Institute of Psychology at the Bulgarian Academy of
Sciences examining the responses of the editorial boards of a number of
newspapers across the Western world to the events of 9/11 during the first year
following the attacks. Specifically, the larger research team is analyzing these
editorials in terms of the frequency with which editorials concerning the events of
9/11 appeared, the trends that frequency manifested, the style of editorials, the
historical references conjured, the topics of content they covered, the salient
figures of speech they coined, and the overall themes they constructed. As part
of the group, I began looking at editorials in four papers before finally heading
the project for The Times, using basically the same, integrative research method
as the group did with the other papers, but with a design to branch off later into
a separate, rhetorical analysis.
At first, the project focused mainly on the response of The New York Times,
given its status as the most important and influential paper in New York City, the
unfortunate, primary victim of the 9/11 attacks. Since the early results from that
study proved eye-opening to the members of the group, and as the research
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group grew to include international researchers as well as Americans, the study
began to expand so as to consider comparing how results from The New York
Times either stood out from or blended in with responses from around the world.
The next American paper considered hailed from the second city targeted, The
Washington Post. But as a group with a strong, international focus—comprised of
members from the United States and Eastern Europe—a variety of papers was
ultimately chosen for the study from beyond the United States, including dailies
from the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Russia, and Spain.
Those particular countries were represented in part because of the nature
of dealing with second languages—we needed to have people who could
adequately read the languages—but also because of these countries’
relationships with the United States after 9/11. As NATO members and Western
European countries with governments immediately sympathetic to the
Americans and also having suffered a history of terrorism from the IRA and ETA,
respectively, both Great Britain and Spain became obvious choices. (Also not
lost on the group was Great Britain’s imperial history in Afghanistan.) Bulgaria,
both because it was home to a number of members of the research team, and
also because it was an emerging East European nation, developing ties to the
United States and NATO, was situated as a solid choice. Finally, as a long-time
adversary, yet potential new ally, and also with a history of terrorism and a long,
difficult history with Afghanistan, Russia struck members of the team as a
particularly interesting choice for study. With those countries in mind and given
that broad focus, newspapers were chosen on the basis of their national and
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international prestige, the size of their readership, their relationships to the areas
of attack, and the rapport the paper’s governing country had with the United
States. Finally, some consideration was given to the quality of writing as
exhibited within the paper. Ultimately, Great Britain’s The Times, Spain’s El
Mundo, Bulgaria’s Sega, and Russia’s Izvestia were chosen for the European
study, usually with an eye toward the paper’s independence, influence,
reputation, and attitude towards the United States.
This particular study of The Times of London is the third of the papers to be
examined in this way, and therefore owes a great deal methodologically to
procedures developed in the previous studies. As in the Pollio, et al. study (In
Press) of The New York Times and in the Stoitsova, et al. (In Press) study of Sega,
this investigation included a look at editorials written during the entire first year
after the 9/11 attacks in order to gather a broad sample of reactions. It was also
designed to gauge what long-standing rhetorical, historical, and metaphorical
themes would emerge from a body of work written over a fairly long period of
time. Focusing on an entire year’s leaders1 allows time for a paper to react
immediately to events, and also to reflect on them, describe them and their
aftermath sufficiently, and prescribe specific courses of action based on the
events in question and their consequences.
As a long-standing and influential paper in the United Kingdom, The Times
was chosen largely on the basis of its status. Though other papers—The
Guardian and The Daily Telegraph immediately come to mind—also enjoy a
1

A leader, or leading article, is simply the British term for an editorial.
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high level of prestige and a broad readership among the British people and
indeed worldwide, neither enjoys the historical position of The Times as a paper
operating since 1785. At the same time, since the era of Churchill and Roosevelt,
the “special relationship” enjoyed between the people and governments of the
United Kingdom and the United States underlined a need for a British paper to
be included in the overall project. A British viewpoint was likely to be both highly
supportive of the American position, yet also, a distinctively independent voice;
after all, the British have long relished their position of being not quite continental
European in their way of looking at the world and yet not just an echo of the
Americans across the Atlantic. Finally, The Times is an extraordinarily well-written
paper by any standards, a factor that cannot be understated when exploring
rhetorical themes.
When gathering data from The Times of London, originally, the intention
was to search the LexisNexis database for any leaders relating to the broad
notion of “terror” during the first year after 9/11, in order to find any leading
article that dealt with terrorism in a broad sense, so that the corpus of data
would include any article that had a direct relationship with the events of 9/11.
This was the technique originally used for searching editorials from The New York
Times. It proved in that case to be highly successful, once the search criteria
"terror*" was used to encompass "terror" and all its permutations (e.g. “terror,”
“terrorist,” “terrorism”), which was broader than “9/11” or “September 11,” or
other search terms that were attempted, and ultimately abandoned because of
their narrowness. When it was searched for this project, however, the LexisNexis
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database did not adequately separate out leaders from other articles
appearing in The Times of London, it was necessary to search quite broadly. The
Times of London returns could not be accurately narrowed since returns included
pieces broadly referred to by LexisNexis as "Features.” At that point, a long list of
returns was tagged to capture those that were called "Features," as long as they
also showed evidence of relating to “terror.” Unfortunately, this process also
included pieces that were not leaders, but columns, guest columns, letters to the
editor, and a few other specials. Thus, with the long list of qualifying pieces in the
"Features" at large category, microfilm of The Times of London was searched
issue-by-issue to pare down which of these “Features” were actually leading
articles. This way, pieces on the tagged list could be conclusively identified as
leaders published between 9/12/01 and 9/11/02, and therefore were subjects for
this study.
Narrowing the results from that first exhaustive search, 251 editorials
comprised the body of material that included the word, “terror,” as a full word or
root term. As in the previous studies however, this original group of editorials
required further narrowing. Though searching for “terror*” did offer the broadest
spectrum of results, which was necessary in order to include anything related to
9/11, even during the first days, before “9/11” had even been coined, “terror*”
also sometimes included leaders not at all related. In many cases, the “terror*”
referred to was terror in Chechnya, Israel/Palestine, Kashmir, the history of IRA
terrorism, or other incidents that were not obviously related to the events of 9/11.
Reducing this body of material further required five independent raters, four with
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backgrounds in descriptive psychology and one with a background in language
and rhetoric and all of whom were trained in psycholinguistics as members of the
larger research team. Team members read each leader and scored it on a (0-3)
scale, with 0 defined as “not related to 9/11,” 1 defined as “little related to 9/11,”
2 defined as “somewhat related to 9/11,” and 3 defined as “most related to
9/11.” Raters’ scores of each of the leaders were then averaged to determine
an overall value between 0 and 3. Cutting off leaders with values lower than
1.75 to include both those articles that were “most related” and also those that
the raters believed were situated somewhere between “most related” and
“somewhat related,” 45 editorials, or 17.9% of the 251, were selected as directly
related to the events of 9/11. Of these articles, 36 (80.0%) had a value greater
than 2.0. Average length of each was 779.7 words per article, but the group
included a broad range, from 359 words to 1853 words. At this point, the output
of these articles over time was charted, to gauge how the focus of the paper on
9/11 varied throughout the course of the year, and whether or not there were
connections between the times of the year that interest spiked and when it
declined (e.g. major holidays, 9/11 anniversary, start of the war in Afghanistan,
etc.).

Reflective, Prescriptive, Descriptive

Three of the original four independent raters (two of the psychology raters
and the language rater—the other had dropped out of the research group for
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The Times of London) were then given the complete set of 45 leaders and asked
to determine their placement into the reflective, prescriptive, and descriptive
categories described by Pollio, et al. (In Press) for The New York Times and
Stoitsova, et al. (In Press) for Sega, based on the definitions developed by the
American and Bulgarian research teams. Two of these categories—reflective
and prescriptive—first arose during the study on The New York Times. It became
clear during the process that different editorials were serving different functions
for the editorialists—either to reflect on the meaning of 9/11 or to prescribe a
course of action the country ought to or ought not to undertake because of
9/11, hence the terms “reflective” and “prescriptive.” But over time, it also
became clear that these categories broadly defined how the editorial pages
focused on various elements of 9/11 and its aftermath over the course of the
year. At that point, the characteristics of reflective and prescriptive articles were
identified and defined, and articles were placed in one category or the other.
Reflective editorials tended to have a past-orientation and typically
concerned possible ways of thinking about the present event in terms of
significant personal and national values. The analysis offered in these editorials
frequently provided a particular understanding of 9/11 in terms of its emotional,
historical, and social meanings. Reflective editorials were defined as being
philosophical, observer-oriented, and story-like in nature. A following excerpt is
an example of reflective writing in The Times:
Six months ago on Monday, the world caught its breath in shock, disgust
and fear, transfixed by the attacks on America. Nothing was known of
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the enemy beyond the appallingly, graphically obvious: that these were
well-organised terrorists who were ruthlessly contemptuous of life, their
own along with that of the civilians trapped with them in the hijacked
aircraft and their victims on the ground. They had inflicted unimaginable
carnage, deliberately indiscriminate. The attacks revealed, as they were
intended to do, the vulnerability not only of the world’s greatest power
but of every society in which fanatics were at liberty to circulate. It was
an attack on freedom itself. (“A World Transformed,” 2001)2
By contrast, prescriptive editorials forwarded particular arguments
concerning what should, or should not, be done in response to 9/11. Usually, the
editorial commented on public figures and governmental activities, or presented
alternatives for action concerning the rebuilding of New York, future military
actions, and domestic and international public policy. These editorials were
defined as being action and participant focused and tended to have a future
orientation. The following is an example of prescriptive writing:
Both in and between countries, Mr. Bush’s effort to “rally the world” has
created unexpected alliances. None is more dramatic, or more
significant, than Vladimir Putin’s decision that Russia and the US must
make common cause, and that “the complete political and ideological
isolation” of Islamist terrorists is so vital to its national interests that Moscow
must, for now, set to one side Russia’s deeply rooted historical suspicions of
any external influences penetrating its Central Asian “near abroad.” So
The examples I offer for reflective, prescriptive, and descriptive styles all come from the
same leading article, for reasons I will explain below.
2
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far, the relationship has been deftly handled by both parties; Mr. Bush
should take exceptional care to ensure that this continues to be so. (“A
World Transformed,” 2001)
Finally, the definition of descriptive editorials was developed because of a
need that only emerged when Sega’s relevant articles were coded. A group of
Sega’s editorials simply did not fit the parameters of either the reflective or
prescriptive categories. What raters repeatedly discussed was that these
editorials seemed to be reporting events as much as commenting on them in a
reflective or prescriptive way. Since the reporting constituted a description of
events, the term “descriptive” was chosen to represent these editorials. Usually,
these editorials report a story connected with significant events that happened
as a result of measures undertaken by the United States, the United Kingdom or
other governments after 9/11. Many of these editorials relate to international
reactions of protest or support for the American understanding of the War on
Terror. Descriptive editorials are largely informational and provide readers with
an opportunity to draw their own conclusions. Descriptive editorializing
resembles this:
This military engagement is only one facet of a campaign on many fronts,
civil as well as military, to starve international terrorist cells of space,
organization and support. But its “demonstration effect” has not been
confined to its military dimensions. President Bush, a politician who, like
Tony Blair but more unexpectedly, has proved well able to raise his game
in response to emergency, has substantiated not only his assertion that
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there can be no neutral ground in this fight. He has shown how all
governments, including those in the Islamic world, stand to gain by
aligning themselves with America to defend civil order against enemies
within the gates that many of them had hesitated, out of fear or
ideological ambivalence, to confront. (“A World Transformed,” 2001)
Unlike results deriving from for The New York Times and Sega, however, The
Times of London’s leaders proved difficult to categorize into reflective,
prescriptive, or descriptive categories. SPSS3 coding was used to evaluate the
reflective, prescriptive, and descriptive ratings of these raters. Then the
language terms “reflective,” “prescriptive,” and “descriptive” were translated
into numbers (P=1, R=2, D=3) that could be quantified statistically, and then
recoded into numerical variables. In terms of a reliability analysis, ideally,
Spearman-Brown alpha reliability ratings should be above 0.80, with an
acceptable rating over 0.70, noting a high level of reliability across various raters.
Both The New York Times and Sega reached this standard, with The New York
Times enjoying an interrater reliability rating for reflective, prescriptive, and
descriptive leaders of 0.73 and Sega, of a very high 0.92. However, the interrater
reliability of separating leaders from The Times of London into these categories
fell far below that ideal with a score of 0.50.
Since the raters in question had previously worked on rating other papers
as part of the team (The New York Times, The Washington Post, and El Mundo),
none of which presented similar problems, a discussion concerning the
SPSS, a statistical program, allows researchers to analyze large amounts of numerical
data in a variety of ways.

3
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underlying cause for this low level of reliability ensued. The conclusion the group
reached was that there was a clear, rhetorical reason why reliability ratings
proved too low to maintain these reflective, prescriptive and descriptive
definitional categories broadly for The Times. As a whole, and as evidenced by
“A World Transformed” (2001) excerpted above, leaders from The Times are
written in a vastly complex style, and what one reader rated as mostly reflective,
others rated as mostly prescriptive or descriptive. In other words, unlike editorials
from The New York Times or Sega, which clearly fell into one of these categories,
leaders from The Times of London often seemed to fall into more than one or all
of these categories at once, as though the purpose of the leader was to reflect,
prescribe, and describe all at once the events at hand, especially as the year
progressed. In the case of “A World Transformed,” this was exactly the case:
one rater believed the leader was reflective, another felt it was prescriptive, and
yet another thought it was descriptive. The fact that it very clearly contains
exemplary elements of each category makes it perfectly understandable why
readers would categorize it differently. Even in the significant number of cases in
which at least 2 of 3 raters ultimately agreed on a category, there was no
question that other categories were represented in the article—often strikingly
so—especially early in the year, when a great deal of reflection, description, and
prescription was happening at once. As a result, separating leaders by
definitional category was abandoned in favor of observing that The Times
published leaders that often represented more than one category (which
actually provides a rich environment for rhetorical analysis of themes), and
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therefore that gave an acceptable explanation for the low interrater reliability in
this area. Given this observation, any subsequent analysis of leaders through
these definitional categories would be handled in a more holistic way that
allowed each leader to be examined as potentially having multiple purposes,
and therefore, not codified simply into one form or another.

Historical References

The next step involved examining the role an understanding of history
played in the construction of the leading articles and in the development of an
overall meaning for 9/11. The group believed that finding all the historical
references in the editorials would provide a substantial grounding for the ways in
which the editorialists were thinking about 9/11 as an historical event, one
grounded in the long, cultural and historical narrative of the United States
specifically, but also of the Western world. If we could track historical
precedents the editorials leaned on to develop an understanding of 9/11, we
could take a large step toward developing the overall meaning of 9/11 the
papers hoped to convey. Historical references would begin to clarify political,
social, diplomatic, and military patterns against which to judge the West’s
behavior in the post-9/11 world. At the same time, historical references could
very likely illuminate what historical inspirations the papers wanted their
audiences to cling to in times of trouble.
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At this point, using the overall coding system developed by the larger
research team, all historical references made in the leaders (e.g. Pearl Harbor,
Margaret Thatcher, the USS Cole bombing, etc.) were noted by The Times of
London team leader and one other member of the team. These 156 references
included overt references that specifically named historical events or individuals,
but also included more subtle references, such as Churchill’s noting of the
“special relationship” between the United Kingdom and the United States,
references to literary figures and quotations from their works, such as
Shakespeare’s Henry IV, or mythological terms, such as the Hydra. After this,
references were broken down by whether they appeared during the first six
months of the year or the final six months, and also how many appeared in each
article over the course of the year, to gauge whether or not there was a
difference in the appearance of historical terms over time. Finally, articles
having or not having historical references were noted, to help describe The Times
of London’s focus on the importance of history in its attempt to reflect on,
describe, or prescribe answers to, 9/11.
These historical references were then grouped into several major
categories, if possible (e.g. the Gulf War, the Cold War, World War II, etc.), in
consultation with the leader of the overall project. Any reference that had a
clear connection to World War II, like “Nazi,” for instance, even though the
reference itself might not specifically name World War II, was included in the
World War II category. By grouping references when possible, finding the
historical pattern the editorialists were using became much easier, since sheer
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mass implied a level of clear importance. The fact, for instance, that The Times
of London had so many references in the first place, but also that over a third of
those references grouped together quite quickly under seven major categories,
implied that The Times connected 9/11 very strongly to other historical events.
References which could not clearly be coded were kept separate, under the
assumption that they might also function as figural terms which would turn up in
coding later (which many did), or key parts of thematic structures that might
emerge later in the project (which some did), whether or not they were part of
clear, historical groups.

Content Categories

With historical references in place, the next step was to track the content
of these leaders. Content categories were determined by the team leader in
conjunction with the team leader of The New York Times study, and also in
consultation with the team leader of the Sega study, by breaking down each
article into its primary, textual features, focusing on the main components of
information the articles attempted to relay to their audience. These features
represented the topic the leader in question discussed and what evidence or
arguments it provided while stating its case. For instance, if the article primarily
talked about the UK’s response to 9/11, that was its primary textual feature which
earmarked it for a specific content category. The leader might also note the
role Prime Minister Blair was playing in Western diplomacy or the response of
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British Muslims to the attacks. Either of these would constitute a main component
of information that the leader was communicating.
Once a first list of textual features was composed, the similarities the
leaders exhibited were tracked, and the various leaders themselves separated
into groups of articles containing the same, general textual concerns that arose
from the leaders. The six groups which emerged were named through terms that
appeared in the articles: (1) The Day That Changed the Modern World, (2) With
One Voice: We Are All Americans, (3) This Is a Long World War Without Borders:
Miles to Go Before They Sleep, (4) Osama bin Laden’s Spectre, (5) Intelligent
Intelligence, and (6) Standing Shoulder to Shoulder: Implications for the UK. One
article from each group was chosen as an exemplar to provide the best
example of the textual features of that particular category. Each group was also
tracked to chart the output of articles in each category to determine if the
concerns developed in each content category remained steady, rose, or fell
over the course of the year. By doing this, we hoped to track how the important
features of 9/11 changed (if they did) over time. Finally, the distribution and
average of historical references was charted by content category to determine
which categories provide the richest sources for historical analogies, and which
textual themes most lent themselves to historical comparisons.
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Salient Figures

Three independent raters were asked to select salient figures of speech
(e.g. metaphors, similes, hyperbole, etc.) in each leader to discover what
terminology was being coined to describe the events of 9/11 and the post-9/11
world. By finding salient figures, we also were quite likely to find novel figures of
speech, or figures that arose directly to depict 9/11 and were entirely new to the
language. We believed that through doing this we might be able to find
patterns of meaning that were being reflected at the basic word level of written
language. All raters had been previously trained to recognize figures for the
sister project focusing on The New York Times, designed by Pollio, et al. (In Press),
using the definitions developed by Pollio, Barlow, Fine and Pollio (1977) to teach
raters a broad variety of figurative usage. Once framed, raters independently
identified all figures of speech in the 45 leaders from The Times; each rater also
selected 15 figures from each leader he or she considered to be the most
noteworthy, and, therefore, most salient. From these groups of 15 figures chosen
from each leader, only those selected by 2 of 3 or 3 of 3 raters were considered
for further scrutiny. Trends were identified among the figures of speech that
appeared in the leaders by the team leader in consultation with other members
of the team (and sometimes others outside the team with previous experience in
recognizing and coding figural terms). Certain figures of speech, for instance,
clearly were comparing 9/11, and/or its after-effects, to games such as
“however fluid the chessboard now,” or scientific reactions such as “unleashing
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a corrosive cycle,” or even to dramatic motifs such as “centre stage.” As groups
began to appear, figures of speech were then separated into the 14 categories
that emerged from the body of research, establishing the broad figural domains
that helped to establish the ways in which figures of speech were being utilized
by editorialists to convey specific messages concerning the events of 9/11. The
14 categories were named (1) Civilised World, (2) Language, Literature, and
Drama, (3) Characters, (4) Change and Time, (5) Medicine, (6) Games, (7)
Science and Engineering, (8) Vision and Shadow, (9) Body, (10) Nautical, (11)
Rooting Out and Closing In, (12) Terrain, (13) Responding to Danger, and (14)
Natural Disasters.
A final step involved calculating the mean and standard deviation of the
number of salient figures per article and then correlating these numbers with the
number of words per article to yield a rate of measure. Ideally, this correlation
would demonstrate whether or not there was a clear connection to the number
of salient figures we gathered from each leader to the number of words in that
leader. Through this figure, the team hoped to learn if the impact of salient
figures was affected by the length of the text.

Themes

Lastly, a thematic analysis attempting to synthesize the body of
information already developed was performed across the 45 leaders. With
historical, textual, and figurative categories already in place, each article was
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reconsidered in terms of the overall thematic interpretations emerging from
previous coding of historical, textual, and figural effects, as well as from a re
reading of the leaders. For instance, since there were historical references to the
Cold War, a number of textual discussions reminding readers of successful and
disastrous Cold War approaches to problems similar to 9/11, and, finally, a
number of metaphors emerging from Cold War events, individuals, or ideology,
could we say that there was an overall theme running throughout the leaders
that surfaced at least in part from of our understanding of the Cold War?
Adapting integrative techniques described by Pollio, Henley and Thompson
(1997), thematic analysis focused on discovering patterns of meaning emerging
from the description of human experience that appeared in the leaders.
Realizing that as individuals who experienced some part of 9/11 it would only be
too easy to impose what we knew to the text, it was necessary to develop a
system for evaluating data that helped us to recognize whatever preconceived
notions we had about the event, and suspend them from the evaluating process
whenever possible. By focusing on the descriptive language of the leaders
through a bracketing procedure, it was possible to focus on the descriptions in
the leaders themselves instead of imposed theoretical frameworks raters brought
to their reading. We could, in that sense, develop our understanding of what
was happening in the leading articles of The Times by looking at what appeared
in The Times. The group felt able to approach the meaning that developed from
the text because we looked at what was coming out of its content, historical
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references, and salient figures, and how they were directing an audience’s
response.
To be able to do that appropriately, while avoiding imposing meanings
onto the text, the team leader for The Times of London discussed themes that
emerged from the data with the team leader The New York Times, along with
others, including the team leader for Sega, taking a close look at the texts with
an eye toward always backing up suppositions with evidence arising directly
from the texts. This small, hermeneutic circle of researchers (most of whom were
members of the larger research group) seemed to provide an independent,
external auditing voice for the process. The result was that I was allowed to
present tentative interpretations of the data with which the group could interact,
evaluating whether my interpretations were supported by the relevant texts. In
the leaders from The Times (as well as the other papers in the group), these
thematic interpretations were examined not simply to determine the frequency
with which certain themes were mentioned, but rather recurring patterns of
meaning and how those patterns focused the readers’ understanding of the
meaning of 9/11 as put forth by the paper, in tandem with the prior examinations
of historical, textual, and figural categories.
Each editorial was reexamined after the coding of content, historical
references, and salient figures to determine remaining elements in play. First, the
content, historical references, and salient figures for each article were
reconsidered to discover what elements, if any, appeared throughout these
three areas. If a particular element appeared throughout, then it was noted as
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a potential theme. If that element lent an additional level of understanding for
the entire article by clarifying, enriching, or synthesizing the textual, historical, or
figural concerns of the editorial, then it was tagged as a theme. In most
instances, this was the case, and themes were derived from the common
concerns shared by content, historical references, and salient figures. At the
same time, particular attention was paid to elements that appeared in multiple
editorials, but that seemed to be speaking specifically to The Times’ audience.
These elements, often visual, theatrical, or pedagogical in nature, appeared to
be almost moral-like, or aphoristic, as though this was the nugget of meaning The
Times hoped the readership would take and consider independently.
Because the team was looking not only at individual texts but also across
the body of texts and across the body of data already gleaned, the themes
elucidated could adequately describe experiential patterns by linking together
separate areas of the texts which exhibited experiential relationships with one
another. This part-to-whole approach, including the historical, textual, and
figurative data into this process of determining thematic interpretations, led to a
highly integrated thematic structure which described experiential patterns and
interrelationships among the themes emerging from the leaders.
In the case of the Cold War question noted earlier, for example, the
question was not could there be a theme, but what was the meaning of a Cold
War-related theme? For example, a theme did surface that allowed The Times
both to reference the Cold War as a guide, but also to focus more directly on
how this new notion of war after 9/11, waged by entirely new enemies with a
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previously unimaginable design of war, was extraordinarily different from the
Cold War and all other wars preceding it. Probing the language of the leaders,
the group finally decided to use a play on a phrase first used by Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and picked up by The Times. The response to 9/11
represented “a new battlefield” and “a different kind of conflict” (“This Is a World
War,” 2001), with new enemies and tactics, and even a new concept of the
theatre of war. The group decided to call this particular thematic category, that
reappeared throughout the leaders, “New War/New Kind of Enemy,” after a
term The Times coined to describe the difficulties of anticipating the varieties of
complications this new approach to waging war would present (“It Won’t Be
Quick,” 2001).
Once themes were set, the group felt the need to quantify just how the
various parts of the overall thematic structure existed concurrently, so the
connections between themes were charted, noting co-occurrences shared by
the various themes. Since any one leader could show evidence of more than
one theme, each leader’s thematic elements were noted. Each time a
particular thematic combination occurred (whether individually, or in various
groupings), it was listed. At the end of listing all of the themes that appeared in
each leader, it was possible to see the thematic combinations which had the
strongest links, and which appeared most frequently across the body of leaders.
By doing this, it was possible to understand how these themes really worked
together to form a coherent, developing whole that provided an overall
structure for the leading articles.
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At that point, five individual thematic domains—(1) New War/New Kind of
Enemy, (2) Duty/Appeasement, (3) Civilised/Uncivilised, (4) Before/After, and (5)
Vision/Shadow—were developed into an overall model structure for the leaders,
based on the strength of their common links. Themes that often appeared
concurrently were grouped near each other in the model, so that a strong
connection between those particular themes was visually evident. Since each
of the individual themes appeared concurrently with the theme of
Civilised/Uncivilised, that theme was given prominence in the model, marking its
position as a thematic anchor.
Taken collectively, these interlinked, themes required a ground to
complete the frame. The ground of the overall structure was determined by
examining how each of the themes was discussed by themselves and in
conjunction with others. In this case, the themes gave focus to the ways in which
The Times seemed to hope its audience would view two specific elements that
characterized the experience and meaning of 9/11. First, a concern with Time
developed as a contextualizing ground given the extraordinary spotlight The
Times gives to viewing any individual event in its proper temporal context.
Indeed, The Times takes careful note of the connection it draws between “The
Times” (the present), and “Times Past” and “Future.” Time was very much an
experiential ground, one that focused on how individuals were living through the
events of 9/11 and their aftermath. Secondly, History developed as a second
ground, one obviously connected to Time. With History, The Times aimed to give
individual lived experience a more formalized structure, and History became the
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means of describing 9/11 as an event happening collectively, one generally
acknowledged by civilised institutions. History, therefore, was symbolic of an
individual memory of 9/11 being transformed by collective memory that large
numbers of people acknowledge, thereby lending that memory a shared
meaning across Western culture.

Rhetorical Analysis

Where this particular study takes a step away from the larger group’s
research on the post-9/11 editorials is in its rhetorical focus on narrative style.
Because the core of both the American and Bulgarian research groups is
psychological in nature, they chose not to develop the rhetorical implications of
their data. My background, however, as a person coming from rhetoric,
linguistics, and history, led me to consider more deeply the rhetorical implications
the data might support. When the research group for The New York Times
concurred with Lule’s (2002) assertion that the structure of these editorials
(specifically reflective editorials) held the form of an epic narrative, we began to
look for similar patterns in other sets of editorials. Until we examined The Times of
London, however, The New York Times appeared to be unique in terms of
employing a narrative structure. Once The Times of London began to show
evidence of resembling a drama in much the same way that The New York Times
resembled an epic, I decided it would be highly instructive to conduct a
rhetorical analysis of The Times of London.
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In addition to the hermeneutic steps outlined previously that follow along
the original, psychological framing for the overall project, this study also included
a rhetorical analysis of the leaders from The Times of London. The analysis
focused specifically on the narrative framework, using Burke’s Pentad (1969),
discussed earlier. The Pentad provides a guide to order the rhetorical setup of
the editorials in the paper, demonstrating how the leaders were framed in a
dramatic or narrative way, breaking down elements of the paper into the
Burkeian categories act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose. These categories
help to frame the readers’ understanding of events, and therefore provide a
story or performance-like narrative for the audience.
Since one research question—How does language act as both symbolic
action and collective therapy in these editorials and how are those two functions
interrelated?—focuses on language as symbolic action and the other—How do
metaphor, memory, and narrative intersect to create meaning?—focuses on a
method of developing meaning through narrative, Burke’s ideas seemed an
effective way to round out the earlier research that is more psychological in
nature. Once the data analysis for The Times was finished, I took a closer look at
both papers to see whether they matched up with the act, scene, agent,
agency, and purpose ratios of the Pentad. With figural and thematic elements
already in play, this turned out to be a question of matching figural and
thematic elements to various Pentadic ratios. Both papers figurally personified
cities, countries, and organizations into agents, as though they were individuals
instead of more nebulous groups of people. Both also spent a great deal of time
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developing the scene of attack or the scene of battle. Without question, both
papers spent a great deal of time describing the acts involved in the attacks
and their consequences, even at times going so far as to make them figural
actors, as well as defining the purpose of such action and its justifications.
Perhaps most interesting, however, was the way in which the papers described
agency. In a narrative sense, both papers made figural the many modes of
agency at work in the post-9/11 world, for instance, from healing a body to
playing a game to picking up President George W. Bush’s sense that searching
for al-Qaeda was like going on a hunt.
Once various parts of Pentadic elements were identified, the rhetorical
analysis basically consisted of simply putting such component parts together as
a kind of script with its various motifs and sub-themes, a process that entailed
drawing from the historical, textual, figural, and thematic elements that were
already part of the research. Characters emerged from discussions of individual
agents or of things personified, while plots developed from discussions of acts
and the agency through which they were being undertaken, particularly by the
West, and the purpose for which they were embarked upon. Finally, scene
emerged from visual descriptions appearing in the texts, usually (but not
exclusively) associated with acts.
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The Elusive Identikit of Terror Is Filling Out
Chapter 3: Results

Overview

Since this project is part of a larger study, progress on the data for The
Times of London was regularly compared to data previously gathered in other
parts of the study. This resulted in a data set that benefited from what the
earliest studies in the project gathered. Nevertheless, to a great extent, what
each study sought to find was the same, and the search developed in largely
the same way.
Completing the project using earlier studies as models provided one very
central benefit: the framework of these earlier studies provided the key concepts
on which this analysis focused by cross-referencing several varieties of data.
Historical references tracked the way The Times used history to bolster a point.
Content categories traced the reporting of the news The Times highlighted in its
leaders over the course of a year. Novel figures of speech underscored the way
The Times chose to characterize 9/11 at a very basic discourse level. And
themes allowed for the possibility of synthesizing textual, historical, and figural
data into coherent interpretations of how to understand the events of the
period. These four parts of the study illuminated the view that The Times took
when underlining the meaning of 9/11. Each area yielded strong data with a
variety of topics for study on its own. Taken together, this data yielded
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something a bit more intriguing—strings of data that appeared to be traveling
through multiple sets.
For instance, after September 11, the notions that we had been tempered
by fire and changed, or that 9/11 was a turning point in history, representing a
change in our sense of time, emerged not only in figures of speech. They also
emerged in direct comparisons to historical references, such as Pearl Harbor or
the adoption of the Truman Doctrine in response to the spread of Soviet
communism.1 At the same time, however, this change in our sense of history also
made a clear impression in the textual concerns of The Times. Several articles
argued that 9/11 was “the day that changed the modern world” to the extent
that 9/11 marked a change in all manner of daily life, politics, economics, and
culture. Finally, this change in our sense of time emerged as a way for The Times
to frame our point of view of events as those happening before or those that
could only happen after 9/11, or even more precisely, the way we understand
that certain events must happen after 9/11.
As more and more results came in, it became apparent that the more a
feature turned up in the various data, the more certain it was that The Times was
using that feature as a critical means for understanding 9/11 and its aftermath.
These cross-referencing features acted as the bedrock for anchoring each of the

Pearl Harbor is more specifically linked to the notion of our being “tempered by fire and
changed” through 9/11, in the sense that the attack on Pearl Harbor involved a
bombing, but also that it marked the entry of the United States into World War II, just as
9/11 marked an aerial attack and an entry into the War on Terror. The sense of the
events of 9/11 as a “turning point in history,” meanwhile, linked up with the notion of the
Truman Doctrine as an endeavor by the West to fight, in part, the spread of an ideology,
just as the 9/11 and the subsequent War on Terror spurred an effort to fight, in part, the
spread of Islamic fundamentalism.
1
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data sets, providing critical links between categories, and therefore, the critical
links The Times chose to draw between 9/11 and its place in the larger sweep of
historical time and in the cultural milieu of the West. Subsequently, in many
cases, these features became key figures in a rhetorical analysis, providing
crucial connections between present data and Burke’s Pentad.
The earliest step involved distinguishing a body of articles most related to
9/11 from the larger group of 251 articles immediately identified as having
something to do with the broad notion of terror. The group of 45 leaders that
ended up comprising the main body of data surprised us in a number of ways.
First of all, simply because given the size of the original sample, we expected a
larger number of 9/11-specific leaders. Upon reexamination, the most common
trait of these leading articles began to emerge: The Times of London produces
leaders that are complex, laden with historical and metaphorical figures that ask
the audience to connect whatever the subject of that particular leader is to
other subjects, both historical and current. So quite often, “terror” was a
secondary concern of a leader that was more concerned, for example, with
Chechnya or the Middle East, without necessarily being directly related to 9/11,
even though the constructed spectre of 9/11 was evident. Once these leading
articles were charted across time, the shape of the curve revealed that the
frequency of output of these 45 leading articles (see Figure 1) over the course of
the year was highly front-loaded, with the vast majority (36 of 45) of these leaders
appearing in the first two months after 9/11.
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During this two-month span, the 9/11 attacks themselves are discussed,
and also the first major phase of the conflict in Afghanistan takes place. The
remainder of the leaders generally revolve around three main themes: (1) an ongoing need to develop an effective intelligence and security apparatus to
protect citizens and interests throughout the world (Leaders 37, 43 and 44); (2) a
reflective instinct that asks the audience to reassess the meaning of 9/11 given
what we know at a given point in time (Leaders 38, 41 and 45); and (3) concerns
regarding the end of the conflict in Afghanistan as well as a combination of
elements from the other two groups (Leaders 39 and 42). The remaining leader
(40) concerns problems arising in developing a memorial to firemen in New York
City.

Reflective, Prescriptive, Descriptive

Once it was clear that the alpha value assessing the interrater reliability of
the reflective (story-like reflections on the meaning of 9/11), prescriptive (policyoriented prescriptions for what ought to be done in response to 9/11), or
descriptive (describing or summarizing events surrounding 9/11 in terms of “what
we know so far”) character of the leaders was very low, at 0.50, a concern arose
over whether or not to develop that part of the analysis further. The first step in
making that decision involved determining what data we had. In terms of
numbers, as Table 1 demonstrates, the reflective, prescriptive, or descriptive
characterizations of 30 articles was agreed on by all three readers, with another
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Table 1. Rates of Editorial Appearances by Reflective, Prescriptive, or Descriptive Type
Reflective
3/3 Readers
2/3 Readers
Totals
Percentages

Prescriptive

Descriptive

Uncategorizable

5

26

0

N/A

1 (d)
1(p)

7 (d)

3 (p)

N/A

7

33

3

2

15.6%

73.3%

6.7%

4.4%

10 agreed on by 2 of 3 readers, leaving only 5% of articles uncategorizable.
However, the numbers fail to present a clear picture of these ratings. On
discussion, each rater expressed the difficulty with which he or she chose a
category—a problem far less prevalent during comparable ratings for The New
York Times, The Washington Post, or El Mundo. For many leaders, in fact, raters
were willing to change their original rating to match up with other raters. But
despite the convenience of having the alpha value rise, ultimately, it was
decided that sacrificing a higher alpha value for a broader discussion of the
rhetorical qualities of the leaders that led to the difficulties in making the
reflective, prescriptive, and descriptive distinctions was a preferable option.
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Content of Leading Articles

After delineating how leading articles fell into the reflective, prescriptive,
and descriptive categories, a next step toward understanding how The Times of
London became aware of the meaning of 9/11 rests in a description of the
content the paper’s editorial writers decided to cover. Overall, each of the 45
leading articles fell into 1 of 6 categories. Figure 2 provides a clear accounting
of the textual interests of each of these categories. Each leader is listed by
category in terms of its position in the set of 45, and then is followed by a brief
description. Exemplary articles that provide the best examples of textual frames
and constituent features for each category are in bold.
These categories represent the major subjects The Times developed over
the course of the year, and the titles of these categories emerge from the
language of The Times. More importantly, these six categories represent a first
glance at what topics The Times felt were important enough to cover in
extended depth. The first two categories, The Day That Changed the Modern
World (Category A) and With One Voice: We Are All Americans (Category B),
both discuss 9/11, its overall meaning in the sweep of history, and the powerful
possibilities it has given the world (especially the West) for banding together in a
post-Cold War era. The real difference between the two categories lies in their
framing focus: Category A observes that 9/11 symbolizes an irrevocable
change, a rift in time, while Category B notes that 9/11 represents a unique
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Category A: The Day That Changed the Modern World
1) 9/11 is the day that changed the modern world
25) Universal gaze has turned towards New York—Statesmen today are blinded by the
explosions in America—Life will not return to normal until their vision is restored
41) World is transformed—Decisions yet to come will be immeasurably harder
45) Hands on clock have barely moved since 9/11—Legacy of 9/11 rests in three theatres
(America’s relationship with the rest of the world; Islam’s attitude toward the remainder
of humanity; and the central structure of the international system itself)—Innocence and
indulgence ended on 9/11
Category B: With One Voice: We Are All Americans
2) We are all Americans—9/11 assaults are an attack upon all—Tragedy for America
could be a turning point for the world—Instinctive global coming together in solidarity
with the dead—America can build on and sustain that sympathy
3) The world must reject terror with one voice—9/11 was never an American catastrophe
but the world’s—There is no middle way between the terrorism of 9/11 and the free world
12) Never before has the world felt itself to be such a global village—Terrorism is a
leveler—World waits for dust to settle
33) Send a message understood by millions—Voicing America’s and world’s contempt
for the terrorists—New York rally is a massive and modern defiance
Category C: This is a Long World War Without Borders: Miles to Go Before We Sleep
4) History demands we not shirk this slow, deliberate test of strength—Make the price of
terrorism unbearable
5) This is a world war—Americans must temper use of force with shrewdness—We must
refuse to let 9/11 push country into recession—War is a new battlefield and a different
kind of conflict
6) Mount the leadership campaign against invisible enemy without borders
7) Pakistan is in grim political position—Sheltering terrorism means facing penalties—
continued sheltering of terrorism will hasten the isolation and disintegration of Pakistan
8) We must act with speed not haste—America’s reach needs to be equally long as the
terrorists’—West must outmatch the terrorists in having the will to prevail
9) Businesses are economic victims of terrorism—Governments must move to limit the
damage triggered by 9/11 on markets—Economic cavalry needed from US and Europe
14) Financial crisis means snatching defeat from the jaws of any military victory—
Collapse of World Trade Center should not mean collapse of world trade
15) This is a long war with decade as timeframe—US and allies must convince everyone
that the world is utterly changed—This war is an ambitious campaign waged the world
over—Mobilisation is gathering pace
18) It won’t be quick—This war defies traditional response to attack—Now is a time for
steady nerves and precise actions
19) Place layer upon layer of global support on NATO core and the other close allies
20) Pragmatic layering of decisions needed to cooperate flexibly—War script must
constantly be rewritten
28) Nerve needed to break cycle of Middle East from feeding on fear
30) There can be no backing away—Afghanistan is one corner of a worldwide canvas
Figure 2. Leading Articles from The Times of London Categorized by Content
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31) Need to keep resolve to win battle for public opinion, not just military battle—We
must ignore defeatist chorus at home
38) This does not feel like war—This struggle is frustrating for civilians because there
cannot be a clearcut military victory, and because it is so much less clear what
individuals can do—September 11 has put Americans back in touch with that “date
which will live in infamy”
39) We must win the peace—There can be no premature embrace of an illusory
peace—The military has miles to go before they are spared to carry blankets
40) al-Qaeda may base its specious philosophies on racial lines but Americans should be
colour-blind—Injustice being done to this uniquely courageous urban army becomes
clearer if one tries to reverse the ethnic model
42) US must not feel constrained to act by the concerns of others but would still work best
in concert with a coalition—Thwarting threats of “mass terror” has become the absolute
essence of American foreign policy
Category D: Intelligent Intelligence
10) Air safety is an immediate concern
22) Intelligence is badly needed and the most deadly new weapon the West can have
32) Airport insecurity is still the norm
37) Crash in suburban New York will reinforce sense of vulnerability—We must look again
at airline and airport security—This crash will challenge America’s leadership—We are
only now returning to normal life
43) Intelligent intelligence is badly needed—We need to rethink our means of gathering
intelligence if it is to be effective
44) Security means expect the unexpected, maintain vigilance
Category E: Osama bin Laden’s Spectre
16) bin Laden is Taleban’s official guest—Taleban is playing out deadly farce—Their
behavior underscores the utter necessity of this unwelcome war
21) Tourniquet is tightening on bin Laden/Taleban
26) bin Laden/Taleban are Afghanistan’s bane
29) Not a war in which you can negotiate—Osama bin Laden is an Ian Fleming-like villain
35) bin Laden’s spectre of nuclear terrorism hanging over world
Category F: Standing Shoulder to Shoulder: Implications for the UK
11) Terror is growing in the West—We need Patriot Act-type measures in the UK—Terrorism
should have no hiding place
13) Britain should not extinguish all signs of normal political life
17) Britain girds against present danger—We must find the proper balance between
standing shoulder to shoulder abroad and thwarting sleeper cells at home in the UK
23) Find balance between determined deployments against terrorists abroad versus
desperate confusion at home—London is the terrorist haven of Western world
Figure 2, Continued.
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24) How do we defend the UK?— We should take every reasonable precaution and
some that would be considered unreasonable in normal times
27) Fatwa on terror is needed from British Muslims to stand up and say that terror is not the
way of Islam and make their revulsion explicit —West has no quarrel with Islam
34) Battle does not have a finite point—Blair fully committed to phase one, but future
phases must be preceded by process of deliberation and consultation
36) Blair’s shuttle diplomacy designed to forge new community of nations
Figure 2. Continued.

chance for the civilised world to show solidarity and transform America’s
“tragedy” into a turning point for the world.
The third, and largest, category, This Is a Long World War Without Borders:
Miles to Go Before We Sleep (Category C), focuses on the War on Terror, how it is
being waged, as well as how it should be waged. With special focus on the
broad, hard-to-define nature of the conflict, these leading articles pay particular
attention to the War’s effect on financial sectors and specific nations, the
importance of international public opinion towards it, and the duty the
Americans and NATO allies have to wage it. At the same time, this category,
perhaps more than any other, epitomized the struggle raters had in judging the
difference between reflective, prescriptive, and descriptive categories. Though
the content of these leaders was often very prescriptive, the tone often tended
toward the reflective or emotional, particularly when the paper reminded
readers of the West’s duty to fight this war.
The fourth category, Intelligent Intelligence (Category D), deals exclusively
with the premium placed on intelligence in this new war by reacting to the fact
that the West was caught brutally unprepared on 9/11. Highly prescriptive and
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demanding that the West must be savvy about how it gathers intelligence, not
depending too much on any one source or method, Category D’s last
appearance concentrates on the importance of maintaining vigilance despite
reaching the end of the war in Afghanistan.
The fifth category, Osama bin Laden’s Spectre (Category E), begins to
profile bin Laden and his sympathizers in the Taleban regime and elsewhere,
developing his seemingly larger-than-life qualities, identifying him as the kind of
villain Ian Fleming might have created as a foil for super agent James Bond.
Category E, however, also calls into question the nature of the Taleban regime,
labeling its behavior in the period between 9/11 and the beginning of the war as
farcical as well as menacing.
The sixth, and final, category, Standing Shoulder to Shoulder: Implications
for the UK (Category F), asks the same question all Western democracies did
after 9/11—what does 9/11 mean for us? In the case of the UK, of course, the
Prime Minister’s promise to “stand shoulder to shoulder” with the United States
throughout the War on Terror lent that question special importance in The Times.
As a result, Category F took pains to describe what was needed from the British
government and its citizens to fulfill duties at home and abroad while carefully
balancing the tensions between freedom and privacy on the one hand and
secrecy and security on the other.
Table 2 presents a tracking of the appearance of each of the content
categories throughout the entire corpus, with groups I-IV representing the first 11
leaders (I), second 11 (II), next 11 (III), and the final 12 (IV). The purpose of this
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Table 2. Frequency of Content Categories Across Time

Category A:
The Day That Changed the
Modern World
Category B:
With One Voice
Category C:
This Is a Long World War
Category D:
Intelligent Intelligence
Category E:
Osama bin Laden’s Spectre
Category F:
Standing Shoulder to Shoulder

I
1-11
9/12/019/19/01

II
12-22
9/19/019/28/01

III
23-33
9/29/0110/22/01

IV
34-45
10/25/019/11/02

1

0

1

2

4

2

1

1

0

4

6

5

3

4

18

1

1

1

3

6

0

2

2

1

5

1

2

3

2

7

Totals

analysis was to see whether or not there were clear trends in the concerns of the
editorialists at given times throughout the year, and to see whether those trends
(if indeed they existed) were consistent with the political and social decisions
being made at the time. The Day That Changed the Modern World and With
One Voice, although low in absolute number, seemed to appear more or less
evenly throughout the year, particularly when taken in tandem. Feelings of
international camaraderie (With One Voice) were slightly more important
immediately after 9/11, and the feeling of a rift or stoppage in time appeared
nearer to the end of the year, when the impetus to move forward, away from
the events of 9/11 themselves, had slightly greater value.
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As the largest category of articles, This Is a Long World War tracks right
through the entire course of the year, without many significant gaps in the
corpus, though once the war in Afghanistan ends, the focus clearly shifts away
from thoughts of war. At the same time, bin Laden’s Spectre, concentrating
solely on bin Laden and his Taleban allies, reveals a surge during the middle of
the corpus, particularly as the war in Afghanistan ends and the hunt for bin
Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders picks up.
Intelligent Intelligence and Standing Shoulder to Shoulder, which focus
most of all on long-term policy concerns, emerge most strongly when the need
for changes or redefinitions in policy becomes more imperative. Looking at the
intelligence apparatus, Intelligent Intelligence turns up briefly at the beginning of
the year, when 9/11 first happens with no warning. Not unsurprisingly, Intelligent
Intelligence emerges in full force only after the initial shock of the day died down
and voices throughout the West began to ask the question, How could 9/11
happen? Similarly, as the shock and sympathy of the British people and
government began to shift towards a policy of close and continuing work with
the United States and others during the war in Afghanistan and the subsequent
hunt for bin Laden, Standing Shoulder to Shoulder emerges. It remains a concern
of the editorialists through the end of the year, after the war in Afghanistan had
for the most part ended, and the truly long-term national and foreign policy
concerns began to take shape.
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Historical References

The first point at which the leading articles in The Times of London make a
truly radical departure from their counterparts in the reflective articles from The
New York Times comes with the enormous attention the writers in London pay to
historical precedent. As shown in Figure 3, The Times of London included 160
historical references in the 45 leading articles, including 35 articles with
references and 10 without references. Also of note are the large spikes in the
number of references in articles 1, 5, 29, 31, and 38. Though the first four articles
are rather long—over 1,000 words in each—article 38 is below mean length, with
only 519 words. Article 1 deals directly with the 9/11 attacks, and with 15
historical references, makes a strong attempt to connect these attacks with
some previous experience in whatever ways are possible, even if these
connections, by admission, come up short. Article 5 builds the case for war in
Afghanistan, paying close attention to the history of war in the region as well as
to the laws of warfare, to define the right to go to war and to describe potential
strategy. Article 29 develops an understanding of Osama bin Laden and the
American and British attempt to capture him, while also taking a closer look at
how the “special relationship” between the US and UK since the days of
Roosevelt and Churchill is playing out in this new conflict. Article 31 presents the
case for continued vigilance and war-time footing, despite the fact that the
ground war in Afghanistan is ending. Article 38, falling on December 7, is a direct
comparison between the effects the attacks on Pearl Harbor on December 7,
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1941 and on New York City, Washington, D.C., and rural Pennsylvania on
September 11, 2001 had on the American consciousness.
No historical references occur in articles 7, 10, 13, 25, 27, 30, 32, 37, 42 and
43. In each of these cases, the articles are rather short, but the overriding factor
appears to be contextual rather than simple length. These articles fall into one of
three categories: how modern Islam and Islamic nations must respond now (7,
27); how the West must respond now (13, 25, 30, 42); and how we must secure
our future now (10, 32, 37, 43). In each case, the focus lies in a decision that must
be made or in a policy that must be changed immediately in which the correct
mode of action is so obvious to the editorialists that there is no need to dwell in
the past to understand the choice. The leading articles of this group are usually
short and clear and discuss post-9/11 concerns such as air safety or intelligence,
usually noting on a basic level that we need tighter air safety or better
intelligence. The articles with more historical references usually discuss issues that
are more complicated, or at least that are presented in a far more complicated
and extensive manner, in which the paper feels a clear need to justify the
position that it takes.
More important than individual numbers, however, is the simple fact that
The Times of London presents a strongly historicized account of 9/11 and its
aftermath. In this sense, there is a contrast to its counterparts in other parts of the
world. The Bulgarian daily, Sega, which published 43 editorials, for instance, only
made 29 historical references (Stoitsova, et al., In Press). The New York Times,
publishing 20 reflective articles and 79 prescriptive articles, produced 94 total
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references, with another 6 references noted, but debatable (Pollio, et al., In
Press). To be sure, since a decision was made during the gathering of references
to collect any possible historical reference, the total number might ultimately be
somewhat inflated. Nevertheless, The Times of London’s 160 historical references,
by the calculus of simply comparing the three papers to each other, is quite
different. While the New York writers of the 20 reflective editorials with which this
current study is most linked are largely focused on the current moment,
concerned as they are with healing their city and citizens, and using only 4
historical references, the writers in London place greater importance in
connecting 9/11 to the past, as well as in considering its importance for present
and future decision-making.
Considering the number of historical references in The Times of London,
examining the eras and topics they repeatedly referred to is pivotal to
understand how history was being used. Pointedly, as shown in Table 3, The
Times relied on the history of the modern period, primarily drawing on the
examples from the post-World War II era. Though the Ancient and Pre-World War
II eras2 received attention, The Times clearly did not use them as frequently as
references to the post-9/11 era. Only references to the ancient, mythical Hydra
stand out as significant in addition to these two time periods. While the number
of entries for the World War II era (24) seems low compared to the number of
references used from later in the 20th century, these references take on a slightly
2 References from the Ancient period included examples such as Psalms, Jeremiah,
ancient Rome, or Greek mythology; while references from the Pre-World War II period
included examples such as the Enlightenment, the Thirty Years’ War, the Barbary States,
or Shakespeare.

70

Table 3. Historical Eras Represented
Historical Era

Appearances

Percent

Ancient to Middle Ages

8

5%

Pre-World War II

21

13%

World War II

24

15%

Post-World War II to 9/11

107

67%

different meaning when one considers that The Times places so great an
emphasis on the 12-year period comprising the World War II era, compared to
the decades and centuries comprising each of the other three periods.
At this point, it was necessary to determine which specific historical events
The Times chose to relate to 9/11 and its aftermath. When viewed by group in
Table 4, the World War II era references (with the sub-group, Pearl Harbor, which
notably shows up 11 times on its own, the most of any single event that fell into a
larger category) becomes a far stronger source of history for The Times, providing
the largest number of references if taken by group. At the same time, the
collection of the First Gulf War, the Cold War, previous terrorist attacks for which
the al-Qaeda organization was culpable, and the very recent, European, and
NATO-led Kosovo campaign demonstrates the importance of the post-World
War II era in The Times’ understanding of how the West should deal with alQaeda after 9/11.
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Table 4. Specific Historical References by Group = ≥ 3
Historical Reference

Appearances

World War II

24

Pearl Harbor

10

Gulf War/Kuwait

16

Cold War

10

JFK/Cuban Missile Crisis

3

Kenya/Tanzania Bombings

6

USS Cole Bombings

3

Kosovo

3

Hydra

3

Table 5, meanwhile, provides a broader understanding for the kinds of
events The Times dealt with to provide an historical framework for understanding
the 9/11 age. Largely pointed towards World War II through contemporary
times, only three references to the Hydra and two references to the Thirty Years’
War stand out in the historical timeline The Times develops. The remaining
examples for the most part fall under the categories outlined in Table 4, with
World War II, the Gulf War, the Cold War, Kosovo, and previous al-Qaeda events
represents again in large numbers.
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Table 5. Historical References by Category = ≥2
Historical Reference

Appearances

Gulf War/Kuwait

16

Pearl Harbor

10

Kenya/Tanzania Bombings

6

Cold War

4

World War II

3

JFK/Cuban Missile Crisis

3

USS Cole Bombing

3

Kosovo

3

Hydra

3

Franklin D. Roosevelt

2

Bill Clinton’s decision not to take Osama bin Laden
(1998)
Margaret Thatcher (Relationship with Ronald Reagan
during the bombing of Libya in response to 1986 Berlin
bombing and Gulf War alliance with George Bush)
Ronald Reagan (1986 bombing of Libya)
Vietnam Conflict

2
2
2
2

George H. W. Bush (41)

2

Chechnya

2

Masood Assassination

2

Israeli/Palestinian Conflict

2

Slobodan Milosevic

2

Nazis

2

Thirty Years’ War

2
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In Figure 4, the number of historical references is tracked across the
various content categories, in order to help describe the kinds of content most
related to the use of historical citation. In The Day That Changed the Modern
World, With One Voice, and This Is a Long World War, historical references
appear quite often, and at relatively the same frequency. Intelligent Intelligence
also shows a fairly high frequency of historical references. But in Standing
Shoulder to Shoulder, there is a clear drop, and with bin Laden’s Spectre, the
appearance of historical references is less that 1 per article.
What Figure 4 reinforces is the strength of the links between historical
references and content categories. In the report on content categories, it was
noted that The Day That Changed the Modern World proposes that 9/11
represents a rift in history. At the same time, With One Voice encourages a post9/11 solidarity in the historically-allied West. In both cases, The Times clearly
orients commentary historically, drawing on common threads of Western sociocultural, political, and religious history to answer why this time and this war are
truly different and why the nations of the West must join together to survive. This
Is a Long World War and Intelligent Intelligence, meanwhile, lay the groundwork
for a War on Terror—a war on a tactic and an emotion, as opposed to a war on
a country or group of countries. This treatment demands some historical
precedent to make that case effectively, and demonstrate how the traditional
rules of engagement have been adapted in similar cases. But, even bin Laden’s
Spectre, drawing a profile of bin Laden and the Taleban, and Standing Shoulder
to Shoulder, reporting the questions the British have about their lives in the post-
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Standing Shoulder
to Shoulder

9/11 world, have to rely on history to make the profile complete and the
reporting accurate, largely because decisions concerning present policy issues
must be made within the context of the actions and orientation of the past.

Salient Figures

Once raters selected the figures of speech, those that were chosen by 2
of 3 raters as most salient for each of the leading articles were then compiled
into a single list. Overall, 543 figures were identified as salient, with a mean value
of 12.06 salient figures (SD=1.97) per editorial. Because editorials were of
unequal length, ranging from a high of 1853 words for Leader 45 to a low of 359
for Leader 12, with a mean length of 779.71 words (SD=388.17) per article, the
relationship between the number of salient figures chosen by raters and the
number of words per leading article was correlated. The value for this
correlation was r(43)=-0.59; (p<0.1), suggesting that as the length of the article
increased, the likelihood of finding salient figures decreased. This is possibly the
result of cutting off the number of figures the raters chose at 15, favoring the
shorter article, instead of raising the limit, which might have favored longer
articles.
The more important results, however, are related to the figurative domains
that emerged out of the leading articles and how they organize themselves into
distinct categories. Overall, there were 14 figural categories, several of which
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were interrelated. Table 6 lists the 14 categories of salient figures that emerged
from the data along with their total number of appearances in the body of
articles. All of the 543 salient figures that emerged from the data were able to
be coded into one of these 14 categories. Note that these totals sometimes
include the same figure twice. For example, “tempered by fire and changed” is
counted both in Category 4 and 7 because it is both a metaphor representing
change and also the reactive properties of heat.
Category 1, Civilised World, was defined by making distinctions of
modern/primitive, West/East, democratic/theocratic, and good/evil, as well as
having an underlying purpose of calling the modern, democratic West (and
countries elsewhere choosing to identify with it) to its honorable duty to defend
itself from a primitive, theocratic evil coming from the East. Arguing that the 9/11
terrorists envisioned a world “ruled by theocratic thuggery,” the post-9/11
“conflict without front lines” was being waged to “restore moral authority” in the
world, by confronting the “core of tensions between civilizations” of “fanaticism
versus freedom” and “tak[ing] up the cudgels against fear.” While the Islamist
“enemy was shorn of scruples” and “sworn to shred the fabric of freedom,”
America was “freedom’s home,” and justice was “civilisation’s most potent
weapon” in this “stand against [the] terrorist menace” in which the “world
divides into two camps.”
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Table 6. Categories of Salient Figures by Total Number of Appearances
#

Figural Categories

Total Appearances

1

Civilised World

96

2

Language, Literature, Drama

79

3

Characters

74

4

Change and Time

55

5

Medicine

48

6

Games

44

7

Science and Engineering

43

8

Vision and Shadow

43

9

Body

33

10

Nautical

21

11

Rooting Out and Closing In

18

12

Terrain

18

13

Responding to Danger

17

14

Natural Disaster

10
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In Category 2, Language, Literature, and Drama, the focus of the figures is
not quite so clearly intended to rouse the public as are the metaphorical terms in
Category 1. The implied directives of the category, however, replicate many of
the foundations of western literary, rhetorical, and dramatic thinking. From the
ancient rhetorical stance that a statesman who could use language well was
also a good model for citizens, the leaders take note that before 9/11 the
“President use[d] words like pieces of wood,” but became a more effective and
attractive leader once he “found his voice and hit his stride.” At the same time,
the articles underscore the importance of narrative frameworks in our ability to
understand the world around us, noting that world leaders are actors “in a
drama whose first act is unfolding,” even as the “Taleban is playing out a deadly
farce.” Meanwhile, language plays a central role in how the War on Terror must
be fought, since “careless language costs lives” and the West must work hard to
“dispel absurd conspiracy theories circulating” and “hone the rhetoric of
readiness.” Finally, this category allows The Times to allude to literary figures
themselves, providing ever-important links from what we already understand to
what we are desperately trying to learn. The Times asks that we shake the
Shakespearean impulse to “call spirits from the dusty deep” in an effort against a
villain “straight out of an Ian Fleming story,” in order not to be “overcome by the
same jaundice as Jeremiah” as the “bells tolled” for the victims of the attack
from the “enemy within the gates.”
In much the same way, the main thrust of Category 3, Characters, reflects
the literary and rhetorical complexity The Times brings to these articles. Given the
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extensive number of figures used to conjure a dramatic sensibility in Category 2,
Category 3 develops a highly personified notion of the various world leaders
(and bodies) in the forefront of the post-9/11 world, picking up on the notion that
world leaders are actors in a “drama.” To a great extent, the Prime Minister starts
this figuring process, assuring Americans early on that the British are “standing
shoulder to shoulder” with their American allies. In that sense, “Britain has shown
a deft hand and a resolute eye” as the “West plans retaliation,” and “America is
crouched,” while the “Taleban hurls defiance.” As the al-Qaeda “terrorist
Hydra” survives in some form after the initial attack on Afghanistan, The Times
becomes more concerned about a shift in the “American national mood” and
“America’s will.” Still, it is quite proud of “Britain’s solidarity” with the States even
though “Britain is as alone as after the fall of France,” while “Europe’s solidarity
with the United States melts into nothing.”
Taking a turn less involved with the narrative elements of the 9/11 story,
Category 4, Change and Time, deals exclusively with 9/11 as a rift in history, a
point at which the world is “tempered by fire and changed” and there is “no
going back to life before.” All our assumptions “turn upside down,” as our “old
habits” and “laxity of the past” become “glorious mundanity” in the
“abomination’s wake.” In this way, “September 11 shattered [our] innocence.”
The “world caught its breath in shock” in the “transformative moment” of this
“new kind of war” against a “new kind of enemy” that ushered in an era of
“permanent vigilance” which “swept every issue from the agenda” other than
the War on Terror.
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At first glance Category 5, Medicine, should resemble some of the most
important work The New York Times is doing with its metaphors of healing. Here,
the British do deal with the healing necessary in New York and America, and
indeed across the collective, Western psyche, noting that the “desire to restore
life to the city” was key to helping “economic victims of terrorism” and “halt the
collapse of the world economy.” At the same time, the “tragic side effect of the
attack on America” was strong enough that it is necessary to “lift the malaise
hanging over Western cities” and “restore the lifeblood of democracy,” while
“reviving something of New York’s bruised zest and gusto.” The British take is also
partly a commentary on the features of a successful prosecuting of the War on
Terror. In a war without obvious enemies, there is “pressure to alleviate the root
causes of terrorism” while at the same time avoiding “political headaches” that
are part of the cause of the “psychological blow struck by the terrorists.” The
answer lies in “surgical strikes” against terrorist “cells” that are “spawning” in the
“festering troubles of the Middle East” in order to “eradicat[e] the menace” of
terrorist regimes.
In a related sense, Games, Category 6, speaks to the skills necessary for
winning a war. First comes the warning that the West “must not shirk this slow,
deliberate test of strength” despite the fact that the enemy does not “play by
the book,” and instead must deliver a “riposte to the carnage visited on
America.” This war is a “marathon effort to rid the world of terrorist cells,” and
“however fluid the chessboard now,” the “diplomatic footwork” the West
displays will be vital when the world is “speculating on the war against terrorism.”
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Addressing the power sources of the conflict, the ferocity of the
anticipated conflagration, and the crucial speed in building an effective antiterror response is Category 7, Science and Engineering. The events of 9/11 were
“scorched into the collective consciousness” by a “true bolt from the blue” that
brought about a “wave of emergency legislation.” As a result, the “deadly force
of the express train bearing down” on the terrorists was a measure of the
“diplomatic momentum.” Nevertheless, it would be prudent not to pour “fuel on
flames of Islamic fundamentalism,” but instead to “galvanise public opinion” in
the Middle East and elsewhere, “build[ing] a military coalition” that allows a
“pragmatic layering of decisions” to “dismantle” the “apparatus of terror.”
Category 8, Vision and Shadow, takes a different tack, aiming to describe
al-Qaeda and its many lairs as well as reflecting on the scene of greatest shock
in New York. So as the “flush of horrified sympathy fades” it becomes clear that
“terrorism should have no hiding place” and no “muddied” or “fuzzy policies”
should allow the terrorists to “melt [sic] into the shadows.” The Times compliments
the Blair government in the days after the attacks, noting that as the “elusive
identikit of terror is filling out,” Britain has shown a “clear-sighted resolve.” But,
that to “uncover the network that made London the terrorist haven of the
Western world” the government must take a critical next step and avoid any
“tendency toward tunnel vision” while the “universal gaze is turned toward New
York.” “Shadowy al-Qaeda” still lurks, with a “spectre of nuclear terrorism,” and,
therefore, any so-called peace before that spectre is lifted is “illusory.”
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Category 9, Body, meanwhile, returns The Times to a personifying motif in
which various players (individuals or not) in the post-9/11 world are actually
bodies operating with the day-to-day habits of human beings. The “evil we saw
strike at the heart of the United States” was “at the heart of the conspiracy” to
level a “terrible blow” against Western economic well-being. As such,
“immediate steps” need to be taken to insure that industry can “recover some of
its position” of the pre-9/11 landscape. In the meantime, finding those who
“slipped between aliases,” requires a “level-headed response” and an answer
from Muslims in kind when Christians “speak of extending the hand of tolerance.”
For an island nation, of course, Nautical metaphors permeate the
language, as reflected in Category 10. Terror undoubtedly poses a threat to the
ship of state, since “terror rots the timbers on which civilisation rests.” To “stiffen
response” for the “long haul,” the West has been “called to the colours,”
because the United States “will not fire more than a warning shot or two.” To the
Prime Minister’s credit, meanwhile, he “saw his duty” and “his course was fixed,”
as he helped to put the “bin Laden network in a state of disrepair.”
Category 11, Rooting Out/Closing In, aims to describe the “hunt” for alQaeda and the environments in which it takes place. It is important, therefore,
“to cut off any room for manoevre” as the “murderous networks are hunted
down.” Not only does the West need to “build a diplomatic fence around
Afghanistan,” it also needs to “root out the terrorists in our midst” so that it is
possible to “close the gaps in this unconventional, common front” and set about
“tackling the root causes of extremism.”
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Directly related to the “rooting out” in Category 11, is the importance of
Terrain, the subject for Category 12. In the “treacherous political terrain” of the
post-9/11 world, countries supporting terrorist groups find themselves in a “grim
political position,” while the countries surrounding Afghanistan represent a
“perilously unstable launching pad” for the allied thrust into the region, even
though the “world stands edgily at the brink” of war. Managing the
“treacherous Afghan wastes” of a “countryside alive with al-Qaeda fighters” will
take time, so that in the hunt for al-Qaeda, “as networks regroup, the trail may
go cold”.
The picture of the West Responding to Danger, Category 13, presents a
dire scenario, in which the West desperately needs to awaken to the dangers of
the 9/11 age. In order to “mount the leadership campaign,” the West needs to
demonstrate it has the “character to rise to the challenge” after so many “met
terrible deaths” on 9/11. In the aftermath, there are “bargains to be struck” and
the “enemy of my enemy should be courted” if we are to avoid the “horrors of a
full-scale nuclear attack.”
Finally, Category 14, Natural Disaster, describes the overwhelming scene
in New York on 9/11 and the continuing threat. On 9/11, New York “suffered an
urban avalanche.” In “sifting the rubble mountain,” rescue workers and
investigators worked in a “noxious covering of dust and ashes.” Now the “world
waits for the dust to settle” after the “spate of attacks.”
Within each of these categories, the importance of civilisation and the
civilised world is emphasized. Very often, the salient figures are used either to
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draw a contrast between the civilised and uncivilised world, to cultivate the
importance of a civilised concept of duty, to propose methods for a civilised
response to 9/11-style terror, or to describe how extreme, uncivilised behavior
alters our notions of time itself.
Taken as a whole, figural categories represent elements of Burke’s
dramatistic Pentad, in various ratios. To a great extent, the figurative results were
the first that pointed towards the possibility of an overarching dramatic structure
in the leading articles because of the significant concentration of literary,
dramatic, and personifying, character-driven figures. These figures appeared to
lay down a basic set of characters, in the Characters and Body categories, and
a scripted plotline, mostly developed in the Language, Literature, and Drama
category, in which various acts and agencies arose to drive the plot forward in a
carefully described set of scenes with specific purpose.
The most pervasive Burkeian ratio representing a merging of dramatic
elements is the act/agency ratio, which appears in Categories 5 (Medicine), 6
(Games), 7 (Science and Engineering), and 11 (Rooting Out and Closing In),
defining the action and how it was taking place. Three other ratios make three
appearances. Purpose characterizes Categories 1 (Civilised World) and 4
(Change and Time), which outline the reason to fight al-Qaeda. Act/agent
surface in Categories 2 (Language, Literature, and Drama) and 9 (Body),
developing the interaction between characters and plot. Finally, scene
emerges in Categories 12 (Terrain) and 14 (Natural Disaster), setting the scene of
the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent battle sites. Four other categories
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meanwhile show evidence of distinct ratios that appear only once. Agent in
Category 3 (Character) identifies the actors. Drawing the scene’s relationship to
plot action Scene/act is Category 8 (Vision and Shadow). Purpose/act/agent in
Category 10 (Nautical) delineates the connection between plot action, the
means of carrying out the plot, and duty the characters have to follow through.
Lastly, the very unique act/attitude in Category 13 (Responding to Danger)
explains how the West has reacted to the challenges of September 11.
An ability of language to lend order to events that occur outside our
traditional scope reinforces the dramatic rendering these figurative categories
represent. But at the same time, figures of speech would also appear to possess
their own dramatic component, and function in ways that are similar to the
narrative properties usually associated with prose. That being said, if in
comparing figurative results to thematic results several of the same dramatic
properties appeared, the dramatic nature of The Times’ response would
strengthen this preliminary evaluation, and bolster the case that The Times makes
an argument in its response to the events of 9/11 that is indeed dramatic in
nature.
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Thematic Results

A total of five themes were identified from the data: (1)
Civilised/Uncivilised, (2) Before/After, (3) Duty/Appeasement, (4) New War/New
Kind of Enemy, and (5) Visible/Shadowy. Together, these themes represent the
underlying currents driving the perspective through which The Times would like
readers to understand 9/11, including the policy decisions politicians make, the
value system that is the foundation of the West and its institutions, the way the
West sees (and must see) the world after September 11, and, finally, our concept
of historical time.
In effect, tracking themes allowed me to look across and through all of
the data for patterns of meaning that permeated the group of texts. At the
same time, underscoring themes is a deep sense of what The Times would like
the audience to take away from the texts in developing a meaning for 9/11. As
patterns began to emerge from the data, the understanding The Times was
working out started to take shape, and notions about how the world organized
itself in terms of time and space, Orient and Occident, were set to change.
To illustrate the theme of civilised and uncivilised worlds, Table 7 provides
a selection of excerpts from leaders tabbed in whole or part as connected to
this theme; it also presents a breakdown of notable thematic features
demarcated in each excerpt. As might be expected given the importance of
civilisation in the figural results, a major thematic meaning emerging from the
data concerned a clash between the civilized, democratic West and the
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Table 7. The Civilised/Uncivilised Theme
Theme
Civilised/
Uncivilised

Excerpt
This attack was, as Tony Blair says, not
against America alone but part of a battle
between terrorism and the entire free world
which can be met only by standing
shoulder to shoulder. Mikhail Gorbachev
famously said that in ending the Cold War
he was doing something terrible to the
West, depriving it of its enemy. The enemy
today is Moscow's, Western Europe's,
America's and the law-loving world's.
Against this monstrosity, the grandest of
coalitions must be forged if evil is not to
prevail (“Terror for All,” 2001).

Thematic Features
 Terrorism vs. the
entire free world
 The enemy vs.
Moscow,
Western Europe,
America, and
the law-loving
world
 Monstrosity/evil
vs. the grandest
of coalitions

Washington and the West must establish
beyond doubt that the civilised world is
able and determined to defeat religious
extremists and aggressive dictators
anywhere that they arise, particularly in the
Muslim world, where bigotry, fanaticism
and religious hatreds against the West sit
too easily alongside the gentler arts of
reason (“Still the Enemy,” 2001).

 Civilised world vs.
religious
extremists and
aggressive
dictators

This was never an American catastrophe
but always the world's. It is the world's
literally as well as metaphorically. The silent
dead of many lands will speak to that truth;
their countrymen must hear them. We are
all counter-terrorists now. That cannot be
repeated too often by the politicians we
trust to defend our freedoms. And they will
need to muster all their eloquence
because this will be a war of attrition,
costly, long and full of risk, against fanatics
within the gates (“With One Voice,” 2001).

 The world vs.
fanatics within
the gates
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 Bigotry,
fanaticism, and
religious hatreds
vs. the gentler
arts of reason

Table 7, Continued.
Theme
Excerpt
Civilised/
The Prime Minister. . . has been helped in his
Uncivilised
role by a powerful personal conviction that
truth must grapple with falsehood to
prevail and that civilised values, when
delivered with his own brand of charm,
have the best possible chance of
prevailing. . . .
September’s tragedy. . . has made possible
the forging of a new "community of
nations" able to defend the institutions of
freedom. . . . There are values of civilised
society; it is not an arrogance to assert
them, but a necessity. (“The Blair Shuttle,”
2001).
The size of the contingent within either the
community of Islamic scholars or on the
streets who have felt able to ask
themselves whether Islam would be well
served by a revolution in thinking - similar to
that experienced by the Christian Church
through the Reformation or for the Jewish
faith courtesy of an Enlightenment - is tiny.
It is this unfortunate state of affairs, not
globalisation or any other trend that may
be connected with America, that is at the
core of the tension between civilisations
(“One Year On,” 2002).

Thematic Features
 Truth vs.
falsehood
 Authors of
September’s
tragedy vs. new
community of
nations

 Islam with no
Reformation and
Enlightenment
vs. Christianity
and Judaism
after having the
Reformation and
Enlightenment

uncivilized, theocratic terrorist havens. At the same time, the content categories,
With One Voice and Standing Shoulder to Shoulder, were re-emphasized here,
as the question of who was represented in the civilised world and what that
representation implied was answered. This structure also gave ample
opportunity for the development of historical references that re-drew alliances
and reinforced alliances already struck, while playing out the ages-old
understandings of “us vs. them” and “East vs. West.” In some form, this theme
anchored all the others, and certainly was the overarching theme appearing in
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The Times. Though the theme represented slightly different meanings in different
contexts throughout the course of the year, it underlay almost all of what The
Times published and framed what was written.
A second major theme in much of The Times’ treatment of 9/11 and its
aftermath concerns 9/11 as a rift in time, or as The Times puts it in the first article’s
very first line, 9/11 is “The Day That Changed the Modern World.” Such a day,
quite obviously, is very rare; when it occurs, the consequences are epic, for good
or bad, and a thorough change in our perception of history results in a beforeand-after dichotomy. On a day like 9/11, all experience is described as being
part of a world before the event occurred or after, noting the change in time.
Reflective of the figural category, Change and Time, as well as historical
referencing of other events that marked dramatic changes in our perception of
when historical eras begin and end (for instance, the American entry into World
War II after Pearl Harbor), the thematic structure Before/After focused on how
time itself seemed to change after that September morning, and how the West’s
self-narrative had to shift. Table 8 breaks down this Before/After theme in some
detail.
Another significant theme, particularly given the paper’s focus on
Civilisation, is that the civilised West has a clear duty to answer uncivilised
terrorists forcefully. Any other behavior smacks of appeasement, of the former
Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, as he signed away parts of Czechoslovakia
in order to ensure “peace in our time.” Figurally, Nautical and Games
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Table 8. The Before/After Theme
Theme
Before/After

Excerpt
[The United States] will fight as a nation
grimly conscious that it has been tempered
by fire and changed, perhaps for ever, by
the ordeal. The psychological impact will
be greater than that of Japan's destruction
of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and will
reach far beyond America's borders. By
comparison with yesterday's smashing of
hijacked American aircraft into American
targets, Pearl Harbor was easy to
understand; it was for most Americans at
the edge of their world. Yesterday there
came a true bolt from the blue, aimed to
humble the heart of the nation (“Terror for
All,” 2001).
"Human kind / Cannot bear very much
reality", wrote T.S. Eliot, a poet whose most
celebrated work closes with the spectacle
of the towers of the civilised world
plummeting to the earth. There was much
that was unbearable in the reality of the
last week. Words and images are scorched
onto the collective consciousness,
replayed in flashback to a newly insomniac
world. We still see the bodies pressed
against skyscraper windows or caught in
obscene free-fall; we still imagine the
airline passengers learning that their
slaughter would itself be used as a
weapon. The poignant simplicity of so
many valedictions. Never before has the
world felt itself to be such a global village a village on the southwestern tip of
Manhattan, a few blocks northwest of Wall
Street (“Dig Deep,” 2001).
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Thematic Features
 The US was
tempered by fire
and changed by
the ordeal
 Yesterday there
came a true bolt
from the blue; by
comparison, the
destruction of
Pearl Harbor was
easy to
understand

 Much was
unbearable in
the reality of the
last week
 Words and
images are
scorched onto
the collective
consciousness,
replayed in
flashback to a
newly insomniac
world
 Never before has
the world felt
itself to be such
a global village

Table 8, Continued.
Theme
Before/After

Excerpt
Six months ago on Monday, the world
caught its breath in shock, disgust and
fear, transfixed by the attacks on America.
Nothing was known of the enemy beyond
the appallingly, graphically obvious: that
these were well-organised terrorists who
were ruthlessly contemptuous of life, their
own along with that of the civilians
trapped with them in the hijacked aircraft
and their victims on the ground. They had
inflicted unimaginable carnage,
deliberately indiscriminate. The attacks
revealed, as they were intended to do, the
vulnerability not only of the world's greatest
power but of every society in which
fanatics were at liberty to circulate. It was
an attack on freedom itself (“A World
Transformed,” 2002).

Thematic Features
 Six months ago,
the world caught
its breath in
shock

This then is the paradoxical conclusion on
September 11. In a vast number of ways
that contribute much to the conduct of
life, it has altered very little. In a small
number of extraordinarily important
spheres, it may change everything. We are
only at the beginning of the attempt to
understand what this will demand of
capitalist democracies such as the United
States and the United Kingdom. In that
sense, while it is September 11, 2002 today,
the hands on the clock have barely moved
since September 11, 2001 (“One Year On,”
2002).

 September 11
may change
everything in
extraordinarily
important
spheres

 The attacks
revealed the
vulnerability of
every society

 We are only
beginning to
understand what
[9/11] will
demand of
capitalist
democracies
 The hands on the
clock have
barely moved
since September
11, 2001
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metaphors appeared, as well as figures of Civilised and Uncivilised worlds. This
theme was also rich in historical references, as it forcefully struck the same notes
Prime Minister Churchill did after the fall of France in 1940, when he called
upon the British people to brace themselves to their duties and stand up to an
enemy that aimed to break the foundations of civilised society, thrusting it into a
new age of darkness. This Duty/Appeasement theme, developed in Table 9,
surfaces throughout the year, particularly in the lead-up to the war in
Afghanistan, but also later, once the fiercest fighting had slowed and the world
began to work its way back to normal again.
The fourth theme emerging from the data, and presented in Table 10, rose
from the War on Terror itself, or as The Times described it, “a new kind of war
against a new kind of enemy.” This theme paid attention exclusively to the war
and its many, often non-traditional, fronts, concentrating not just on military
efforts, but also on the importance of waging a multi-dimensional conflict. Since
al-Qaeda aims to disrupt the world economy and institute an Islamist theocracy
throughout the historical realms of the Islamic world, The Times widened the
scope of the battle for the West beyond the need for sheer military might. New
War/New Kind of Enemy picked up a variety of figural categories, with
metaphors of Science and Engineering, Medicine, Games, Rooting Out and
Closing In, and Responding to Danger having particular importance, while
historical references were quite broad, drawing especially on the history of World
War II and the Cold War to provide contrasts. Finally, like the content category,
This Is a Long World War Without Borders, the topics of this theme recognize that
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Table 9. The Duty/Appeasement Theme
Theme
Duty/
Appeasement

Excerpt
This is a tense time for the world and a time
for steady nerves and precise actions. It is
right that the United States should punish
the Taleban for refusing to hand over Bin
Laden and that it should go into
Afghanistan to seek him out. It is right that
the training camps and terrorist
infrastructure should be destroyed. . . . This
is a war without end and a war that we
can never be certain we have won. Even
after cells have been smashed and there
has been peace for many years, nobody
can be sure that another terror movement
will not emerge. That, however, should not
deter the West from the long, hard struggle
ahead because the alternative is too awful
to contemplate (“It Won’t Be Quick,”
2001).

America bears the greatest burden of
leadership, but Britain's interests are just as
fully and directly engaged in this struggle.
Many Britons were killed in New York; this
was the deadliest ever terrorist attack on
British citizens. But Mr. Blair is right that this
would be Britain's fight even if not one
British person had died. The national
interests of this country are directly
engaged, because at stake are the lives
and livelihoods of all. There is no backing
away—and no scope for failure (“Another
Front,” 2001).
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Thematic Features
 This is a time for
steady nerves
and precise
actions
 It is right that the
US should punish
the Taleban, that
training camps
and terrorist
infrastructure
should be
destroyed
 The threat of
terror should not
deter the West
from the long,
hard struggle
ahead because
the alternative is
too awful
 The national
interests, lives,
and livelihoods
of all are at stake
 There is no
backing away—
and no scope for
failure

Table 9, Continued.
Theme
Excerpt
Duty/
Liberals should be cheering that America
Appeasement
has irrevocably accepted its obligations as
the world's only superpower. They should
welcome an allied strategy whose aim is to
inflict minimum civilian casualties and give
Afghans a new start to free them from
perpetual civil war and a regime that
subjugates women, denies human rights
and rules by theocratic thuggery. Those
who doubt the outcome are the real
isolationists. This war is winnable and the
West has the resolve, whatever the
domestic panics to come, to achieve it
(“The Defeatist Chorus,” 2001).

When the flames came from the World
Trade Centre, it is said to have taken Tony
Blair no more than minutes to see his duty.
It was clear to him that he should give the
United States Britain's full support in what
would surely be a wearying war against
the common terrorist enemy. Even had so
many British citizens not been among the
dead, his course was fixed (“A Man Alone,”
2001).

Thematic Features
 America has
irrevocably
accepted its
obligations
 Allies aim to give
Afghans new
start to free them
from perpetual
civil war and a
regime that
subjugates
women, denies
human rights
and rules by
theocratic
thuggery
 The West has the
resolve
 Blair took no
more than
minutes to see his
duty
 Blair knew he
should give full
support in a
wearying war
against a
common enemy
 Blair’s course was
fixed
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Table 10. The New War/New Kind of Enemy Theme
Theme
New War/New
Kind of Enemy

Excerpt
As political leaders work to overcome the
obstacles to military and diplomatic
success in the war against terrorism, it is
vital that the avoidance of a serious
economic slump is never far from their
minds. A financial crisis bringing economic
ruin to millions would be a terrible blow to
the global capitalist system and a triumph
for those out to destroy it in any way they
can. It would snatched defeat from the
jaws of any military victory the free world
won. . . . The collapse of world trade would
bring almost as much satisfaction to the
terrorists as the collapse of the World Trade
Centre. It must not be allowed to happen
(“It’s the Economy, Still,” 2001).
But whatever action America and its allies
take against bin Laden's Afghan lairs, that
will be a foretaste only of a vastly more
ambitious campaign, waged the world
over. The US is preparing, and mustering
allies in every quarter it finds them, even in
Sudan and Cuba, for a new kind of total
war, one that takes into account all forms
of human organisation from banking to
intelligence, from weapons proliferation
and organised crime to poverty and its
relief. In this campaign classic war fighting
may have an occasional role only;
terrorism's underground forces will be
fought where they operate and with
methods that are anything but
conventional. And it will be a long war
(“Long War,” 2001).

Thematic Features
 Economic
slump/financial
crisis would
snatch defeat
from the jaws of
any military
victory
 The collapse of
the World Trade
Centre must not
bring about the
collapse of world
trade

 Action taken
against bin
Laden’s Afghan
lairs will be a
foretaste only of
a vastly more
ambitious
campaign
 US is mustering
allies in every
quarter, even in
Sudan and
Cuba, for a new
kind of total war
 In this campaign,
classic war
fighting may
have an
occasional role
 Terrorism will be
fought with
methods that are
anything but
conventional
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Table 10, Continued.
Theme
Excerpt
New War/
This is not to imply that all and any "enemy
New Kind of
of my enemy" should be courted, let alone
Enemy
trusted; the mistakes the West made in the
1980s in arming Afghans against the Soviet
Union, and Iraq against Iran, must not be
repeated. But it does point to a pragmatic
layering of decisions to co-operate flexibly
on the basis of common aims that may shift
in the course of the long campaign ahead.
What will be required is not a coalition but
a palimpsest, a political, military and
intelligence-sharing script that is constantly
rewritten (“Palimpsest,” 2001).

No intelligence-gathering operation will
ever be comprehensive, just as no building
can be wholly secure. The essence of
security, however, is permanent vigilance
and re-examination of old assumptions. No
senior intelligence officer should be relying
on tried and tested methods. The confusion
in America is a warning to all Western
intelligence services; they should pay
critical and concentrated attention to an
unclear and present danger (“Intelligent
Intelligence,” 2001).

Thematic Features
 This war requires
a pragmatic
layering of
decisions on the
basis of common
aims that may
shift in the course
of the long
campaign
 A political,
military and
intelligencesharing script
that is constantly
rewritten is
required
 The essence of
security is
permanent
vigilance and reexamination of
old assumptions
 No senior
intelligence
officers should
be relying on
tried and tested
methods
 The West should
pay critical and
concentrated
attention to an
unclear and
present danger
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this War on Terror is going to end neither quickly nor easily, but will morph from
one military, economic, and cultural front to another.
The final theme, Visible/Shadowy, is the one least interlinked with any of
the others, and the one that appears most infrequently, though it appeared
often enough and with sufficient clarity to present a striking theme. Presenting
an embodied means to make sense of 9/11 and the subsequent War on Terror,
Visible/Shadowy is very closely linked to its figurative counterpart category, Vision
and Shadow (see Table 6, p. 78 ). While textually linking up with Osama bin
Ladin’s Spectre and The Day That Changed the Modern World, this theme is
geared very much in the present and future, and therefore, its historical
referencing is weaker than other themes. This theme focuses on the pivotal
place of intelligence in this war, what we can and cannot see, what is
democratic and open versus what is criminal and shadowy, and most
importantly, what we are prepared for and what we cannot yet imagine. Table
11 presents this thematic category.
These five themes do not occur one by one. Quite the contrary, they
often overlap and co-occur, and create layered patterns of meaning that
stretch through the leading articles. By tracking their co-occurrence, one finds
clues toward each theme’s larger contextual framework. Linking them together,
especially with the figural, historical, and textual elements that provide thematic
building blocks, helps to shape The Times’ understanding of 9/11. Moreover,
considering that two of the most important figural categories—Language,
Literature, and Drama and Characters—appear across all these themes, and are
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Table 11. The Visible/Shadowy Theme
Theme
Visible/
Shadowy

Excerpt
[T]here is no single stroke that will slay these
invisible enemies, no one riposte that will
“take out” this threat. Effective mastery of
this terrorist network—and the one
certainty is that many people are
involved—will require a changed attitude
of mind to every aspect of civil as well as
military security (“Terror for All,” 2001).

Thematic Features
 No single stroke
will slay these
invisible enemies

The elusive identikit of terror is filling out.
American negotiators came away
yesterday from talks in Pakistan with
agreement to co-operate in tracking down
bin Laden and a mass of valuable data on
Taleban garrisons and equipment,
weapons dumps and the airstrips where it
keeps its small airforce. . . . The moment
intelligence coalesces there will be a swift
spring. America is crouched (“Crouch,
Spring, Crouch,” 2001).

 The elusive
identikit of terror
is filling out

Not only have the freedoms of Western
societies been used to mask a terrible
conspiracy of destruction, but those
employed to guard these freedoms have
signally failed to do their job. The worst
lapses have been in intelligence and
counter-intelligence. . . . Hindsight
underlines blame but clarifies the need for
action. . . . And Parliament must look hard
at what legislation, now hampering
investigations, may need to be suspended
or repealed. A new war demands new
weapons. Intelligence is by far the most
deadly (“Intelligence Needed,” 2001).

 Freedoms of the
West have been
used to mask a
terrible
conspiracy of
destruction
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 The moment
intelligence
coalesces there
will be a swift
spring

 Hindsight
underlines blame
but clarifies the
need for action
 Parliament must
look hard at
legislation

Table 11, Continued.
Theme
Excerpt
Visible/
Like the rest of the population, politicians
Shadowy
have responded with a tendency towards
tunnel vision, despite the best efforts of the
media to continue to draw their eyes to
the rest of the world. Even where journalists
have been able to keep attention
focused, action in these countries has itself
diminished, as the universal gaze has
turned towards New York. . . . For President
Mugabe, the atrocities in New York have
been convenient. Not only have they
eclipsed reports of continuing violence
against white farmers and his
determination to ignore the undertakings
given by his negotiators in Nigeria; they
have also led to the cancellation of next
week's Commonwealth Heads of
Government Meeting in Brisbane. . . .
[S]tatesmen today are blinded to other
issues by the explosions in America. Life will
not return to normal until their vision is
restored (“Tunnel Vision,” 2001).

Thematic Features
 Population and
politicians have
responded [to
9/11] with tunnel
vision, despite
the best efforts of
the media to
draw their eyes
to the rest of the
world
 Even where
temporarily able
to keep attention
focused, the
universal gaze
has turned
towards New
York
 Statesmen today
are blinded by
the explosions in
America
 Life will not return
to normal until
their vision is
restored
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not intricately interwoven with any one of them, this points again towards a
dramatic sensibility translated across the themes, as though the whole body of
text can be taken as a kind of script with its own meta-theatrical elements.
Table 12 charts the co-occurrence of themes, and presents the total
number of appearances each theme makes. The two most frequent themes are
New War/New Kind of Enemy and Civilised/Uncivilised. The next two themes in
line, Duty/Appeasement and Before/After, also represent themes that The Times
took very seriously. The difference between these two separate groupings results
from the number of times that each of these four themes appeared in
conjunction with other major themes. New War/New Kind of Enemy showed
evidence of overlapping with each of the other themes, though
Civilised/Uncivilised and Duty/Appeasement were natural thematic
counterparts, since both of those latter themes flowed directly into the aims and
impetus for waging the war.
Civilised/Uncivilised and Before/After both occur with three other themes,
and particularly with each other, appearing nine times in conjunction, the most
frequent of any co-occurring theme pairs. This common co-occurrence suggests
that our understanding of what civilised and uncivilised signify was considerably
challenged by the events of 9/11, and that in its wake, we could define ourselves
or others with those terms in quite the same way. At the same time,
Civilised/Uncivilised and Before/After also appear evenly with other themes,
corresponding to the large number of salient figures that appear in the Civilised
World and Change and Time figurative categories (see Table 6, p. 78).
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Table 12. Co-Occurrence of the Five Major Themes
Duty/
Appeasement

Civilised/
Uncivilised

Visible/
Shadowy

New War/
New Kind
of Enemy

Total

2

0

9

2

3

16

x

4

6

0

6

16

X

X

3

0

6

24

Visible/
Shadowy
(6)

X

X

X

1

3

6

New War/ New
Kind of Enemy
(22)

X

X

X

X

8

26

Theme

Before/
After

Before/ After
(13)
Duty/
Appeasement
(14)
Civilised/
Uncivilised
(19)

Duty/Appeasement only occurred with two other themes, representing a
case in which a theme’s overall track is highly concentrated in a few areas. In
each case, those links were significant, since in each group its appearances
occurred almost equally. It also defines the role The Times expects the British
notion of duty to play in this conflict. Knowing one’s duty is critical in wartime in
the face of the intense pressure to perform at critical moments, and in this socalled new kind of war, one without traditional rules or boundaries, duty can still
be a constant. At the same time, the British notion of duty is intricately
interwoven with the British notion of what constitutes civilised society; to be
civilised is to do one’s duty.
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Finally, the theme of Visible/Shadowy occurred six times, primarily in cooccurrence with Before/After or New War/New Kind of Enemy. Given these
numbers, thought was given to calling Visible/Shadowy a sub-theme. Instead,
the appearances of Visible/Shadowy were deemed so striking as to require a
separate thematic category, despite its relatively small frequency of
appearances.
Taken together, the interconnection between themes can be
characterized by a gestalt relationship, visualized as a geometric figure
grounded by an awareness of time and history. Representing the five themes in
this way emphasizes not only the importance and clear identity of each theme,
but also the interrelated nature of the common themes and their overall
concern with temporal and historical contexts. This complete pattern, therefore,
describes an inclusive picture of the thematic understanding of 9/11 and its
aftermath that The Times of London developed in the course of 45 editorials
appearing in the year-long period following the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Figure 5 presents this understanding in the form of a geometric figure, a
pyramid, in which the center is defined by Civilised/Uncivilised, the theme most
central for understanding The Times of London’s overall thematic structure. At
the same time, the four corners at the base of the pyramid are defined by each
of the remaining four themes. Appearing against the combined background of
Time and History, all five themes are grounded temporally and culturally, by the
historical experiences of the British people.
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Duty/
Appeasement

Before/After

Civilised/Uncivilised

New War/
New Kind of Enemy

Visible/Shadowy

Time and History

Figure 5. Thematic Structure for The Times of London
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To put this understanding in clearer perspective, when The Times writes
about civilised and uncivilised worlds, it describes the civilised world as having
undergone a Reformation and Enlightenment that forever separated the
institutions of Church and State, implying that a civilised society requires such
separation. By contrast, in the dichotomy The Times develops, the terror-driven
uncivilised world still exists in the dark ages of history, unenlightened, unreformed,
and unrepentant for the strict religious fervour that drives its understanding of the
world. At the same time, Civilised/Uncivilised readily compares today’s enemy to
the enemies of the Cold War, which offer an historical context for this struggle.
The Cold War in many ways becomes the dominant metaphor to represent a
war of ideologies that the West fully understood. Unlike the enemies in the War
on Terror, the Soviet enemy wanted ultimately to survive; that war was about
expanding circles of power, not the seemingly indefatigable heart of jihad.
In the theme of Before/After, the historical contrast presented is Pearl
Harbor, and 9/11 is described as something having happened “never before.”
To that end, the overwhelming shock of 9/11, through its sheer power, forces us
to gaze over and over at the kamikaze airliners screaming into the Trade Center
Towers, almost as though if the day is “replayed in flashback,” we will ultimately
accept it as having been real. In this sense, time itself is demarcated by 9/11, by
“the reality of last week” so that something as simple as the thought of “last
week” becomes figural. Even a year later, “the hands on the clock have barely
moved since September 11,” as though time became frozen by that moment,
and has yet to fly again.
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When speaking of the contrast defining the theme of Duty/Appeasement,
more temporal emphasis is placed on the future, in the “long, hard struggle
ahead,” a “war without end.” Immediately recognizing the War on Terror as
something radically different than the West has experienced, The Times
nevertheless instantly understands that this war will not be quick. It will instead
require steady nerves and a fixed course, a clear resolve to see it through to its
bitter end. But time past is still evident, since it is our duty to “free [the Afghans]
from perpetual civil war.” In that sense, this war can become our instrument to
correct some of our more tragic mistakes.
The theme of New War/New Kind of Enemy develops in much the same
way as Duty/Appeasement, with a temporal emphasis on the future in which “it
will be a long war” and the “essence of security. . . is permanent vigilance.”
Time becomes a feature of this new war, as though the fight will in part be
against time, against growing distracted or weary as the permanence of war
bears its weight. The historical emphasis, meanwhile, rests on not repeating past
mistakes, as in arming the Afghan mujahadeen against the Soviets or Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq against Iran during the 1980s. Part of being vigilant, in the view of
The Times, is thinking long-term, of identifying far more frightening long-term
enemies from the ranks of myriad short-term allies.
Finally, the focus in Visible/Shadowy rests in our ability to look, in terms of
“hindsight,” for those to blame for the failures of 9/11. It becomes crucial not to
ignore our mistakes; it steers part of our duty to the dead and our continuing
struggle. But danger lies in our tendency to get stuck in that day, since “life will
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not return to normal until vision is restored.” Unless we can see what is coming in
the fog of this long war, we will suffer in its wake.
In terms of the overall rhetorical structure, the interconnections that
develop between the themes highlight Burkeian notions of ambiguity by
emphasizing the points at which themes, what Burke might call motives,
intersect. The trend, for example, of Civilised/Uncivilised and Before/After
working in tandem so often suggests that the underlying motives framing those
themes are merging, and in that way, transforming what either means on its own.
In the merging of themes, The Times seems to be creating specific frames for
understanding the various actors, actions, and motives behind the conflict.
As an illustration, the theme of Visible/Shadowy is not just an obvious
commentary on scene, but also on implied commentary of the agents, acts,
and their agencies involved—some are blind, some are hiding. The underlying
definition of duty in the theme of Duty/Appeasement, in its connection to the
New War/New Kind of Enemy theme, remains in line with our traditional, military
notions of doing one’s duty, and with an agent and his agency. But when
placed alongside the theme of Civilised/Uncivilised, that military definition
merges with a deeper sense of duty to one’s society, one that is more
interwoven with the larger, moral concerns of preserving the tenets of civilised
society, avowing an underlying purpose for the struggle. At the same time, the
interconnections between the theme of New War/New Kind of Enemy and each
of the other themes suggest that this war lurks at the fringes of many of the
critical ways we characterize ourselves. It will challenge our notions of
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civilisation, duty, and history accordingly, shaping our acts, our understanding of
the agents involved, the extreme agency they may sometimes choose, and
ultimately, their underlying purpose.
For The Times, references to time and history seem to represent a means
to locate 9/11 in the great sweep of Western civilization. Just as World War II did,
9/11 created a temporal rift in which every subsequent event will be marked as
happening before or after. In the same way, 9/11 represents an historical shift in
the way we think. Just as the Cold War changed the way we think about war or
the Reformation and Enlightenment altered our perception of religion and the
Church, 9/11 will change our conceptions even more, asking us to realign how
we respond to the pressing needs of military readiness, economic well-being,
diplomatic and cultural engagement, and religious conviction. In any event, all
of these concerns invite us to place the figure of 9/11 and its various thematic
meanings against the ground of time and history to enable us to make sense of
the event and its consequences.
To that end, the exceedingly strong link between Civilised/Uncivilised and
Before/After reinforces how critical our understanding of history is to our sense of
narrative reality whenever we find ourselves face-to face with a history-shaking
shift. On 9/11, all our pre-9/11 notions of civilisation came crashing down with the
Twin Towers; after that, not only was everything immediately different; it had to
be different. This thematic link suggests that the way The Times accounts for that
shift is in the symbolic linking of the terrorist attacks of September 11th to an
assault upon all of Western civilisation and its history through the rhetorical,
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thematic structuring it uses to symbolize the event. For the editorial writers of The
Times, the scene/act of the Towers falling, the agents who wrought their
destruction with such seemingly unpredictable agency, and the very purpose of
the attack merge so ferociously that their editorial pages must draw the
attention of their readers to that point. It marks a decisive shift in the West’s
awareness of its own historical civilisation.
Taken together, the themes and rhetorical stances developing in The
Times of London display a profound sense that the events of 9/11 represent a
significant alteration in the course of Western civilization, a fundamental change
in the way we understand historical patterns, and, finally, a paradigm shift in how
to interpret what we see happening in the so-called uncivilised world. At the
same time, The Times does not hesitate when calling on the West to fight the
most dangerous elements of the shift, noting that it is our duty to defend our
culture, heritage, and history, and also to redefine carefully and thoughtfully the
legacy we wish to leave after this long, world war. Ultimately, in their focus on
our temporal conceptions of reality, the themes of The Times reflect our sense of
history as narrative, as a collective set of stories told and re-told over the course
of time, begging us to learn from them. In this sense, 9/11 becomes a dramatic
turning point in our historical narrative.
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The Hands on the Clock Have Barely Moved
Chapter 4: Discussion

Overview

In the days immediately after 9/11, as the Western world reeled in shock
and terror, it quickly became aware that the symbol of the Twin Towers
crumbling signaled a profound change in the world order. The search for
understanding, for a way to make sense of what had happened and what it
ultimately meant, was just beginning. What was certain was that the West could
no longer look out at the Middle East as a troubled, distant place; the West had
to look in, because the trouble had come to it, broadcast live around the globe.
By September 12th, everyone knew the terrorists had ensured that the world was
now irrevocably different.
The editorial board for The Times captured this sentiment immediately;
9/11 was “the day that changed the modern world.” Unlike New York, London
was not a new-age Pompeii, buried beneath an “urban avalanche.” The
Londoners writing The Times enjoyed some distance. And with that distance, The
Times went to work. Acknowledging that New York and New Yorkers needed to
heal, having nearly suffocated in the rubble mountain, London could rally the
troops, define the long mission ahead, and prepare the West for its inevitable
riposte. As the United States’ longtime ally, the United Kingdom stood in a
position to share both the American grief (the second greatest number of
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casualties at the World Trade Center were UK citizens) and the battle it would
fight. At the same time, the UK was also the closest American ally, the nation
“best placed to whisper words in the right ears” (“The Old War,” 2001).
Across the Atlantic, The New York Times focused on the hole tearing
through the heart of the city and the growing vulnerability building up around it.
For the writers in New York, there would be no quick understanding of this kind of
attack; this was an attack on the collective, New York soul. The suffocating
smoke and ashes gave way to the million-ton pile in Lower Manhattan, a
continuously burning mountain of debris fueled by what remained of the World
Trade Center, and the victims who had been trapped inside. The memory of
person after person, plummeting from the top floors of the towers, lingered on,
and with each new disclosure of information about that day, their ghosts
reappeared. Victims’ postal codes were transformed into a kind of map of the
fallen, with the disturbing realization that most of the dead hailed from just a few
neighborhoods. The parts of the towers that were not reduced to rubble were
cared for as though they were fallen heroes, the assassinated sentries that had
manned the gates of Manhattan. Each grizzly corpse, or part of a corpse, was
treated to solemn funeral rites as it was carefully removed from the pile that
came to be known all too quickly as Ground Zero. Every holiday became a
reason to pause, to reflect on how strange this one felt compared to just a year
before, when the city was still bustling, blissfully unaware what fate held in store
on a crisp, September morning.
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New York also needed something to cling to, something to give shape to
the struggle ahead. Outside of the events of Pearl Harbor sixty years before, no
attack inside the mainland in American history provided even the remotest
parallel. New York—and the rest of America—searched for a frame of reference
to make sense of events and to define a common goal. What emerged in the
reflective articles of The New York Times, as a result, was an epic structure,
replete with a solid, archetypal foundation for traditional, epic storytelling (Lule,
2002; Pollio, et al., In Press). Lule noted four main themes in The New York Times—
(1) The End of Innocence (Everything Has Changed); (2) The Victims (We Might
Have Been); (3) The Heroes (amid the Horror); and (4) The Foreboding Future (as
Horrible as It Is to Imagine) (2002, p. 280). Similarly, Pollio, et al., mentioned four
related, reflective themes of their own—(1) Fracture and Division; (2) Death and
Destruction; (3) Consolation and Commemoration, and (4) America’s Strength
(In Press). Despite differences between the last figures in both groups, one that
Pollio explains by noting the difference in the temporal framework of the two
studies, what was amazing about these structures was that both notably lack a
theme for the villain. The New York Times instead rarely mentioned the villains or
a quest for vengeance, but instead “focused inward” on healing, emphasizing
“the sacrifice and suffering that had been and would be endured by the
American people” (Lule, 2002, p. 286). New York was simply not quite ready to
consider the bellicose vision of what would come next.
As The New York Times set about the process of healing the city, The Times
of London began to build the West’s argument for a massive counter-assault,
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one that took into consideration the variety of threats the terrorists posed and
the variety of vulnerabilities the West suffered. The Times struck upon the need to
“call spirits from the dusty deep,” but not to run headlong on “a fool’s errand,”
echoing the advice Shakespeare had offered almost 400 years before (“Replies
of Steel,” 2001). But this was no fool’s errand, at least where the hunt for Osama
bin Laden in Afghanistan was concerned. The fool’s errand to be avoided was
at home, where, in the hearts of the great democracies of the West, debates
would rage on, questioning for what price would this war be fought. The Times
remained convinced that democracy was something worth salvaging, that its
great, inherent debates must continue, but that it must not make shackles for
itself, hijacked from action by endless, indecisive debate. It was the West’s duty
to defend democracy, certainly. But it was also the West’s duty to rescue its
civilisation from the clutches of fanatics who acted most easily when the
mechanisms of democracy were mired in inactivity.
Specifically, The Times focuses on three key areas: (1) constructing an
historical case for war, with an eye to the theory of war developed by
Clausewitz, in which historical references provide the basis for the theme, New
War/New Kind of Enemy; (2) drawing a thematic parallel between the battles
the West, particularly the UK, was readying itself to fight in 2001 and 1940 through
the wartime speeches of Winston Churchill, in which there is a convergence of
historical references with the themes, Duty/Appeasement and
Civilised/Uncivilised; and (3) narrating a thematic and figural literary framing of
the events of 9/11 into a Shakespearan-style drama, taking a cue from Henry IV
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and Henry V. In this last section, the focus points of content categories provide
various exigencies for building the drama. In Burkeian terms, the purpose for
which the war is being fought develops from the five themes and the figural
categories, CIvilised World and Change and Time. The figural categories, Vision
and Shadow, Terrain, and Natural Disaster, along with the Visible/Shadowy
theme, set the various scenes of the war. The way that The Times personifies
agents driving the drama appears in the figural category, Characters. Finally,
the war responses to 9/11, and the means of carrying those responses out,
combine as act-agency ratios in the figural categories, Nautical, Medicine,
Science and Engineering, Rooting Out and Closing In, and Games.
Combining these three elements—the historical basis for the War on Terror,
the themes that define what The Times believes is at stake, and the narrative
framing of events through an historical, dramatic structure that underscores the
rhetorical discourse—allows The Times to develop a clear picture of the impact
of 9/11, what the War on Terror is about, how the West can best carry itself in
battle, and perhaps most importantly, how to win the day. Contrasted with what
was happening in New York, London steps into the debate ready to help its ally
emerge from the dust hanging over Manhattan and stand shoulder to shoulder
in a battle that The Times believes threatens the very foundations of Western
civilisation. As a result, The Times casts 9/11 and its aftermath as watershed
events, specific in their own time and circumstances, but ultimately, a conflict
undeniably linked to moments in history that, in threatening its survival, shaped
the Anglo-American world.
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The Reality of the Historical Past

Working with this awareness, The Times focuses its editorial approach on
laying out an argument for a firm, unyielding Western response to the attacks of
September 11. Understanding that this conflict would likely stretch the traditional
Western concept of war, The Times undertakes an historical explanation for the
reasons why the War on Terror is justified. The sheer number of historical
references The Times utilized reflects this aim, but more importantly, the kinds of
references they choose to highlight underscore the conclusions they draw.
For example, unlike the history of European warfare culminating in the First
World War, The Times concludes that the War on Terror would not be a war
fought because of territory, kingly power, or age-old alliances. As a result, The
Times never lingers for long in discussions of pre-20th-century Western history, with
only 29 of 160 total references coming from before World War II (see Table 3, p.
71), since that history does not accurately reflect the end goals of the War on
Terror. At the same time, despite al-Qaeda’s claim that it hopes to reestablish
the Islamic caliphate that ruled much of the world in the Middle Ages, The Times
views their ultimate aims quite differently, since the editorial pages do not
mention this period. For The Times, the phenomenon of al-Qaeda terrorism is a
modern one, much more wrapped up in the concerns of the last 100 years of
Middle Eastern history than the last 1000.
More surprisingly, given the 24 historical references raised (see Table 3, p.
71), from The Times’ point-of-view, the ultimate war aims of War on Terror also do
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not share a true counterpart in the history of the Second World War. Although
Adolf Hitler was a megalomaniac who hungered for German racial purity and
fed on the German people through his cult-like manipulation of the Third Reich 10 ,
he was still the elected leader of Germany, a clearly identifiable nation-state.
The Nazi terror was a state-mandated terror, not the terror of an independent,
underground organization. Since Hitler, as the German leader, launched
conventional war throughout Europe, successfully employing a military blitzkrieg
against nearly every Allied combatant, Great Britain’s fight against the German
Blitz, no matter how terrifying for the people of London, was therefore an
exercise in surviving a conventional conflict, no matter how unconventional its
means. Similarly, although Pearl Harbor was a sneak attack executed by
suicidal, kamikaze pilots, they attacked a traditional, military target, the
American Pacific Fleet. For Americans in 1941, the target of counter-attack was
clear—Tokyo. After Lend-Lease and the Atlantic Charter, as well as after
numerous appeals from Prime Minister Churchill for an American entry into the
war, it was only a matter of time until the Americans declared; the Japanese
simply provided the impetus the American government needed to convince the
American people that this war was necessary.
When World War II is referenced, The Times is careful to highlight why this
conflict will be different, and particularly, why the attacks of 9/11 are not merely
a repetition of the attack on Pearl Harbor, which it references directly 10 times
The Times does draws links to the behavior of bin Laden and the Nazis, particularly with
regard to bin Laden’s ability to inspire cult-like fanaticism through a “specious” religious
philosophy based on “racial lines” (“Long War,” 2001; “Not Correct,” 2002; “One Year
On,” 2002).

10
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(see Table 4, p. 72 and Table 5, p. 74). Winfield, Friedman, and Trisnadi (2002)
concur, noting that “The Times alleged that the analogy to Pearl Harbor was a
historical fallacy” since Japan was “a recognizable enemy [that] had different
goals.” While 9/11 “had more numbing complexities, the challenges were larger,
and the psychological damage would also be greater” (p. 297). In that sense,
the easiest historical comparison the Americans could make was an
inappropriate one. That easy comparison fails to take into account the
conditions of this new kind of war, something The Times notes right away, on the
12th of September:
The psychological impact will be greater than that of Japan's destruction
of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and will reach far beyond America's
borders. By comparison with yesterday's smashing of hijacked American
aircraft into American targets, Pearl Harbor was easy to understand; it was
for most Americans at the edge of their world. Yesterday there came a
true bolt from the blue, aimed to humble the heart of the nation. (“Terror
for All,” 2001)
Later during the year, after the Afghanistan phase of the War on Terror winds
down, The Times comes to the same conclusion. On December 7, 2001, writing
directly to compare the condition of the contemporary world to what the world
was like generations before, The Times argues that “these two devastating
attacks, 60 years apart, are not comparable.” While the attack on Pearl Harbor
“was an act of aggression against a military target. . . by a country which had
already invaded China and which, the United States was reluctantly concluding,
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it would have eventually to confront,” by contrast, “September’s slaughter of
civilians had no basis in strategic calculation” (“One Sunday in 1941,” 2001).
The real similarities between 9/11 and its aftermath and the Second World
War are the effects both had on the United States and its relationship to the
world, particularly to its closest ally, the United Kingdom. “September's tragedy,”
The Times observes, citing Henry Kissinger, “united [America] even more strongly
than did Pearl Harbor and made possible, provided that the campaign against
terrorism is pursued with exemplary vigour, the forging of a new ‘community of
nations’ able to defend the institutions of freedom” (“The Blair Shuttle,” 2001).
While the uniting of America is the one significant link the two dates of infamy
share, the most meaningful connection between the Second World War and the
War on Terror is that they both “aligned the rest of the world” (“One Sunday in
1941,” 2001), helping to form a “new community of nations.” Specifically, the
community of nations begins with the Anglo-American alliance, forged by
Churchill and Roosevelt in the darkest days of World War II. That “special
relationship” proves itself again in the days after 9/11, with Tony Blair acting as an
unofficial liaison between the United States and the other allies (“Just the
Beginning,” 2001). In the immediate wake of 9/11, The Times notes, “old rivalries
have been buried, resentments of the sole superpower set aside and snide
commentary abandoned,” replaced by a solidarity in the West such that “every
Western leader has pronounced the appalling assaults on Washington and New
York to be an attack upon all” (“Still the Enemy,” 2001).
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In yet another historical contrast, The Times addresses the Cold War with
some depth, referencing it 10 times (see Table 4, p. 72). Though perhaps not as
evocative of struggle and suffering to a Briton as the Second World War, the
Cold War nevertheless lasted decades, flared in a variety of contexts, and was
waged in multiple forms across much of the world. Although the Cold War was
largely a war of competing ideologies, much like the War on Terror would be, it
was also a conflict of clear dividing lines and specific flash points, an icy detente
rather than an all-out world conflict. Even the Cuban Missile Crisis provided a
difficult analogy at best, since diplomacy offered the best means to redevelop
the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Triggering a global-thermo-nuclear war was not in either nation’s, or either
system’s, best interest, and since the Cold War was largely a conflict of
competing interests rather than a fight to the death, the hottest of flash points
was carefully averted.
The Times takes note of these differences, first remarking that making a
direct comparison with the events of 1962 underestimates the challenges of a
post-9/11 president:
[George W. Bush] has fewer obvious courses of action open to him than
did that other young and still untried President [John F. Kennedy] in 1962,
when he was confronted by the Cuban Missile Crisis. Again, as with Pearl
Harbor, Kennedy had a known adversary to deal with. (“Terror for All,”
2001)
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The focus The Times places on the known enemies of the Cold War is an issue the
paper develops throughout the leading articles. For The Times, the terror of the
unknown is truly more terrifying than the known. John Kennedy could ultimately
initiate a diplomatic discourse with Nikita Khrushchev and work through
American-Soviet grievances. Communication between the West and Osama
bin Laden, on the other hand, happens exclusively through the press; in bin
Laden’s case, after 9/11, that communication only happens through video or a
written declaration, while he makes it perfectly clear in his repeated threats that
he does not desire formal diplomatic channels.
At the same time, bin Laden and many of his al-Qaeda followers are Cold
War creations, men trained by the West during the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan, a fact not lost on The Times. In the War on Terror, not “all and any
‘enemy of my enemy’ should be courted, let alone trusted,” as was standard
practice in building spheres-of-influence during the Cold War. “The mistakes the
West made in the 1980s in arming Afghans against the Soviet Union,” have to be
avoided in this war, and the pragmatic decisions of alliance-building must be
carefully measured against the long-term war aims (“Palimpsest,” 2001). In this
sense, the great number of Cold War references The Times provides operate not
so much as a comparative, but as a warning not to conduct the War on Terror
the same way.
As an historical analogy to the War on Terror, even the first Gulf War,
appearing 16 times (see Table 4, p. 72 and Table 5, p. 74), waged by many of
the same players in nearly the same part of the world, does not quite measure
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up. In contrast to the post-9/11 endeavor, that conflict seemed as though it had
been fought during another, much more remote, time, when wars were still
fought solely for territory and natural resources. Iraq invaded Kuwait to blackmail
the rest of the Arabian Peninsula to change the world’s petroleum values so that
Iraq could more easily pay off its enormous war debt to the Persian Gulf states
leftover from the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. In part, then, the conflict was fought
to stabilize the international petroleum market, hardly something evocative of
the War on Terror. On the other hand, the war was also fought to drive Saddam
Hussein’s army from Kuwait and reestablish Kuwait’s lawful government,
something that did (remotely, at least) resemble the post-9/11 design to drive bin
Laden and al-Qaeda from Afghanistan and replace the Taleban with a
governmental structure less obviously hostile to the rest of the world.
The most obvious similarity between the so-called Hundred Day War and
the possibly endless War on Terror, according to the comment pages of The
Times, is the Western-spearheaded coalition that came together to force Iraqi
troops out of Kuwait. The Times assumes that the West will rally to a certain
degree behind NATO’s Article 5, but garnering the support of a broader, and
preferably Muslim, coalition is just as important as it was during the Gulf War.
Despite the fact that “[m]ost of the Muslim world still recoils instinctively from any
attack on a fellow Islamic nation,” the unprecedented threat from bin Laden in
Afghanistan can sway reluctant Muslim states to back the Western coalition, at
least behind the scenes, since, “as in the Gulf War, common fears make
common cause” (“Layer Upon Layer,” 2001). Critical in this effort would be
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convincing potential, Muslim allies that the West is serious about punishing bin
Laden for the 9/11 attacks, and is willing to take military action against his
Afghan hosts to find him, if necessary. The Times notes “[t]hat was true in the
Gulf War; and the lesson then, which should be remembered now, is that the
best defence is attack. So long as the Western allies were understood to be
absolutely determined to deal with Saddam Hussein, they had Arab support.
When they wavered, so did Iraq's neighbours” (“With One Voice,” 2001). Looking
back toward the Gulf War for perspective, the advice The Times offers for the
new war is clear: shore up the coalition with a show of strength and determined
resolve, because that is what the Middle East values.
For The Times, therefore, history provides the guidelines against which the
War on Terror ought to be planned, and to a great extent, understood. In its
comparison of the post-9/11 mode of war against the examples of war still most
accessible in collective Western memory, The Times takes great care to
demonstrate that the War on Terror represents a conflict far different than
anything the West has encountered. That assessment aligns The Times with Carl
von Clausewitz, a figure The Times bears in mind as early as September 15th
(“Replies of Steel,” 2001). Historically speaking, whereas Clausewitz had noted
that “every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting condition, and its own
peculiar preconceptions” (1976, p. 593), The Times, calling upon the spirit of
Clausewitz, realized that the War on Terror represented a new kind of war with a
new kind of enemy. Arguing for a counter-attack framed by historical context
became a paramount concern for The Times on its editorial page. At first, the
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question was what kind of war would the West fight? Knowing that the West had
long responded to terrorism, even al-Qaeda terrorism, as a kind of “limited war,”
responding to each new terrorist attack as though it were an individual event to
be answered individually in a long-running tit-for-tat, The Times recognized that
through the attacks of 9/11, al-Qaeda had effectively crossed the Rubicon.
In the past, the bombing of an airplane, a nightclub, or even an embassy
was countered with either a legal investigation and judicial trial or a quick, onetime, military strike. But no longer would this be a war in which each act of terror
was individual. Instead of a handful or even hundreds of deaths, the 9/11
attacks were certain to have murdered thousands in the air and on the ground.
New York City and Washington were not like Lockerbie, Berlin, Nairobi and Dar es
Salaam. This was not a relatively limited attack on an American warship
stationed in the Persian Gulf. This attack was nothing like the 1993 World Trade
Center bombings except that one of the targets had been the same. 11
Collectively, the latest targets represented the military, political, and economic
nerve center of the most powerful nation in the world, and the targets had been
carefully chosen, studied, and exploited. The casualties were almost completely
civilian, and the World Trade Center had lived up to its name; citizens of 115
countries perished, mostly when the towers collapsed. “This,” The Times
concluded, “was never an American catastrophe but always the world’s,” and
Though The Times gives a good bit of attention to both the 1998 Embassy bombings in
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, referencing them 6 times, and the attack on the USS Cole in
2000, referencing it 3 times, the attention given to the explosion of Pan Am flight 103 in
Lockerbie Scotland in 1988, the Berlin nightclub bombings of 1986, and the first World
Trade Center bombing all receive minimal coverage, with only 1 reference given to
each (see Table 4, p. 72).
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the necessary reply no doubt had to “be a war of attrition, costly, long and full of
risk, against fanatics within the gates” (“With One Voice,” 2001).
Although “the new truths of a changed world [had] yet to be seen,” The
Times was certain that this attack would “change the political landscape,” and
that there was “no single stroke that [would] slay these invisible enemies, no one
riposte that [would] ‘take out’ this threat” (“Terror for All,” 2001). The nature of
this attack demanded a full, war footing; “The aim,” The Times argued, “must not
merely be to punish but to extinguish the threat” (“Terror for All,” 2001). After all,
Osama bin Laden had declared war on the West in 1996, calling on the panIslamic ummah to fight against what he called the Zionist-Crusader alliance.
Policy, Clausewitz’s definition for the interests of the community, had just
become more “ambitious and vigorous,” thrusting this conflict towards an
“absolute war” (1976, p. 606).
Since building momentum toward a war without end could be particularly
dangerous, The Times has set out to guide the West to “trace each action to an
adequate, compelling cause” (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 578), knowing that not to
consider carefully and thoroughly its war grievances, the West would surely court
disaster. The Times, noting the difficulty of declaring war when there was no
state against which to declare it, understands the difficulties of declaring war on
an international organization as opposed to a nation-state. This is precisely why
The Times goes to the lengths it does to retrace al-Qaeda attacks on US
Embassies, US warships, and even on the US mainland, as well as linking the
attacks of 9/11 to the broader threat of terror rising from the Middle East against
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the West its cultural values. Even so, taking into account the anti-war response
that “the right course . . . is unrelenting pursuit of the guilty through the courts, but
through the courts only” (“Replies of Steel,” 2001), the issue here, The Times
argues, is not just a matter of the international law that has guided the Western
concept of war since the end of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648 (“The Old War,”
2001), even though international, Islamic-based terrorism has been a world-wide
concern since the 1972 Munich Olympics.
Instead, the issue is at heart an historical one, insofar as the precedents for
a war like this one do exist in the scope of Western historical civilisation. “In the
longer sweep of history,” The Times argues, “war has taken multiple forms in a
bewildering range of circumstance,” often being “waged against people and
causes, not jurisdictions of geography” (“The Old War,” 2001). Citing the Roman
response to the myriad raiders who troubled their shores, the ultimatums issued
by various Mediterranean principalities against Islamic pirates in the medieval
period, and even the response of American President Thomas Jefferson to the
extortion and banditry of Barbary city-states of North Africa during the first
decade of the 19th century, The Times believes that “war is thus neither an
inaccurate term nor a word without meaning in this hour” (“The Old War,” 2001).
At the same time, to limit the scope of the West’s response to 9/11 solely by what
the letter of international law specifically allows ignores the history of terrorists
who continue to raise the ante until a reply is made in kind:
Terror thrives on such ingenuous moralising. History teaches the opposite
lesson. Precisely because terrorists crave publicity, unless they are

125

relentlessly pursued and disabled they will pile atrocity on atrocity until,
unchecked, terror rots the timbers on which civilised coexistence rests.
Failure to strike will be trumpeted as proof of impotence, or of fear, with
the same effect. (“Replies of Steel,” 2001)
For The Times, the historical precedent trumps the legal one, especially given the
difficult concerns and absolute quality of the War on Terror, when a
Clausewitzean planning of the “character and scope” of a war at its outset
demands a formulation of tactics “on the basis of political probabilities” (1976, p.
584). As a war like this one begins to take shape, “the clearer appear the
connections between its separate actions, and the more imperative the need
not to take the first step without considering the last” when taking into
consideration the course of action that is most likely to yield a favorable
outcome (1976, p. 584).
The main caveats The Times foresees concern the visceral response to
9/11 and the impulses that arise from it. Ultimately, past choices cannot
completely govern future action, though they can inform and help frame what
goals we construct from the circumstances that we encounter now.
Understanding that, The Times takes these historical precedents as resources;
however, knowing how different the War on Terror will likely be from any other
from the past, The Times also anticipates the need to consider those goals and
the means by which the West can achieve them very carefully. When
Clausewitz (1976) warns that “the aim a belligerent adopts, and the resources he
employs, must be governed by particular characteristics of his own position,” The
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Times agrees, arguing that since the West is strong, the War on Terror must be
fought by demonstrating its strength. At the same time, The Times finds just as
much wisdom in Clausewitz’s concerns that the belligerent and its resources must
“also conform to the spirit of the age and to its general character,” when it
warns that care must be taken in planning how to approach the Muslim world
when conducting that fight. Finally, as it describes the many fronts on which the
War on Terror will be waged, The Times recalls the Clausewitzean advice that the
agents of war and their places and styles of fighting “must always be governed
by the general conclusions to be drawn from the nature of war itself” (p. 594).
The danger, in this case, arises because the War on Terror is neither war
against a single entity, nor even a single war. The Times reminds its readers that
“[h]owever deadly the enemy, its legions are invisible. No one is sure what states
are behind them or how many heads the Hydra truly has. There is no prospect of
decisive set-piece battles.” As a result, “[a]gainst enemies that operate across
borders and melt into the shadows of anarchic or outlaw lands, coalitions are
hard to mobilise and harder to sustain” (“Speed Not Haste,” 2001). Given this,
defining the war, for the allies and for The Times, is difficult, but absolutely
necessary. Having already set the historical framework for the war, in
developing the definition for the War on Terror, The Times considers four central
questions: (1) How quickly should the West respond? (2) What fronts should the
West target? (3) What roles do which allies have? (4) What are the goals of
each phase of the war?
In terms of speed, The Times concludes that the counterattack must be
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swift, but still deliberate, a lightning war of sorts waged with 21st-century
weaponry, including a much-proved intelligence apparatus, which the paper
admits is easy to say but harder to do. “Intelligence. . . has a limited shelf life,”
and “speed is important,” but at the same time, “precision matters too,” and
“America would look weaker, not stronger, if it were to rush ahead with an illaimed or ineffective counter-strike prompted mainly by the need to be seen to
act” (“Speed not haste,” 2001). The Times applauds George W. Bush for not
rushing immediately into war without carefully considering his targets, but also
concludes that waiting too long invites “the temptation to treat this monstrosity
as a ‘one-off’” and other enemies, such as Iraq, can “seize the moment”
(“Speed not haste,” 2001). The Times concludes that the Western response must
come sooner rather than later, but only after the proper targets are identified.
Identifying those targets is the next step The Times advises. While “[t]he
West could find itself simultaneously engaged in conventional and guerrilla
wars,” particularly against the Taleban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, “[s]pecial
forces operations that track down and kill individual terrorists will be more
effective than hundreds of missile attacks” (“Speed not haste,” 2001). Similarly,
since the targets of this war are also economic, careful action must be taken in
that front also, and “a form of economic cavalry” requires a “sustained,
international intervention” including tax cuts to increase private spending,
governmental support for the industries placed in jeopardy by the attacks,
reconstruction money for lower Manhattan, and a concerted effort by the
international banking and energy supply worlds “to take whatever measures are
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necessary” to ensure that “the collapse of the World Trade Centre” does not
bring about “the collapse of world trade” (“Back in Business,” 2001; “It’s the
Economy, Still,” 2001).
More disturbingly, many of the individual terrorists are already embedded
in Western societies. “In Hamburg, Paris and London, in Florida and Boston,” The
Times notes, “plotters of mass murder were able to exploit the frameworks of
freedom against freedom,” so there is “little gain in hunting down terrorists
thousands of miles away if they are not relentlessly pursued at home, too”
(“Terrorism at Home,” 2001). All through the West, security needs strengthening,
from shoring up airport security, tightening domestic laws to prevent terrorists
from so easily planning their attacks inside the soft, legal underbelly of their
victims, placing the extradition of terror suspects on “fast-track,” and even,
perhaps, to adopting national identity cards. But democracy must flourish if the
West is to have something to fight for, and “[t]o extinguish all signs of normal
political life would, at a time like this, be wrong.” Nevertheless, internal
squabbles must be limited, and “it would be foolish to criticise any party which
chose to minimise potential conflict on the domestic front” (“United Home Front,”
2001).
Bolstering such a wide variety of globalized fronts requires allied help in a
variety of contexts, and “[t]he US must decide early what help it needs, from
whom, and for what purposes” (“Speed Not Haste,” 2001). Even though war
plans are not finalized, The Times insists that “[t]he US is preparing, and mustering
allies in every quarter it finds them, even in Sudan and Cuba, for a new kind of
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total war, one that takes into account all forms of human organisation from
banking to intelligence, from weapons proliferation and organised crime to
poverty and its relief” (“Long War,” 2001). China and Russia must at least
acquiesce to allied plans. Some central Asian states, like Uzbekistan, can
provide bases of operation, while others, like Pakistan, can provide military
support simply by reinforcing security along their borders. NATO and other
Western allies that supply training, logistical support, and fly-over rights, can be
just as valuable as allies like the UK, which will supply troop units on the ground.
Finally, as Tony Blair reminded the United Nations in 1998, every terrorist attack “is
a reminder that terrorism should have no hiding place, no opportunity to raise
funds, no let-up in our determination to bring its perpetrators to justice”
(“Terrorism at Home,” 2001). Therefore, any nation that refuses to provide safe
haven to terror groups, freezes terrorist funds, or identifies and captures the
terrorists is an ally in this fight.
Given the multiple conditions of diplomacy, battle fronts, and planning
that the War on Terror requires, the most difficult areas for The Times to define,
predictably, are the overall goals of each conflict falling under the terms of the
war. In the first year after 9/11, toppling the Taleban in Afghanistan and
capturing members of al-Qaeda are the most obvious military goals. In looking
back to adversaries who have had long histories of supporting terrorist
organizations, however, the potential long-term goals of removing Saddam
Hussein in Iraq or finding ways to deal effectively with theocratic government in
Iran are also parts of planning for the war that The Times recognizes. While “[a]
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decade is the timeframe Washington is working to,” the first goal, The Times
argues, must be for the West to demonstrate a “determination to destroy the alQaeda ‘academies of death’ and private army which bin Laden has built up in
Afghanistan” (“Long War,” 2001). That goal is complicated by the Taleban,
whose “apparent inability to comprehend the enormity of the outrage that has
been committed, or the deadly force of the express train that is in consequence
bearing down upon their land,” reinforces “the intellectual and moral isolation of
this cruel and obscurantist regime” (“Prime Suspect,” 2001). Even though the
West mainly wants Osama bin Laden and his associates in al-Qaeda, they are
nevertheless harbored by the Afghan Islamist government. If the West truly wants
to “strike at the center of gravity of the entire conflict,” then it must strike both alQaeda and Taleban targets, making the Afghan conflict, in that way, what
Clausewitz would call a “single war” (1976, p. 596-597).
Moving outwards from that center axis, however, is much more
complicated because the war becomes not just a single “center of gravity,” but
“multiple centers,” something that Clausewitz warns happens only very
infrequently. “[T]errorist cells that are believed to exist in 60 countries” will require
a “marathon effort” to eradicate, particularly if those countries are not willing to
inoculate the cells on their own. These war aims become even more difficult to
measure when one considers that “[t]his is a war without end and a war that we
can never be certain we have won” (“It Won’t Be Quick,” 2001). By the time
that the heaviest fighting in Afghanistan—“Phase One”—is over and “Phase
Two” is initiated, the conflict is headed toward Iraq, where the aims are not as
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clear, except for a design to stop its financial support of terrorist organizations in
the Middle East and to rid Iraq of its so-called weapons of mass destruction once
and for all, two goals leftover from the first war in the Gulf. Of course, defining
and accomplishing that goal remains a murky endeavor well after March of
2002, when The Times cites Vice-President Dick Cheney, who asserts that “[t]he
notion of a plan for multiple pre-emptive missile strikes was. . . ‘a bit over the
top’” (“Coalition Politics,” 2002). By September, military intervention seems
inevitable, but exactly how events would unfold is far from certain.
By defining the parameters of the War on Terror, The Times is able to follow
through on its description of the historical scene of the war and the purposes for
which it ought to be fought. In effect, it relies on the history of other battles to
delineate what the War on Terror will not be, and, also, what tactics to avoid.
When introducing the key players, their goals, and the methods they will use to
achieve them, The Times uses Clausewitz’s historical theory of war to set a plot for
waging the war. This allows The Times to focus more clearly on what the war will
become, who will participate and what means they will use, and what its
ultimate goals will be. At this point, the audience has enough background
information to understand the drama as it unfolds, and, leaning on the collective
historical memory of the British people, The Times can begin to construct the
dramatic stage that sets to action the main figures and themes of the War on
Terror.
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Historical Narrative and Iconic Memory

At the end of the first year, The Times senses that the world has changed
dramatically as a result of the attacks of 9/11, but that the full extent of the
changes are still in their infancy. The concern that The Times issued on
September 12, 2001 still resonates one year on: “The new truths of a changed
world have yet to be seen” (“Terror for All,” 2001). The one certainty, given the
sometimes tumultuous first year, is that the “new truths” will have far-reaching
effects that radically shift the way the West views its historical moment. The sense
of delayed impact, given the magnitude of the likely change, does not alter The
Times’ outlook, but simply reemphasizes the extraordinary rift 9/11 is likely to
create:
Much of what we have come to appreciate as the most powerful
moments in history did not lead to the whole pattern of human activity
being overturned overnight. The impact in this case, as in so many others,
is on a scale beyond conventional comprehension. It will endure, in all
probability, for many decades to come (“One Year On,” 2002).
The post-9/11 historical narrative, in effect, is still very much in the process
of being written, although The Times is certain it will emerge as a powerful,
pivotal figure in the ground of Western historical memory. Nevertheless, a
profound change in the way that the West views itself and its relationship to the
rest of the world develops throughout the year. The challenge becomes can the
West continue the struggle and disregard the impulse to move on, fighting the
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sense of inertia that comes to characterize the War on Terror after the major
conflict in Afghanistan ends. The Times deeply believes that Afghanistan is but
the first phase of a new war that is ultimately a battle for the survival of Western
civilisation against an uncivilized horde of fanatics wishing to engulf the world in
a dark age of fear.
In that sense, The Times fully expects the terror blitz to continue, and that
this war will be as vital a struggle as the British people have seen since the
Second World War. Over and over again through the course of the year, the
themes emerging in its commentary echo the exhortations delivered by Churchill
in 1940 after the fall of France, when the United Kingdom was the only nation
standing between Hitler and European domination.
In content, figures, and themes, The Times echoes the program Churchill
develops in his speech to Parliament on 18th of June. Bungay (2001, ¶ 8)
identifies five “propositions” driving that speech:
(1) We face a monstrous evil which is a threat to the whole world.
(2) If we can stand up to it, we will save not only ourselves, but the whole
of mankind.
(3) Our ultimate goal must be victory, for this is an evil so virulent that it
must be utterly extinguished.
(4) The road to victory will be long and hard, and involve much pain and
sorrow . . .
(5) . . . but if we support each other and stick together, we can do it.
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The Times picks up these propositions and translates them for the post-9/11 world,
in a case of Thelen’s (1989) and Nora’s (1996a; 1996b) description of reframing
history to fit current circumstances. Item (1), with its focus on a monstrous evil
that threatens the world, anticipates the figural and thematic portrayal of the
War on Terror as a fight between the civilized and uncivilized worlds, one
respectful of justice, freedom, and human life, and the other caught in the
“growing grip of Islamic extremism” with “conspirators” who commit “monstrous
acts” (“Pakistan’s Choice,” 2001; “With One Voice,” 2001). Item (2) introduces
the theme of the West’s duty to engage fiercely and directly with the terrorists
instead of attempting to appease them, “because at stake are the lives and
livelihoods of all” (“Another Front,” 2001). The notion of “an evil so virulent” in
item (3) reflects the tenor of casting the War on Terror as a new kind of war
against a new kind of enemy, since the terrorists are little more than “fanatics
preaching hate,” who use mass murder as a weapon to “rip apart the fabric of
civilised society” and “target . . . the future of everyman” (“First Things First,”
2001). New War/New Kind of Enemy, along with the content category, This Is a
Long World War Without Borders, also emerge as an echo of Churchill’s
proposition (4), envisioning a “vastly. . . ambitious campaign, waged the world
over” in a “new kind of total war” (“Long War,” 2001). Finally, item (5) with its
exhortation to “stick together” invokes the sentiment of the content category,
With One Voice, that Le Monde first published and The Times echoed: “We are
all Americans”—all of the “old rivalries have been buried” (“Still the Enemy,”
2001).
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In much the same way, Churchill’s final refrain could just as easily be
spoken to a new generation across the West, something, again, picked up by
The Times, particularly in its construction of major themes:
What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I expect that
the battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the
survival of Christian civilisation. Upon it depends our own British life, and
the long continuity of our institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and
might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he
will have to break us in this Island or lose the war. If we can stand up to
him, all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move forward
into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including
the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink
into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more
protracted, by the lights of perverted science. Let us therefore brace
ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and
its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, "This was
their finest hour” (1940, ¶ 21).
Here it is possible to see all five of The Times’ themes for 9/11 working in concert
with themes from times past. Civilised/Uncivilised emerges beginning with “Upon
this battle depends the survival of Christian civilization.” Visible/Shadowy recalls
the contrast between “broad, sunlit uplands” and a “sinister Dark Age,” lit by
“perverted science.” Before/After is marked by Churchill’s staging of the “battle
of Britain,” on which everything will depend. New War/New Kind of Enemy
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appears as “the whole fury and might of the enemy” that threatens not just the
British Empire, but British life and institutions, as well. Finally, Duty/Appeasement
becomes the coda, as Churchill urges his nation to “brace ourselves to our
duties,” and “bear ourselves” in this, the moment forever that will be known as
“their finest hour.”
In this organization of themes, The Times links the British present indelibly
with its past, in what Nora (1996b) might call “the solidarity of memory with the
present” (p. 634). By doing so, The Times highlights the remarkable changes 9/11
has wrought, since “the more deeply the sense of history permeates society, the
more widespread the perception of change, the more uncertain we have
become of the future and of the means of predicting its general timeline” (p.
634). Precisely because the West is so shaken after 9/11, it reaches into the past
to establish some sense of certainty in the present.
But the object of the The Times’ reach is important. Reaching for
Churchill’s speech of the 18th of June, 1940 is not exactly to reach for a moment
of calm or surety. At that moment in time, “the battle of Britain is about to
begin,” a battle that surely would have crushed a nation less resolved to endure
anything to survive. The United States is a year and a half away from entering
the War, the Soviets are still allied with the Nazis, help seems to come from few
quarters, and time is fleeting. In that moment, the British “brace” is one of a
nation that is in the midst of becoming sure-footed. The Prime Minister, in his
address, rallies his people and instills them with the sense that they can survive
this, that they “can stand up” to the fight, and “the life of the world may move
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forward into broad, sunlit uplands.” By choosing this moment, The Times clearly
understands its power in the British cultural consciousness—1940 represents the
nation in its darkest, but finest, hour.
Across the Atlantic in New York, the same story seems to be unfolding.
Even while “[w]e still see the bodies pressed against skyscraper windows or
caught in obscene free-fall,” we encounter “humanitarianism at its most epic
and fundamental” (“Dig Deep,” 2001). The Times, looking on from a distance,
finds the drama unfolding particularly evocative. Believing that “US will fight
back in defence of [its] dream” (“Terror for All,” 2001), The Times is certain that
New York’s self-described “moment of supreme national horror” (“Heroes Amid
the Horror,” 2001), will only spur the US to respond decisively, rather than to
retreat. Once Mayor Rudolph Giuliani emerges as a Churchillian figure,
especially in the view of The New York Times, declaring that New York and the
rest of America “would emerge better and stronger” and “would never bow to
mere terrorism” (“Mayor of the Moment,” 2001), the picture London develops
taps into a view of the past broadly understood and recognized, and therefore
carries particular salience.
In the most obvious sense, an historical analogy like this one appeals to
the audience of readers because Churchill’s speech defines “what it has meant
to be British for the two generations after the one which [first] heard it. . . and
perhaps, now, to a new generation facing another mortal foe” (Bungay, 2001, ¶
9). By introducing this historical metaphor in its thematic elements, The Times
appeals to a culturally-recognized social construction of history—this is how the
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British are supposed to behave when their very survival is threatened. Positing a
discussion of Blitz-era Britain outlines the British role in the new war by
appropriating an historical drama readers clearly understand with a problem far
less ordered. Relying on the historical metaphor of the Blitz provides an instant
means for British readers to understand what is at stake, what dialogue they
ought to be having with the Americans and the rest of the world, and why they
should behave this way.
At the same time, by choosing this tack, The Times accepts and rejects
other metaphors that can easily be applied to the current situation. By asserting
that this conflict is Churchillian, The Times invokes the special relationship; just as
the Americans came to the aid of the British during the Second World War, the
British must stand shoulder to shoulder with the Americans in this war. By
declaring that it is part of the British duty to rebuff these modern-day terrorists,
The Times rebuffs the great sin of Neville Chamberlain’s 1938 deal with the Nazis,
the “peace in our time” rhetoric, that now pleads for a negotiated settlement
with bin Laden, potentially sacrificing whole nations on the altar of pan-Islamism.
Invoking “their finest hour,” The Times tells the British people that a similar kind of
war has just begun, one in which there will be many casualties, often civilian,
and one in which there can be no serious negotiation with opposing parties until
absolute victory is won.
The close relationship that The Times develops between 1940 and 2001
links the most commemorative aspects of British (and Western) behavior during
the Second World War to what it expects will come to identify Western behavior
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after 9/11. By tapping into a collective memory, important aspects of that
memory are likely to be reshaped again. It is as though The Times injects the
memory back upon us, so that we are part of the experience of both 9/11 and
the Blitz. We are in both places at once, so to speak, since the memory of
“being there” in 1940 merges with the experience of “being there” in 2001. The
conversation The Times starts with the past by reintroducing the nightmare of the
Battle of Britain transforms what kind of conversation about 9/11 we can have.
Our historical prejudice limits the dialogue by framing our understanding of
events so that the conversation, the “being with others,” is most inclusive of those
who share the same collective memory, and in this case, the same fears and
drives. World War II significantly reshaped the West’s culture and beliefs, and by
incorporating the memory of it into the contemporary discussion of 9/11, its
history continues to shape culture and beliefs. 12
The thematic structure that The Times develops over the course of the
year, then, is one devoted to organizing 9/11 and its aftermath into a frame that
the public can relate to and readily understand. The Times cites Eliot’s
Wasteland when describing the Western reaction to what it sees unfolding:
“Human kind / Cannot bear very much reality.” The magnitude of the event itself
encourages disbelief in the West; things like this just do not happen in a city like
New York. Before the West can confront the challenges of 9/11, it first has to
overcome the shock of seeing New York explode in flames. For this reason, it

12 Pennebaker and Banasik (1997) make this argument, noting that we most remember
events that change how we live, which is why we remember World War II more than the
Korean Conflict or Vietnam more than the first Gulf War.
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becomes extremely important to absorb “the spectacle of the towers of the
civilised world plummeting to the earth” (“Dig Deep,” 2001). It has to work out, if
The Times is correct, a response that is intrinsically “human.” We have to find a
way to work the event into our narratives of time and history, of making it fit with
the language we possess for framing an experience whose cost seems so great.
Finding an analogy that is readily translatable is paramount to shaping a
reasonable response. When The Times reaches for the analogy of the Battle of
Britain, it is an easy story to translate because it is already a story the British know
intimately.
Within the overall structure, each individual theme develops with a
counterpart, historical analogy that the audience recognizes, and allows it entry
into the meaning-making conversation about 9/11. Civilised/Uncivilised and
Duty/Appeasement, in particular, make sense because they resonate most
clearly with their analogical counterparts from the Second World War. These two
themes anchor the other three, because in Before/After, New War/New Kind of
Enemy, and Visible/Shadowy, part of what the West has to understand is
something that is not obvious—either something new or something hard to see.
Before/After takes on extra meaning because after 9/11 the Uncivilised is
commonplace. New War/New Kind of Enemy stands out when placed against
an Uncivilised enemy with whom Appeasement is unacceptable.
Visible/Shadowy becomes clearer once the West’s Duty to defend democratic,
Civilised society from those who cast a spectre over the West crystallizes.
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The Times appropriates the past in what Frijda (1997) would call an
attempt to define the West’s new historical position so that current activities are
given meaning. Giving orientation to a present event in this way also begins to
construct an event’s narrative space, as though offering up a kind of ground
against which to build the figures of a story. The language of the narrative
transforms into symbolic action echoing a plot’s development, an historical
model against which to hold ourselves.
In its appropriation of such a culturally-salient historical past, The Times
revives the acts of that past’s special drama. Sarbin (1993) suggests that we
dramatize new action insofar as behavior can then be thought of as acting out
specific roles in a dramatic construction infused with historical predecessors
through analogy. Once the analogy is made, the preferred response, in this
case, to crisis, is implicit. Because the symbolic action preferred is so widely
admired, not just in the UK, but throughout the West, the symbol opens the
action to include the participation of the audience in its development.
Bungay (2001) notes that the end of Churchill’s 1940 speech is an
“inverted epitaphios” in the sense that Churchill anticipates the future
commemoration of the battle of Britain. What The Times does after 9/11 is much
the same. Just as Churchill, in his commission of Olivier, lionizes “we happy few,”
suggesting that by standing firm against the Nazis the British people will be
worthy of their ancestry to “Harry the King, Bedford and Exeter,” The Times, in
commemorating the honor of a generation twice removed from our own, asserts
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that the historical present is irrefutably linked to the lonely days of 1940, and by
association, those of 1415.

Language As Symbolic Action

On September 12th, The Times reminds its readers that “[v]ery few events,
however dramatic, change the political landscape. This will” (“Terror for All,”
2001). The morning of September 11th is already an iconic moment in The Times’
view, aligned with nation-changing events of the past. Across the Atlantic, The
New York Times declares that the day was “one of those moments in which
history splits, and we define the world as ‘before’ and ‘after,’” and that now, in
this new world, we live on “other side of history's rift” (“The War in America,”
2001). The effect is dramatic, and the changes 9/11 drives in the social and
political landscapes of the West resonate with the force of an urban earthquake.
To make sense of the event, both papers begin a memory-shaping
conversation that invests the audience in the dramatic staging of 9/11. If one
takes into consideration the pentadic elements Burke (1969) describes as
necessary to create a dramatic rendering of any event in language—scene,
act, agent, agency, and purpose—one finds that both papers strive to shape
the events into a configuration the audience can readily understand, a
structured narrative of time. In New York, the conversation takes the shape of
myth (Lule, 2002; Pollio, et al., In Press), specifically a tragic epic. In London,
however, the conversation which emerges is a political and historical drama. In
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both cases, the discussion assumes a narrative bent, giving to 9/11 the rhetorical
frame of a story still in the process of unfolding.
Bitzer (1992) notes that “rhetoric is a mode of altering reality . . . by the
creation of discourse which changes reality through the mediation of thought
and action . . . [so] that the audience, in thought and action, is so engaged that
it becomes mediator of change” (p. 4). Ricoeur (1984) and Neisser (1996) also
argue that writers of highly skilled language, such as what appears on an
editorial page, have a basic knowledge of narrative conventions, or what
knowledge an audience requires to enter into the public dialogue concerning
an event. Added to this is Bakhtin’s (1986) assurance that “genres of complex
cultural communication” are drafted with the “actively responsive
understanding with delayed action” of an audience (p. 69). Combined, a basic
knowledge of narrative conventions added to an event’s exigence and an
audience willing to participate create an ideal atmosphere in which to construct
a landscape for argument, a mode in which shared language is oriented toward
a specific purpose.
In the case of 9/11, the audience is certainly actively responsive, since
people throughout the West are suddenly forced into vigilance against the
unknown after that New York morning. In the same way, the exigence of the
situation is obvious. How the West should respond to the terrorist attacks
becomes a focal point around which much of Western political conversation
revolves for the following year after the attacks. To a great extent, the content
categories (see Figure 2, p. 60) of this project describe how The Times

144

approached that central concern, showing the pattern of exigencies that
concerned the people and government of the United Kingdom after September
11th (and to a great extent, the kinds of exigencies which concerned their fellow
Westerners, wherever they live). September 11th is The Day That Changed the
Modern World. It is that moment at which the West stood as one and said, With
One Voice: We Are All Americans. In the days immediately following, once the
smoke, dust, and debris begin to clear and the West gains a sense of who is
responsible for the attacks, it appears that whatever the answer, This Is a Long
World War Without Borders, fought against Osama bin Laden’s Spectre, using
Intelligent Intelligence as the preferred weapon of choice. Finally, as the year
rolls on, the question of what role each nation has comes into play—for The
Times, what Standing Shoulder to Shoulder with the US really means, and what
are the Implications for the UK.
Finally, these patterns of exigencies provide the sparks for a narrative
conversation that brings the audience to the rhetorical theatre of the editorial
page. In setting the stage, The Times must put in order the dramatistic elements
necessary to draw up a proper staging. To a great extent, the pentadic purpose
is captured by the historical referencing and the themes that orient and justify
the case for war. The purpose emerges also in the figural elements, particularly
in the figural categories Civilised World, with 96 total figures, and Change and
Time, with 55 (see Table 6, p. 78), which address concerns similar to the themes of
Civilised/Uncivilised and Before/After. The Times describes the great change
9/11 has wrought when it declares, “The world divides after this tremendous
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event into two camps, with no possibility of neutrality, no middle way, between
them” (“With One Voice,” 2001). In this line, The Times links its notion of what
constitutes “civilised” to a companion notion of “time,” as though 9/11
symbolizes a stark demarcation point. To be on the side of the terrorists after
9/11 is to be part of the “uncivilised camp.” Terrorism is no longer a method
about which the West can justify its “neutrality” and “no middle way” can be
forged “where bigotry, fanaticism and religious hatreds. . . sit too easily alongside
the gentler arts of reason,” deep in the heart of the Islamist world (“Still the
Enemy,” 2001). The Times describes the stakes and dangers most clearly when it
warns,
[b]ut the reality is that America is at war, and the enemy has to be killed
or be captured. Host states have to be forced to end support for terrorism.
Appeasement will only bring more death. With a few voices already being
raised in Britain against America, the West must remain united. A war will
inevitably provoke retaliation, maybe from suicide bombers attacking
Britain. We must all fear their search for weapons of mass destruction.
(“This Is a World War,” 2001)
The dangers, it is clear, are all around, but the purpose of the War on Terror is
unambiguous: “the enemy has to be killed or be captured” in “the
abomination’s wake” (“Dig Deep,” 2001).
The Times draws the contrast even more starkly as it discusses the purpose
for the war in terms of its great irony. In Taleban-run Afghanistation, “[a]t the
chaotic heart of a primitive, terror-ridden, travesty of a state, bin Laden runs a
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small but well-oiled armed machine” (“Against Evil,” 2001). As a result, the
Taleban is willing to “protect bin Laden . . . not only because he is their banker,
but because they share his enmity” to the civilised world. Because the Taleban
and bin Laden would rather let innocent Muslims, especially Afghans, die
needlessly, “[t]heir stance demonstrates the utter necessity of this unwelcome
war” (“Prime Suspect,” 2001). In a case like this, the most absurd irony becomes
shockingly suitable: “there is one truism when faced by such an enemy: the
hawks are the true peacemakers” (“This Is a World War,” 2001). One only needs
to recall what New Yorkers experienced, when so many fire-shrouded victims
plunged to their deaths that New York schoolchildren exclaimed to their
teachers, “the birds are on fire” (“’The Birds Are on Fire,” 2001), to understand
that 9/11 has upended “the glorious mundanity” (“Dig Deep,” 2001) of a life that
we understood, “turn[ing] it upside down,” (“Terrorism at Home,” 2001).
Furthermore, the terrorists have usurped what the West holds most
precious. The Times announces that “[i]n Hamburg, Paris and London, in Florida
and Boston, plotters of mass murder were able to exploit the frameworks of
freedom against freedom,” so that in the wake of 9/11, it is clear that “the West's
most cherished values and legal traditions gave evil abundant opportunity”
(“Terrorism at Home,” 2001). These “mega-terrorists” (“It Won’t Be Quick,” 2001)
represent “an enemy shorn of scruples,” who are “sworn to shred the fabric of
freedom, to render civilised existence impossible” (“Back on the Ground,” 2001).
This more figural argument, coupled with the thematic structure,
underpins the purpose of The Times’ drama. The War on Terror is a war of
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“[f]anaticism versus freedom” (“Who Defends Britain?,” 2001), in which freedom
will “[take] up cudgels against fear” (“Prime Suspect,” 2001). Those severe
contrasts, which resemble only too frighteningly the stark realities of the Second
World War, supply This Long World War Without Borders with a noble purpose,
one worth fighting for now just as much, if not more, as it was 60 years before.
If the West needed more incentive to begin the struggle, The Times needs
only to remind it of the scene of the first attack in this new kind of war. In this
Burkeian element, the figural categories of Terrain, Natural Disaster, and Vision
and Shadow (the latter of which also sets up the scene-act ratio), with 18, 10,
and 43 figures, respectively, best describe the setting of the various theatres of
the War on Terror. For the opening act, the attacks of 9/11 themselves provide
the startling images necessary to provide the descriptive backdrops. The New
York Times mournfully remarks that by mid-morning on September 11th, “Lower
Manhattan had become an ashen shell of itself, all but a Pompeii under the
impact” (“The War Against America,” 2001). The Times of London, meanwhile,
takes a similar view of the scene, describing New Yorkers as having “suffered an
urban avalanche” (“Terror for All,” 2001). Just hours after the towers collapsed,
“on the still unstable streets of Lower Manhattan,” New York City workers, “the
masked and dust-caked, bone tired, devoted crews,” were already busy “sifting
the rubble mountain,” quickly coming to the realization while working at the
enormous pile that “each survivor is a reminder of how very many have been
crushed or burnt to death” (“With One Voice,” 2001). The world economy is
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reeling, with governments hastily working to “cushion” their financial systems from
“the aftershocks” of the man-made rumble on 9/11 (“Back in Business,” 2001).
After the initial attacks and into the second and third acts marking the
beginning and ending of the war in Afghanistan, still, “[m]uch of everyday
human activity has ground to a halt, obscured by a noxious covering of dust and
ashes” (“Tunnel Vision,” 2001). By November, the earthquake at Ground Zero is
replaced with another scene of potential natural disaster in the making, as the
world wonders if “the spokes of the American umbrella are strong enough to
withstand the storm” (“The Blair Shuttle,” 2001).
During these crucial second and third acts, the “political terrain” of the
War on Terror is “treacherous” (“Terror for All,” 2001), with nations such as Pakistan
standing in a “grim political position,” (“Pakistan’s Choice,” 2001), like “perilously
unstable launching pad[s]” (“Long War,” 2001). “Pockets” of “Pashtun
heartlands” scatter throughout “the treacherous Afghan wastes” (“Back on the
Ground,” 2001), so that the “countryside is alive with Afghan fighters” (“First
Things First,” 2001). As if these conditions did not make the fighting difficult
enough, bin Laden’s “legions are invisible,” and “melt into the shadows of
anarchic or outlaw lands” (“Speed Not Haste,” 2001). Back home, a “malaise” is
“hanging over Western societies,” which hover under the “spectre of nuclear
terrorism” (“Nuclear Network,” 2001). By the end of the year, the world
landscape is in much the same place. New acts have yet to open, and
throughout the world, the scene is much the same.
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Since the purpose of the drama is largely developed in the themes,
content categories and historical references that The Times develops, the figural
domains may not seem particularly extraordinary. The scenes that The Times sets,
correspondingly, are so visually metaphorical that the density in which they
emerge in figural categories is hardly surprising. With the purpose and scene set,
however, the dramatic rendering that The Times undertakes becomes a bit
trickier to isolate. In developing a cast of characters, The Times relies on the real
agents of action. But beyond the predictable political and religious leaders on
either side of the fighting, countries, cities, buildings, and even specific industries
become personified in their own right and become their own character studies.
At the same time, these “characters” that emerge, noted in the 74 figures that
appear in the eponomously named figural category, are intricately interwoven
with plot elements of act and agency, providing a narrative core for the rising
action.
Baydala (2003) argues that in the weaving together of self-referencing
“discursive fragments” like these, a story emerges coherent and whole. The
Times, then, in connecting the various parts of its commentary, along with
scripting elements that point towards their narrative being a dramatic one, is
crafting the events of 9/11 into a functional story, and not just a simple recording
of events. The key, however, lies in the drafting of characters, the descriptions of
the actions they take, and agencies they adopt to undertake those actions.
The Times crafts its characters by focusing on their immediate responses,
and the possibilities for action developing in these responses to 9/11. After 9/11,
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the “flexing” of America’s vast “muscle” begins (“Replies of Steel,” 2001) and
“the West plans its retaliation” (“United Home Front,” 2001). If “the Kremlin’s
suspicions of NATO designs” can be surmounted (“Speed Not Haste,” 2001) and
“Pakistan’s indulgence of the Taleban” ends (“Pakistan’s Choice,” 2001),
“America’s diplomatic footwork” (“Layer Upon Layer,” 2001) will be rewarded, as
will Great Britain’s, since it is firmly “standing shoulder to shoulder” with the
Americans (“Terror for All,” 2001). Washington is “gleaning intelligence” (“Prime
Suspect,” 2001) while “Britain girds against the present danger” (“Back on the
Ground,” 2001) and “Western governments appreciate the dangers they face”
(“It’s the Economy, Still,” 2001).
These immediate responses shift once the thrust towards war begins to
take shape. While the initial responses describe a broad range of characters in
play, after the shift, the descriptions turn to demonstrate which of these
characters are most ready to act. In a great sense, these figures are inwardlooking, as though questioning the will of the main players to act, and which
ones are readying themselves. When it becomes clear that France has yet “to
fall into line” as the likely “third musketeer,” Britain finds itself “standing in a line of
only two abreast” (“Back on the Ground,” 2001), but nevertheless shows a “deft
hand and a resolute eye” (“It Won’t Be Quick,” 2001), even though it is “a
country alive with troubled and legitimate questions” (“Back on the Ground,”
2001). As the eve of war arrives, the “world [is] standing edgily on the brink” (“It
Won’t Be Quick,” 2001), “America is crouched,” (“Crouch, Spring, Crouch,”
2001), and “Britain must rise to the challenge” (“Tough on Camera,” 2001).
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Finally, the view shifts from the West to its (Burkeian) counter-agents in the
Muslim world. Rather importantly, an interesting collection of terministic screens
develops in this set of description insofar as The Times clearly sees the Taleban, in
particular, as a kind of extended farcical joke, since none of its reactions to the
demands of the West seem to have any basis whatsoever in reality. As the
Muslim world “recoils instinctively” from an attack on a “fellow” (“Layer Upon
Layer,” 2001), the “Taleban hurl defiance one day” and “plead ignorance of
Osama bin Laden’s whereabouts the next” (“Crouch, Spring, Crouch,” 2001),
only finally to “publicly [slam] the door” on the West, who now must work to
“prise it open again” (“Against Evil,” 2001). Finally, the Islamist enemy becomes
something not quite human, a chimera of sorts. The Times’ observation leads it to
believe that al-Qaeda is a monster that cannot be truly defeated until all of its
myriad incarnations are defeated. Behind this screen, al-Qaeda morphs into a
“terrorist Hydra” (“Long War,” 2001) of “Jackal cunning” (“Intelligent
Intelligence,” 2001), with “tentacles everywhere,” although the West does not
yet know “how many heads the Hydra truly has” (“Speed Not Haste,” 2001).
As The Times describes its characters, it continues to develop the
terministic screens through which it understands the War on Terror to be a
conflict of Civilised and Uncivilised. A civilised democracy responds to an attack
like 9/11 with a kind of righteous might (as in the description of the United States)
and with a legitimate questioning of what the war’s aims ought to be and how
best to achieve them (as in the description of the United Kingdom). But the
converse, as seen in the descriptions of the Taleban and al-Qaeda, portray an
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illegitimate, farcical response to a truly monstrous act. Given this picture, the
contrast between the civilised West and the uncivilised terrorists could not be
clearer.
With the characters dramatized, plot action is put into form. In terms of
the pentadic elements of act and agency, The Times deals with its largest
numbers of figural forms, with five categories—Nautical, Medicine, Games,
Rooting Out and Closing In, and Science and Engineering—combining as both
act and agency. As a result of some of these connections, act and agency are
also perhaps the most difficult to set apart cleanly. Perhaps the best way to note
the difference is that when The Times is describing an act, the action implied is
clear; when it mentions agency, The Times describes the means or nature of the
action.
For perhaps the most illustrative example of the way act and agency
combine, the Nautical figural category, with 21 figures, clearly demonstrates
both, as well as linking up with the purpose-laden theme, Duty/Appeasement.
To a certain extent, act and agency combine so easily in this category because
the theme of Duty/Appeasement that The Times develops comes through quite
forcefully. As might be expected for an island nation that has for so long looked
to its Royal Navy for the protection and expansion of its interests, duty, as a
figural as well as a thematic notion, is both something to be done (as in “doing
one’s duty”), but also is an ideal to guide action (as in “abiding by one’s duty”).
After the “turbulence” of the 9/11 attacks (“Terror for All,” 2001), reservists
are “called to the colours” (“Replies of Steel,” 2001), while “[a]nger and anguish
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are more likely to mount than subside” (“With One Voice,” 2001). Because
“terror rots the timbers on which civilised coexistence rests” (“Replies of Steel,”
2001), when responding to the attacks, it is “a time for steady nerves and precise
actions” (“It Won’t Be Quick,” 2001). As the momentum for the war in
Afghanistan builds, the “US will not fire more than a warning shot or two”
(“Crouch, Spring, Crouch,” 2001), something diplomats must make clear while
“shoring up the American-led alliance” (“Just the Beginning,” 2001) to “stiffen the
response” of allies (“Tough on Camera,” 2001) as they prepare for “the long
haul” (“Against Evil,” 2001; “The Defeatist Chorus,” 2001). Recognizing that
“security breaches threaten every citizen’s safety,” a “wave of emergency
legislation” (“Airport Insecurity,” 2001) is passed, while at the same time
America’s and the West’s “attempt to weather” the ongoing danger is put into
doubt (“From New York Skies,” 2001). Praise is given to Tony Blair, who takes “no
more than minutes to see his duty” and proves early on that “his course was
fixed” (“A Man Alone,” 2001). At the end of the year, the 9/11 event still certainly
could “carry clout,” but al-Qaeda is likely “in a state of disrepair” (“Security
Matters,” 2002).
Also combining act and agency, though for slightly different reasons, is
Science and Engineering, with 43 figures, which links the acts of channeling
momentum or energy and building or tearing down structures with the effects
those acts have. If the Nautical category helps to define the screens through
which to add more layers of understanding to the Duty/Appeasement theme,
Science and Engineering points toward the myriad means by which the West
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needs to fight a New War against a New Kind of Enemy that in few ways
operates by the traditional rules of warfare. By attacking in the way it did on
9/11, for example, al-Qaeda, who “engineered an act of mass murder” (“First
Things First,” 2001), struck like a “true bolt from the blue, aimed to humble the
heart of the nation” (“Terror for All,” 2001). The attacks are so remarkable that in
“the scale of the confusion” (“Intelligent Intelligence,” 2002) words and images
are “scorched onto the collective consciousness” (“Dig Deep,” 2001). Because
of the “gravity of the situation” (“The OId War,” 2001), the West must “galvanise
public opinion” (“Tough on Camera,” 2001) and begin to neutralize the
“corrosive political corruption” of Middle Eastern regimes (“With One Voice,”
2001), while not “pouring fuel on the flames of Islamic fundamentalism” (“It Won’t
Be Quick,” 2001). As the West builds “diplomatic momentum,” Tony Blair, in
particular, has value as a “conduit,” even as a “lightning conductor” (“The Blair
Shuttle,” 2001), while the West’s “coalition-building” drive (“The Defeatist
Chorus,” 2001) erects multiple “layers of global support,” like bricks, “layer upon
layer” (“Layer Upon Layer,” 2001). Once the war in Afghanistan begins, troops
and intelligence services must begin “dismantling” (“Crouch, Spring, Crouch,”
2001) bin Laden’s “apparatus of terror” (“Intelligence Needed,” 2001).
Like Science and Engineering, 48 Medicine figures continue to define the
terms of New War/New Kind of Enemy, appearing as surgical means for the West
to conduct its activities. At the same time, figures of Medicine appear as the
side-effects the 9/11 attacks have brought upon the West, and therefore further
describe how a Civilised society must react to an Uncivilised terror. For example,
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as part of the War on Terror, the West needs to approach the long struggle
ahead with a surgeon’s eye, and apply “constant pressure to alleviate the root
causes of terrorism” (“This Is a World War,” 2001), while avoiding “self-inflicted
mistakes” (“Back in Business,” 2001) and “political headaches” (“United Home
Front,” 2001). In the “desire to restore life” (“Dig Deep,” 2001) to a “stricken” New
York and “revive” some of its “bruised zest and gusto” (“Rock Solidarity,” 2001),
America must also take care of the “economic victims of terrorism” (“Back in
Business,” 2001) and not ignore the “psychological blow struck by the terrorists”
(“It’s the Economy, Still,” 2001). Finally, in the heat of the battle to “eliminate the
scourge of terrorism”, the US and its allies must conduct “surgical strikes” (“Long
War,” 2001), and mind “the festering troubles of the Middle East” (“Layer Upon
Layer,” 2001). But the allies, knowing that “as the tourniquet tightens it begins to
pinch,” must be willing to “fray more nerves” (“Crouch, Spring, Crouch,” 2001)
and “starve transnational networks of power” (“A Man Alone,” 2001). Only by
taking initiative can the West “penetrate Islamic cells” (“Intelligent Intelligence,”
2001) and “eradicat[e] the menace” of suspect regimes, even in Iraq (“A Man
Alone,” 2001).
Rooting Out and Closing In, meanwhile, with 18 figures, focuses on the
notion of tracking down and surrounding al-Qaeda, particularly in Afghanistan.
These figures particularly fit into the New War/New Kind of Enemy theme,
especially in light of the view Bush takes, promising to “smoke out” the terrorists.
In the rush to “cut off any room for manoeuvre” that terrorists have (“Pakistan’s
Choice,” 2001), the allies will “hunt” them and “track down” any accomplices
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(“Speed Not Haste,” 2001), while building a “diplomatic fence around
Afghanistan” (“Layer Upon Layer,” 2001). As the UK “join[s] the hunt” (“Who
Defends Britain?,” 2001), the “encirclement of Afghanistan” is about to begin
(“War of Nerves,” 2001), while bin Laden “hole[s] up” in his “hideout” (“Just the
Beginning,” 2001). After the conflict ends, the ultimate dual missions of “root[ing]
out the terrorists in our midst” (“Tough on Camera,” 2001) and “root[ing] out
regimes” that support terror continue (“A World Transformed,” 2002). As
terministic screens, this category in a sense continues to describe the enemy as
something not quite civilised, or even human, since it lives underground and
becomes the object of a hunt. At the same time, the screens that develop the
notion of “fencing in” or “encircling” mark the enemy as something that must be
caged for there to be any chance to tame it.
Finally, in the 44-figure Games category, The Times plays upon the
metaphor of British sport, particularly gambling metaphors of card playing and
horse racing, though other metaphorical terms also appear. To a great extent,
the games brought into play to create this category’s screens are legendary
gambler’s sport, reinforcing the sense that many of the decisions made by
commanding officers when fighting an enemy like al-Qaeda will be hard
gambles. Other metaphors developed here are games that require complex
strategy and long periods of time. Given these guidelines, The Times notes that
“[h]owever fluid the chessboard now” (“Palimpsest,” 2001), it will take a
“marathon effort” (“It Won’t Be Quick,” 2001) to win the war. Tony Blair has
shown a sound ability to “raise his game” in a crisis (“With One Voice,” 2001),
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while leaders of other, long-suspect regimes are busy “speculating” on the
outcome of the war (“Tunnel Vision,” 2001). Even though the West must “play by
the book” and respect civil liberties at home (“Terrorism at Home,” 2001), there is
“no neutral ground” in this fight (“A World Transformed,” 2002), so the West must
“not shirk this slow, deliberate test of strength” (“Replies of Steel,” 2001). Very
little will “stay America’s hand” (“Prime Suspect,” 2001), though some allies show
a “reluctance to stake everything” on the war’s outcome, sensing that the
course will be “frustratingly hard to call” (“The Defeatist Chorus,” 2001). Even
though “overseas tip-offs” are invaluable (“Intelligence Needed,” 2001), ignoring
problems at home while obsessively following the trails of foreign intelligence will
no doubt snatch “defeat from the jaws of any military victory the free world
won” (“It’s the Economy, Still,” 2001).
What these figurative acts and agencies do is describe the broad array of
tactics and aptitudes fighting the War on Terror requires. The ideal footsoldiers
must possess the dexterity and ability to develop and execute strategy of the
best athlete coupled with the skill of a surgeon and the understanding of human
behavior that a psychologist practices. They must be able to hunt the enemy
down and build structures to hold the enemy once caught, and still be able to
help rebuild and bolster the security apparatus of the West. At the same time,
these ideal soldiers must maintain a deep, abiding sense of duty, not unlike a
naval officer, and possess a singular capacity to fulfill it.
In this way, the figuring of act and agency also sets into motion the driving
elements in the drama. The War on Terror is a risky gamble, in which chance will
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play a tremendous part in the successes and failures of the Allies. It is also a
conflict that demands high levels of skill and surgical precision, particularly in
military engagements that unfortunately occur in highly-populated areas. The
war will place a great burden on the need for speed and quick, but calculated,
reactions, combined with a clear understanding of how coalitions are put
together as well as how they are broken. In the search for bin Laden and alQaeda, the West can only be successful if it ruthlessly hunts the terrorists, rooting
them out wherever they hide.
At its core, this conflict is a competition of psychological warfare. In one
sense, the war is a matter of duty—the duty the West has to the rest of the world,
to its own institutions, and to its vision of the future. But even if its intentions are
completely honorable, the great struggle of the War on Terror will be the West’s
ability to translate its own sense of duty for the rest of the world, and particularly
the people of the Middle East. Just as Lakoff describes the events of 9/11
reaching in and changing the brains of westerners, The Times believes that the
West, as part of its post-9/11 aim, must approach the rest of the world in much
the same way.
On the one-year anniversary, The Times takes note that the “serious
legacy of September 11 rests instead in three theatres. These are America's
relationship with the rest of the world; Islam's attitude towards the remainder of
humanity; and the central structure of the international system itself” “(One Year
On,” 2002). As The Times carefully analyzes the changes already evident in these
three “theatres,” the conclusions it comes to demonstrate its belief that the
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traditional ways in which people think about the world have to change. In the
first place, Americans must realize that it is their “country's destiny ‘not to have an
ideology but to be one,”’ and that they must be willing to lead the world even in
times of relative peace and prosperity as opposed to shrinking behind a curtain
of isolationism. 13 As for Islam’s attitude, The Times concludes that “Islam would
be well served by a revolution in thinking,” citing the West’s Renaissance and
Enlightenment as models for how such a revolution should evolve. In other
words, Islam must be willing to meet the West on equal terms, particularly in terms
of the dangers of mixing radical religion with repressive politics. Finally, and
perhaps most threateningly, The Times reckons that though 9/11 has not
particularly changed our understanding of a nation-state, “the character of
what is a threat to the nation-state has undeniably evolved.” In that sense, the
age of terror requires a greater level of international cooperation than ever
before if nation-states are to feel truly safe again.
Of course, The Times does not choose the metaphor of three “theatres”
carelessly. All throughout the year, The Times carefully includes figures of
Literature, Language, and Drama, taking one step beyond the Burkeian notions
of dramatizing language and often figuring the acts and actors of these three
theatres in striking ways. The Times no doubt first sees George W. Bush as a kind
of Prince Hal, the son of a former President with a history of carousing and being
not particularly interested in the work of domestic or foreign policy. In “this
world-spanning task of persuasion,” Bush appears to require the sound support of

13

The Times cites the American historian, Richard Hofstadter, for this observation.
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his own Exeters, advisors more qualified than he to guide his country at such a
difficult hour, who can be found among his cabinet and foreign leaders like the
Prime Minister, many of whom had served their governments in other difficult
moments. At the same time, “the President uses words like pieces of wood. Time
and again he has striven to match the occasion, to comfort, inspire, to
intimidate” and has “fallen flat.” As a result, “his language poses a genuine
problem of leadership” (“With One Voice,” 2001).
George W. Bush’s strength in language to this point has largely been in the
speech of the commoner. He speaks the language, in a sense, of baseball and
the Wild West, and to a great extent, is more likely to trade in Falstaff’s brand of
“quips” and “quiddities” (1957a, 1.2.45) and Texas tall tales than in the stuff of
sweeping, political rhetoric. He appears to lack “Hobbes's ‘common power to
keep men in awe’,” and in that sense may very well be unable to bear “the
burden of being the leader of the free world.” Nevertheless, he is likely to be the
leading “actor in the drama whose first act is unfolding” (“With One Voice,”
2001).
By the end of the first week, however, The Times has notably changed its
assessment. The already highly-effective metaphor of the Hydra comes to carry
a second layer of meaning when one recalls that Shakespeare’s Archbishop of
Canterbury says early in the first act of his new King, “never Hydra-headed
willfulness/ So soon did lose his seat, and all at once,/ As in this king” (1957b,
1.1.35-37). Almost overnight, The Times gains a new-found confidence in the
untested President after watching him muster brilliant moments at the National
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Cathedral, Ground Zero in New York, and later at Camp David. The nowtransformed Bush “has found his voice and hit his stride” (“The Old War,” 2001),
the way Prince Hal at his father’s deathbed, and in battle against Hotspur,
makes the leap to becoming Henry the King.
Offering his own “Non Nobis” and “Te Deum” in respect for “all holy rites”
(1957b, 4.8.117-118), the coda of Bush’s remarks at the National Cathedral,
reminiscent of Romans 8:38-39—“[a]s we have been assured, neither death nor
life, nor angels nor principalities nor powers, nor things present nor things to
come, nor height nor depth, can separate us from God's love” (2001, ¶ 20)—
echoes Shakespeare’s careful situating of King Henry as a sure, but humble,
Christian king. As Americans come to know the names of those who died trying
to save the lives of others in the air or on the ground, Bush assures the country,
“[w]e will read all these names. We will linger over them, and learn their stories,
and many Americans will weep” (¶ 5). Bush no doubt catches The Times’
attention in part because he sounds so much like King Henry, as he assures his
men, “Then shall our names,/ familiar in his mouth as household words/ . . . Be in
their flowing cups freshly rememb’red” (1957b, 4.3.51-55), especially when
juxtaposed with the image of the President standing on the ruins of the World
Trade Centre, rallying the country, promising that the slaughter of innocents will
be avenged. And as Bush speaks of the importance of unity, honor, a
“responsibility to history . . . to rid the world of evil” (¶ 7), and that “the
commitment of our fathers is now the calling of our time” (¶ 18), his words ring
nearly the same notes that Churchill had in 1940. By the following Monday
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morning, at the beginning of the second week of the post-9/11 era, The Times is
convinced Bush has shown that “he has the character to rise to the challenge of
now serving as a war leader” (“The Old War,” 2001).
Figurally speaking, The Times’ dramatic awareness continues even after
the basic dramaturgy of world leaders is set. A steep drop in stock prices
“upstage[s]” the reopening of the New York Stock Exchange (“Back in Business,”
2001), while memories of that Tuesday morning are continually “replayed in
flashback” (“Dig Deep,” 2001). Pakistan is “uncomfortably in the frame” (“Long
War,” 2001) as the Taleban is “playing out a deadly farce” (“Prime Suspect,”
2001). The focus on the importance of what lines are spoken on stage continues
since in the Middle East “careless language costs lives.” What the West really
needs is “a palimpsest, a political, military and intelligence-sharing script that is
constantly rewritten” (“Palimpsest,” 2001). Crucial operations happen “offscreen” as the West begins to “hone the rhetoric of readiness” (“Another Front,”
2001). Once Afghanistan is under control, the British forces, better prepared to
be peacekeepers than the Americans, “have a new role to play” (“The Defeatist
Chorus,” 2001) and take “centre stage” (“First Things First,”2001), while Tony Blair
finds himself in the position of Bedford or Gloucester, “best placed to whisper
words in the right ears” (“The Old War,” 2001).
Shakespeare’s Henry declares himself “no tyrant, but a Christian king”
(1957b, 1.2.241), and once an English right to war is settled, soon “all the youth of
England are on fire/. . . Now thrive the armorers, and honor’s thought/ Reigns
solely in the breast of every man/ . . . Following the mirror of all Christian kings”
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(1957b, 2.1.1-6). The same sentiment rings true in 2001, particularly after the
weekend The Times believes marks Bush as a man capable of leading the world
through a troubled time. From that point forward, The Times pens its international
drama as the story of a civilised, Christian West against an enemy “ruthlessly
contemptuous of life” (“A World Transformed,” 2001). By choosing literary and
historical allusions that resonate deeply within British culture, The Times aligns the
actions of the post-9/11 world with remembrances of war, framing the
audience’s understanding of events by tapping into its collective memory. By
connecting 9/11 to the Blitz and its aftermath to Shakespeare’s rendering of the
Battle of Agincourt, The Times weaves the three events and their leaders
together, scripting a way for the British people to understand what this new
tragedy means as well as how important it will be in shaping the future of their
civilisation and institutions and their “special relationship” with the people of the
United States. “In its anguish,” a “hobbled” America which “seemed to stand so
very nearly alone,” will find in its best and closest ally “respect, honour and offers
of help,” an “instinctive. . . coming together in solidarity with the dead” (“Still the
Enemy,” 2001). Having found itself nearly alone in the dark days of the past, The
Times reminds its readers that only by standing shoulder to shoulder will the British
and Americans be able to “defend civil order against enemies within the gates”
(“A World Transformed,” 2002).
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Never Before Has the World Felt Itself to Be Such a Global Village
Chapter 5: Conclusions

General Conclusions

Perhaps the most instructive way to begin a discussion about the general
conclusions I draw from this project is to take a step back to my research
questions and reconsider them in light of the results derived. The first question—
(1) How does language act as both symbolic action and collective therapy in
these leading articles and how are those two functions interrelated?—seems to
require a slight reframing in light of results. When I first considered this question, I
already had many of the results from The New York Times project to consider.
The 20 reflective editorials from The New York Times are undoubtedly concerned
with helping the city to heal after the horrors of the 9/11 attacks. With their focus
on anniversaries, holidays, and moments of symbolic, funeral ritual, the reflective
editorials sought to provide frames of meaning for the collective grief and
trauma of the people of New York.
My initial expectation for The Times of London, therefore, was that the
paper would try to do some of the same things. To an extent, The Times does just
that, in the sense that some anniversaries and holidays are covered, and the
British people, who themselves were mourning the deaths of many of their
countrymen at the World Trade Centre, suffered their own grief. But, the primary
grief for Londoners, I would argue, was that watching 9/11 unfold across the
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Atlantic in a city that in many ways is London’s partner and sister, reminded them
only too sharply of catastrophic events of London’s relatively recent past,
particularly the terror of the Blitz. In that sense, using its leading articles as a
realm for collective therapy was not really the aim of The Times.
Using language as symbolic action, however, was quite clearly an aim.
The language of The Times, in a great sense, came to frame the narrative means
for understanding the events of 9/11 and its aftermath. In leading articles The
Times produced in the year following 9/11, action-made-symbolic provided a
dramatic foundation for explaining the various roles of the main actors and acts
of 9/11. If by “collective therapy” one assumes a way to help a group of people
come to make sense of a traumatic event, then certainly, language as symbolic
action, it would seem, provides a means for The Times to accomplish just that. If,
however, “collective therapy” takes on a more traditionally psychological
connotation, as it does in The New York Times, then what the leading articles of
The Times of London do is not really collective therapy, and The Times does not
particularly make the connection that The New York Times does so well.
This conclusion, nevertheless, leads directly to the second research
question: (2) How do metaphor, memory, and narrative intersect to create
meaning? Taking the dramatic form that develops through language as
symbolic action that The Times brings into play as a starting point, at least one of
the ways in which figural terms, historical memory, and dramatic, narrative
structure intersect is by providing frames of meaning for understanding traumatic
events that translate easily into British culture. For instance, the sparkling points at
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which civilisation emerges as a thematic anchor, a metaphorical term, and an
historical analogy give the ground of time and history perspective by providing a
profound figure that stands out to an audience struggling to understand the
events of 9/11. It calls upon, for example, the collective memory of the Blitz, the
iconic Churchill and Henry V, the figural understanding of what constitutes
civilised versus uncivilised society, and finally, the Shakespearean portrayal of the
greatest moments in the coming of age of a great king to structure the post-9/11
world in a way that the United Kingdom can easily interpret. In these
intersections, The Times typifies the ways in which historical, rhetorical, and
psychological themes converge when the need to build frames of meaning from
tragic events demand it.

Limitations

In a study that generates as much data as this one, one of the limitations
will always be the choices made in order to make the data manageable. In the
first place, whittling down 45 leading articles from 251 possible leaders that were
earmarked to rate for relevance was an exercise in discovering what different
kinds of readers see. In those early ratings, five readers determined which
articles were relevant, and among those five readers, two factions emerged.
Two clearly read articles concerning 9/11 and the resulting war in a relatively
narrow way. By that, either an article was obviously and clearly related to 9/11
and the war in Afghanistan, or it was something else entirely. During the second
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half of the year, therefore, when the war in Afghanistan effectively ends, the
number of relevant articles drops dramatically. Two others, meanwhile,
conceptualized 9/11 and the resulting War on Terror as a far broader endeavor,
and viewed relevant articles quite differently.
For instance, a leader from 27 December, 2001, “The Mosque As Beacon,”
deals with more understated questions of the cultural and psychological aspects
of the role of the mosque in the West as a potential bridge to peace or as a
potential breeding ground for home-grown terrorists. The two readers who read
more broadly rated this leading article quite highly, while the two who viewed
the issues of 9/11 more narrowly found it to be largely irrelevant. The last reader,
who was generally the wild-card in the rating process, agreed with the latter
group, and therefore this particular article fell beneath the threshold for selecting
relevant articles. In light of the London bombings of the 7th of July, 2005,
however, a leader like this one clearly takes on a different level of importance.
In any event, I believe that rating articles as relevant with a broader eye towards
what constituted a relevant article would have resulted in a steadier rate of
overall output of articles, a rate that would have more closely resembled the
data coming from The New York Times, which this study views, more than any
other papers involved in the study, as containing the most similar stylistic and
thematic links to The Times of London.
At the same time, the terror of the 7/7 bombings suggested an interesting
counterpoint to the original set of articles. The temptation was to add the first
few weeks of leaders that appeared after 7/7 to this study, to gauge how the
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views from London have really changed since September, 2001. In part, this
possibility was influenced by the data we saw coming from El Mundo after the
11-M attacks of 2004 in Madrid in which the initial response was remarkably
similar to the response in New York. In our early looks at The Times after the
attacks of 7/7, this trend seemed to hold true—7/7 became Britain’s 9/11. As
such, being able to track that data would have likely proved extremely
interesting as to how Western attitudes have held in the years and struggles since
9/11.
Finally, in ordering agreement of salient figures, the data suggested that
as the size of a leading article increased, the likelihood of finding salient figures
decreased. Many of those longer articles, however, are ripe with brilliant figural
language. The hypothesis, therefore, is that a longer article simply offered more
possibilities of salient figures. More possibilities, then, yielded a lower level of
figures on which raters agreed, simply because there were so many options from
which to choose. As suggested in explaining this data in Chapter 3, the rate of
output for salient figures would likely have remained steadier had we raised the
number figures that raters could select as salient. At the same time, my
hypothesis is that the total body of salient figures likely would have included
more data describing the tests of fighting the psychologically and culturallychallenging War on Terror, the part of the War that, most likely, we will fight for
the longest time.
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Suggestions for Future Research

The most obvious places to begin research rest in the cross-cultural nature
of the larger project. Comparative studies detailing the contrasts of The Times
with other papers in the project would be highly informative, particularly with
regard to the deeply-embedded literary and historical metaphors that appear
to drive British culture. Do other papers demonstrate this kind of model, and if so,
what do their models look like? As I have worked through The Times, I have
constantly compared it, with our American team leader, Howard Pollio, to The
New York Times, The Washington Post, and El Mundo, all of which I helped to
rate, and also, in conversation with our Bulgarian partner, Tolya Stoitsova, with
what she has learned from Sega and Izvestia. So far, we have run into very
specific kinds of styles for each paper though some of these styles intersect,
specifically, a highly literary style shared by The New York Times and The Times of
London, and across Europe, some similarities in terms of how history is treated.
As a group, all of the European papers appear to place a far greater
emphasis than the American papers do on 9/11’s place in the larger historical
ground of Western civilisation. How that history develops varies quite a bit from
culture to culture, but particularly between continental Europe, which depends
greatly on history from before the Second World War to frame 9/11, and the
United Kingdom, which obviously places a great deal of emphasis on World War
II and the post-war world. The relationship between The New York Times and The
Times of London, however, is most striking because of each paper’s
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dependence on complex rhetorical styles through which to present its views, as
well as the similarity of themes and content which develop therein. Originally,
this project was to include that comparison, but it simply became too unwieldy
to cover adequately.
Finally, it would be very interesting, I believe, to develop the stark contrast
that exists between the data from The Times and The Washington Post, which,
oddly, might be the least rhetorical and least historical of any of the other
papers. Given the “special relationship,” that contrast seems extraordinary, as
though one capital views 9/11 solely as a matter of contemporary politics, while
the other sees it as a figure in the long ground of history. That striking difference
begs the question how much weight does being the cultural capital of a
country, as well as its political capital, place on a paper’s outlook on the world?
At least in the case of 9/11, it would appear that whatever city is the cultural
capital of a country—London in the UK, New York City in the States—is likely to
develop the more resonant rhetorical themes. That notion, given the ongoing
War on Terror which seems to become ever more complex, is a fascinating one
to explore. To that end, the better question might be what defines and drives a
nation, its politics or its cultural history? The answer to that question has
implications across the political, social, and cultural spectrum, across the world,
and therefore, in it, we would likely find our best means of understanding each
other, and of living together not in war, but in peace.
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The Times’ 15 Rated Figures by Rater
Anne

Lance 1

Terror for all

Terror for all

Daniel 1
Terror for all

12-Sep-01

12-Sep-01

9/12/2001
P

P

P

recover identity as young nation

halt normal business

urban avalanche

standing shoulder to shoulder

urban avalanche

turbulence to world markets

a nation tempered by fire

turbulence

impact on the American mind

these Manhattan murderers = heroes

price of vigilance

new truths to be seen

suffered an urban avalanche

constant reminders

change the political landscapes

civilised world grieves with them

incalculable impact

a nation tempered by fire

reminders of this dreadful day for years

new truths of changed world

bolt from the blue

new truths of a changed world

treacherous political terrain

country's huge security apparatus

fight back in defense of (American) dream
true bolt from blue aimed to humble heart of
nation

potent symbols

an abstract peril

grimly conscious

country's sense of itself

trying out JFK's shoes
assault on freedom demands devastating
response

tempered

US to recover its identity

true bolt from the blue

heart of American power

reflecting regime's delight

a footing with Tel Aviv

trying out JFK's shoes

no single stroke will slay invisible enemies

extinguish the threat

brought to justice

treacherous political terrain

trying Kennedy's shoes

treacherous political terrain

Still the Enemy

Still the enemy

2

2
Still the enemy

13-Sep-01

9/13/2001
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13-Sep-01

P

P

P

pavement carpeted with flowers

stirred/hobble American power

pavement carpeted with flowers

hatreds sit alongside/gentler arts

recall, shuddering

old rivalries have been buried

rivalries buried/Parisian sniping banished

"We are all Americans"

no melting into the shadows

appalling assaults attack upon all

vigilantly contain spreading terror

fuzzy western policies

no melting into shadows/shroud preparations

melting into the shadows/shroud

American failure of understanding

Schadenfreude

driven to stone age

his existence proclaims

terrorism could hobble American power

muddied/fuzzy policies

jockeying for influence

demand Kabul yield up bin Laden, dead or alive

miscalculation

muddied the Palestinian waters

Taleban break-out

jockeying

idea has grown

instinctive global solidarity with dead

popular Schadenfreude

hobble American power

nurture the sympathy

stamp out

sit too easily among gentler arts of reason

Tuesday's outrage
popular revulsion asset of incalculable
importance

Washington isolationism

sloppy intelligence

looking other way

giant that seeks to go about business

we are all Americans

hatreds sit alongside gentler arts of reason

popular Schadenfreude

disavowed terrorist has no hiding place

Sloppy intelligence

exemplary riposte

With one voice

With one voice

3

3
With one voice

14-Sep-01

14-Sep-01

9/14/2001
P

P

P

sifting the rubble mountain

dust-caked

rubble mountain

masked, dust-caked, bone tired, devoted crews

sifting rubble mountain

each survivor is a reminder

anger/anguish more likely to mount than subside

clean houses of terrorist taint/purge terror

anger and anguish like to mount
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towers the very opposite of Babel

roll

towers that were the opposite of Babel

never American catastrophe but the world's

silent dead speak truth

support can leech rapidly away from wars

silent dead of many lands speak to that truth

cherished liberties

world-spanning task of persuasion

war of attrition against fanatics within gates

words like wood/fallen flat

words like pieces of wood

president uses words like pieces of wood

raise his game

he has fallen flat

actor in drama whose first act is unfolding

no middle way

stand-four square

language poses genuine problem of leadership

blank cheque

world divides into two camps

Pakistan progressively Talebanised

reining Washington

clean their own houses of terrorist taint

actor in unfolding drama

safe house is a safe house
cheerleaders and fundraisers for bin
Laden

Pakistan's corrosive political corruption

solid motives

actor in drama whose first act is unfolding

world divides into two camps/no middle way

corrosive political corruption

hotbeds of militancy

Pak's intelligence hand in mailed fist with Taleban

shed image

clean their own houses of terrorist taint

Replies of steel: Answers to inevitable criticisms of
an

4
Replies of steel

4
Replies of steel

inevitable response

15-Sep-01

15-Sep-01

9/15/2001
P

P

P

flexing of America's vast muscle

flexing

flexing of America's vast… muscle

bells tolled yesterday

bells tolled

called to the colours for land

shelter fanatics poised to strike

called to the colours

roots of terrorism

called to the colours

betraying democracy's values

moving silence

betraying democracy's values

moving silence

spirits from the dusty deep

call spirits from dusty deep

retaliation would hand them victory

Hegel's spirit spar with Machiavelli's, Clausewitz's

call spirits
democracy noisy sceptical affair/fool's
errand

unleashing corrosive cycle of violence

breed "martyrs"

justice is civilisation's most potent weapon

justice is civilisation's most potent weapon

unleashing

terror rots timbers which coexistence rests
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unleashing corrosive cycles of violence

terror rots timbers on civilised coexistence rests

terror rots timbers

democracies made shackles for
themselves

failure to strike trumpeted as proof of impotence

crushed

"freedom's home"

shackles

shackles

betraying democracy's values

freedom's home

unbearable price

test of strength

make price of terrorism unbearable

test of strength

history teaches the opposite lesson

shirk this slow deliberate test of strength

America "freedom's home"

democracy is a noisy, sceptical affair

This is a world war

This is a world war

5

5
This is a world war

16-Sep-01

16-Sep-01

9/16/2001
P

P

P

descent into prolonged barbarity

strike heart

heart of the US

no going back to life before

no going back

struggle that has shadowed the west

bring to head struggle shadowing West

hawks are true peacemakers

however it rears its ugly head

ruling clique in Afghanistan

shadowed West

turning point in history

deploring fate of Manhattan's twin towers

hidden supporters

height of its powers

Muslim "wild west"

spread terror

offer of cooperation is opaque

pressure to alleviate root causes of terrorism

turning point in history (like Truman Doc)

Muslim "wild west"

fortress America was already moribund

heavy loss

US to become global cop

shattered for ever last Tuesday

distilled

Fortress America

fuel flame of terror

global cop

fuel the flame of terror

whipping the terrorists

keeps head down(re:Reagan & Gadaffi)

the "Great Satan"

hawks are true peacemakers

alleviate root causes

economic muscle

weapons of mass destruction

fuel terror's flame

hawks are the true peacemakers

Great Satan

temper force

[Gadaffi] keeps his head down

pursuit of common menace

hostile lands

root causes of terrorism
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6
The old war

The old war

6
The old war
17-Sep-01

9/17/2001
P

P

P

invisible enemy without borders

stark unavoidable facts

an invisible enemy

bewildering range of circumstance

firm/measured manner

notion of war has rested on the idea

jurisdictions of geography

invisible enemy

law rests on this structure

react to piracy

rests on structure/idea

sweep of history

undeclared war against bandits

bewildering range

fledgling republic

elaborate protection racket

gravity of situation

gravity of the situation

standing shoulder to shoulder

whisper words in right ears

standing "shoulder to shoulder" with US

best placed to whisper words in the right ears

found voice/hit stride

G. W. Bush has found his voice

extravagant plan of aggression

rise to challenge

hit his stride

found his voice and hit his stride

unparalleled collective experience

moving words

stance on the rubble in NYC

patient & patriotic

mount the leadership campaign

mobilised American people

mount

parallel to present time

character to rise to challenge

surreal

gravity of the situation

mount leadership campaign

parallel to our present times

whisper words in right ears

notion of war/law rests on structure

restrain

assemble the evidence
7

Pakistan's choice

Pakistan's choice

7
Pakistan's choice
17-Sep-01

9/17/2001
P

P

P
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grim political position

grim position

face the penalties

growing Talebanisation of Pakistan

blunt demands

faces bloodshed

inspired by zealotry of clerics holding sway

face

Taleban was nurtured

run campaign of terror

international cover

growing Talebanisation

live with anarchy across border

revealed

preaching a message of hate

preaching message of hate

growing/nurtured Talebanisation

growing grip of Islamic extremism

holding sway

growing grip of Islamic extremism
cut off room for manoeuvre in
negotiations

cut off any room for manoevre

preaching message of hate

run into a wall of obscurantist militancy

run into wall of obscurantist militancy

growing grip of Islamic extremism

hand over bin Laden

Pakistan's indulgence of Taleban

cut room for manoeuvre

tilt world opinion

rein in fanatics

run into wall

grim position

hand over bin Laden to escape retaliation

indulgence

blunt demands

hasten isolation/disintegration of Pakistan

tilt world opinion

revealed the hypocrisy

tilt world opinion decisively toward India

route

international cover

realpolitik

reform disfunctional society

Pakistan's indulgence of the Taleban

Speed not haste

Speed not haste

8

8
Speed not haste

18-Sep-01

18-Sep-01

9/18/2001
P

P

P

America's reach needs to be equally long

invisible legions

legions are invisible

legions are invisible

Hydra heads

how many heads the Hydra has

how many heads the Hydra has

melt into shadows

melt into the shadow

decisive set-piece battles

hunted down

networks are to be hunted down
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melt intro shadows of anarchic or outlaw lands

first flush fades

Pentagon readies its plans

murderous networks hunted down

temptation

intelligence has a limited shelf life

flush of horrified sympathy

patient intelligence

treat this monstrosity as a one-off

muttering will grow louder

terrorist networks regroup trail goes cold
members have little real appetite for a
war

as networks regroup trail may go cold

produce uproar/splits

Iraq could seize the moment

little real appetite for war

appetite for war

Kremlin suspicions

conflict fought with all weapons, blackmail

concentrated targets

stateless terror

track down

assailants have tentacles everywhere
lay solid diplomatic and military
foundations

Kremlin suspicions of Nato designs

tentacles everywhere

terror has no hiding place

West should deal direct with Russia's neighbours

scourge

first flush fades

Islamist assailants have tentacles everywhere

outmatch

track down

Back in business

Back in business

9

9
Back in business

18-Sep-01

18-Sep-01

9/18/2001
P

P

P

back in business

upstaged

ceremony was promptly upstaged

expected collapse

triggered

cut interest rates

fade away into outright recession

robust efforts

growth could fade into outright recession

prolonged slump

testing

deliberate assault on a symbol of nation

big boost

fade

economic victims of terrorism

free market principles being placed to one side

slump

economic cavalry

deliberate assault on symbol of nation

plainly determined

British economy cushioned by aftershocks

self-inflicted mistakes

big boost

make or break sentiment in the markets

form of economic cavalry

formula

damaged triggered

cushioned from aftershocks

inspire recovery

robust efforts of Fed. Reserve Board
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take time off from pursuing personality cult

deliberate assault on a symbol

next few months will be testing

make or break sentiment in markets

irrational

formula required to inspire recovery

limit damage triggered by last week's atrocities

economic victims of terrorism

decent taste than hard economics

economic cavalry

strong case for conventional … principles
save S&L industry from self-inflicted
mistakes

upstaged

cushioned from aftershocks

In the air

In the air

10

10
In the air

18-Sep-01

18-Sep-01

9/18/2001
P

P

P

the nation's life

recovering

air traffic recovering some of its position

fell sharply in value

nation's life

in the nation's life

stepped up their own vigilance

desperate to reassure

stepped up their own vigilance

laxity of the past

stepped up vigilance

El Al has long set the example

old habits

lax procedures

beyond immediate steps toward changes

stopping kamikaze terrorists

become used to

kamikaze terrorists

plane as bomb

global agreement

using a plane as a bomb

chemical sniffer to detect explosives

using plane as bomb

chemical "sniffer"

check in a bomb

amid confusion

fell sharply

trust in baggage reconciliation

fell sharply

old habits are hard to change

false assumption

old habits hard to change

airlines will object

complying with hijackers' demands

higher standards

lax procedures

suicide terrorists

El Al set example

safety enforced by global agreement

recovering some of its position

look beyond immediate steps

pilots may need to be armed

immediate steps

kamikaze terrorists

higher standards
11
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11

Terrorism at home

Terrorism at home

Terrorism at home
19-Sep-01

19-Sep-01

9/19/2001
P

P

P

triumphalist bile fills airwaves

sifted

evidence is sifted

evidence is sifted

terrible truth

clearer the terrible truth becomes

clearer the terrible truth becomes

clearer

exploit frameworks of freedom

plotters of mass murder

exploit frameworks of freedom

values and traditions gave evil opportunity

exploit frameworks of freedom against freedom

gave evil abundant opportunity

strong grounds to suspect

nature of clandestine networks

puzzle

puzzle was not pieced together

puzzle not pieced together

deadly inside knowledge

financial markets turn upside down

tumble with bombed towers

turn upside down

courtesy of civil liberties

sleepers ready to strike

circulate

enemy within the gate

enemy within gate

"sleepers"

authorities must play by the book

little gain in hunting down terrorists

enemy within gate

British book has long needed rewriting

their ilk

play by the book

terrorism should have no hiding place

alert to menace

triumphalist bile

police fight shy of arresting people

no scruples about using law against law

nation's distaste

triumphalistic bile fills the airwaves

terrorism should have no hiding place

resorting

fast-track extradition procedures

Dig Deep

Dig deep

12

12
Dig deep

19-Sep-01

19-Sep-01

9/19/2001
R

R

R
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human kind cannot bear very much reality

glorious mundanity of life

towers of the civilised

spectacle of towers of civilised world plummeting

towers of civilised world

images scorched onto consciousness

unbearable in the reality of last week

plummeting

newly insomniac world

scorched into collective consciousness

dig deep into pockets
scorched onto consciousness/replayed
flashback

their slaughter itself used as a weapon

abomination's wake

scaling those fatal monoliths
desire to restore life to their city

world felt itself to be global village/terror is leveller

newly insomniac world/unbearable
caught in free-fall/world waits for dust to
settle

poignant simplicity of so many valedictions

learning

abomination's wake

abomination's wake

slaughter used as weapon

terrorism is a leveller

gave up lives scaling fatal monoliths

poignant simplicity

glorious mundanity of life New Yorkers lost

humanitarianism at its most epic

terrorism is a leveller/global village

worlds waits for dust to settle

desire to restore life to city

scaling fatal monoliths/rubble

bear this sort of reality

glorious mundanity

epic/fundamental

spirit reflected all over New York

Americans continue to dig through rubble

restore life to city/assuage feelings

assuage [world's] feeling of grief

United home front

United home front

replayed in flashback to newly insomniac world
bodies pressed against skyscraper windows
caught in obscene free-fall/world waits for dust
settling

global village

friends can dig deep into their pockets

13

13
United home front

20-Sep-01

20-Sep-01

9/20/2001
P

P

P

democracy's best retaliation against terror to
thrive

suspend domestic politics

democracy's retaliation is to thrive

Stars and Stripes on the wrecked side of Pentagon

dug from dust

democracy itself is under attack

democracy itself under attack

extinguish signs

West plans its retaliation
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dug from dust

measure of restraint

extinguish all signs of normal political life

West plans retaliation

best part of week

circumstances demand

extinguish all signs of normal political life

political headaches

political headaches

slip into rebellion from one wing

slip into rebellion

conference is an important platform

crude anti-gov't tactics from the other

crude anti-Government tactics

from one wing of the party

labour left threatening rebellion

break guarantee of support

lost the stomach for the fight

temporarily lost stomach for fight

appear statesmanlike

political jousting

opportunity for dissent

lost the stomach for the fight

conflict on the domestic front

hearts of public and politician

lose little sleep

conference is likely to slip into rebellion

political jousting

hearts of public/politician

hearts of public and politician

lose little sleep

political jousting

normal political life

appear statesmanlike

normal political life

New Yorkers dug from the dust

It's the economy, still

It's the economy, still

14

14
It's the economy, still

20-Sep-01

20-Sep-01

9/20/2001
P

P

P

avoidance of serious economic slump

emblazoned words

economic ruin

crisis bringing economic ruin to millions

a real war

real war rooms

snatched defeat from jaws of any military victory

vital

terrible blow to the global capitalist system

triumph for those out to destroy

slump

snatched defeat from jaws of military

economic slowdown not confined to US

terrible blow

psychological blow struck by terrorists

jaws of military victory

psychological blow struck by the terrorists
governments appreciate dangers they
face

gov'ts appreciate danger they face

dramatic fall

initial hesitancy of European Central Bank

psychological blow struck by terrorists

vital that stability pact not sterility pact
join the international drive to avert a
slump

Stability Pact not allowed to become sterility pact

appreciate danger they face

economic slump
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join int'l drive to avert slump

extraordinary measures

far from their minds

collapse of world trade would bring satisfaction

early moves

set against the pessimistic news

so-called war room/real war

sensible response to serious events

overcome by political pressure

free world won

build military coalition

effect felt on the east coast

terrible blow

international drive

build a military coalition

helped economy to recover

collapse

collapse of world trade

Long war

Long war

15

15
Long war

20-Sep-01

20-Sep-01

9/20/2001
P

P

P

mobilisation gathering pace

gathering pace

time is fast running out for the Taleban

White House's brusque insistence

White House's brusque insistence

White House's brusque insistence

bin Laden's Afghan lairs

terrorist Hydra

bin Laden's Afghan lairs

mustering allies in every quarter

necessary intelligence

classic war fighting play occasional role

foretaste only of vastly more ambitious campaign

bin Laden's Afghan lairs

terrorism's underground forces

waged world over

mission impossible

shed some post-Vietnam habits of thought

shed some post-Vietnam habits of thought

Achilles' heel

surgical strikes

willingness to stay same long course

world is utterly changed

electronic battlefield

siding with civilised world lesser risk

shed post-Vietnam habits of thought

uncomfortably in the frame of Pakistan

deter American in determination to destroy

surgical strikes

Pakistan is launching pad for operations

al-Qaeda academies of death

electronic battlefield

al-Qaeda "academies of death"

alien power within fractured, factious state

in the frame

mission impossible terrain and history imply

caught by Achilles' heel

stark necessity

caught by his Achilles’ hill

guile and gold as much as with force

rightly calculates

terrorist Hydra

test of strength against terrorist Hydra

perilously unstable launching pad

gathering pace
16
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Prime suspect: The Taleban are playing out a deadly
farce

Prime suspect.

Prime suspect.
21-Sep-01

21-Sep-01

9/21/2001
R

P

D

first step down very long road

marathon ahead

marathon ahead

utter necessity of this unwelcome war

freedom takes up cudgels against fear

freedom takes up cudgels against fear

Taleban playing out deadly farce

words set against backdrop

silence surrounds

freedom takes up cudgels against fear

imminent military riposte

words set against the backdrop

marathon ahead

carnage visited on America

speed far outstrips allied response

silence surrounds all military detail

utter necessity of unwelcome war

first step down a very long road

riposte to carnage visited on America

a settled decision/made plain

Taleban are playing out a farce

no diplomatic or covert avenue being neglected

gleaning intelligence

speed far outstrips allied response to Iraq

never until now

time in hand and bargains to be struck
deadly force of express train bearing
down

first step down very long road

multi-faceted

stay America's hand

deadly force of express train bearing down

first step down long road

Taleban would buy time

takes no measure of this momentum

playing out a farce

because he is their banker

under cover of grand Shura of clerics

intellectual/moral isolation

military riposte

time in hand/bargains to be struck

express train bearing down upon

comprehend enormity of outrage

stay America's hand

Washington is gleaning intelligence
no diplomatic or cover avenue is
neglected

Back on the ground

Back on the ground

17
22-Sep-01

9/22/2001
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17
Back on the ground
22-Sep-01

P

P

P

Britain girds against present danger

lifted fatigue

enemy shorn of scruples

sworn to shred fabric of freedom

voiced no shadow of doubt

voiced no shadow of doubt

enemy shorn of scruples
country alive with troubled and legitimate
questions

enemy shorn of scruples

shred the fabric of freedom

shred fabric of freedom

country alive with questions

treacherous Afghan wastes on far side of world

"sleepers" in bin Laden's shadowy al-Qaeda

tumbling into the front line of a war

shadowy al-Qaeda

Britain girds against danger

standing "shoulder to shoulder" with US

lifted Blair's fatigue

nation understandably nervous

Britain standing in line of only two abreast

not marching but tumbling into front line of war

tumbling into front line

France most likely third musketeer

standing shoulder to shoulder

airwaves filled since 9/11

take the high ground abroad

Britain standing in line of only two abreast

grand emergency

low road Government continues to tread

Nato's all for one and one for all pledge

brace against grave menace

Britain girds against the present danger

most likely third musketeer/France not in line

fall into line

lifted Bair's fatigue

rhetoric rallying world against common enemy

commit British arms

no shadow of doubt

what happened to rhetoric - rallying world
high ground abroad/low road tread at
home
treacherous Afghan wastes on far side of
world

It won't be quick

It won't be quick

take high ground abroad/low road at home

France has yet to fall into line
"sleepers" in bin Laden's shadowy alQaeda

18
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It won't be quick

23-Sep-01

23-Sep-01

9/24/2001
P

P

P

pouring fuel on flames of Islamic fundamentalism

calibrating / measured response

world standing on the brink of war

world standing edgily at brink of war

world standing edgily on brink of war

struck at the heart of America

195

choosing war-hardened veterans

bolstered by speed/scale

in the heat of battle

US mission=our moment

pouring fuel on flames of fundamentalism

Germany not involved in "adventures"

struck heart

signaled new era

defeat on its doorstep

alliances suffer stresses/strains in heat of battle

struck heart of America

Hussein keep his head down

find excuses otherwise occupied when bullets fly

mission

Palestine’s hotheads

Britain has shown deft hand/resolute eye

when bullets start to fly

battle for world opinion

time for steady nerves/precise action

deft hand & resolute eye

new kind of war

marathon effort to rid world of terrorist cells

unprecedented scale

new kind of enemy

pale compared to these mega-terrorists

unsettled markets

marathon effort

fighting new kind of war/new kind of enemy

terrorist infrastructure

time for steady nerves

provoking backlash in rest of Islamic world
Pakistan survive unscathed the defeat on
doorstep

ethnically linked fundamentalism

pouring fuel on flames of fundamentalism

battle for world opinion

Iran's overtures to the west

battle for world opinion

mega-terrorists

warning voices already being sounded

Layer upon layer

Layer upon layer

19
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Layer upon layer

24-Sep-01

24-Sep-01

9/24/2001
D

P

D

place layers of global support on Nato core

diplomatic fence

diplomatic fence

states not normally even on speaking terms

diplomatic footwork

diplomatic footwork

elimination of scourge of terrorism

heterodox coalition

heterodox coalition

scourge of terrorism

Gulf states promised to "stand by" US
place layers of global support on Nato
core

channel of communication too long clogged

whip up opposition

whip up opposition

this outer layer

layers of global support

won "shoulder-to-shoulder" backing

tackling root cause of extremism

"shoulder-to-shoulder" backing
opens up clogged channel of
communication

channel of communication clogged

include all who volunteer for American terms
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endorsement from this outer layer

festering troubles of Middle East

outer layer

root cause of extremism

common fears make common cause

recoils instinctively

recoils instinctively

Muslim recoils instinctively from attack on fellow

common fears make common cause

festering troubles

won shoulder to shoulder backing

tackling

tackling

diplomatic fence around Afghanistan

root cause

lifting of sanctions

layer upon layer

festering troubles

America's diplomatic footwork

grand coalition against terrorism

assemble a heterodox coalition
allow governments to voice anything but
caution
20

Palimpsest

Palimpsest

20
Palimpsest

26-Sep-01

26-Sep-01

9/26/2001
P

P

D

disgusted retreat from medieval theocracy

contribution

however fluid the chessboard now

balance

countries to stand against menace
close gaps in unconventional common
front

careless language costs lives

close gaps in unconventional common front

set to side Russia's anxieties about US penetration

courted

"enemy of my enemy" should be courted
common aims shift in long campaign
ahead

shared outrage

pragmatic layering

script that is constantly rewritten

Putin kept Washington waiting

palimpsest

palimpsest

ask countries to stand against terrorist menace

script

starved of funds

balance that US and UK must strike

starved of funds

Iran is also a shelter

close gaps in this unconventional common front

careless language

Iran is a bankroller

enemy of my enemy should be courted
pragmatic layering of decisions co-operate
flexibly

set aside anxieties

Iran, bracketing it with Britain

American penetration

"breed terrorism"

shift in the course of long campaign ahead

deftly handled

political spectrum

palimpsest

medieval theocracy

however fluid the chessboard
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intelligence-sharing script constantly rewritten

shared outrage across political spectrum

careless language

some Western quarters

fluid chessboard

deftly handled on both sides

Crouch, spring, crouch

Crouch, spring, crouch

21

21
Crouch, spring, crouch
28-Sep-01

9/28/2001
D

D

P

elusive identikit of terror filling out

tourniquet tightens/begins to pinch

pockets of its heartlands in the south

as tourniquet tightens it begins to pinch

hurl defiance

time to fray more nerves

Taleban hurl defiance one day

pockets of Pashtun heartlands

will not change to fit coalitions

pockets of its Pashtun heartlands

fray nerves

financial loopholes

Pentagon expects time to fray more nerves

rugged weapons

not fire more than warning shot or two

giving Taleban chance to recant

sharp memories

sharp memories

selecting targets by committee

close cells & loopholes

identikit of terror

close down terrorist cells/loopholes

warning shot

military plane

US will not fire more than warning shot or two

elusive identikit of terror

America is crouched

Washington's thinking anything but conventional

filling out

Taleban's time for reflection may be brief

deliver up

waiting game like no other
as the tourniquet tightens it begins to
pinch

strike designed to concentrate minds

dismantling

rugged soviet-era weapons

moment intelligence coalesces will be swift spring

crouched

coalition-building

America is crouched

waiting game

deliver up bin Laden

waiting game like no other

intelligence coalesces

dismantling al-Qaeda operation

Intelligence needed

Intelligence needed

22

22
Intelligence needed
28-Sep-01
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9/28/2001
P

P

P

evidence emerging of cells and agents, sleepers

entrenched

evidence is emerging

funding Jackal cunning/slipped between aliases

emerging evidence

apparatus of terror

mask terrible conspiracy of destruction

apparatus of terror

Jackal cunning

new war demands new weapons

becoming clear

slipped between aliases, etc.

intelligence by far most deadly

slipped between

scraps of information

vital pooling of information

growing aghast

overseas tip-offs

hindsight underlines blame

mask

political pressure

too blithe an assurance

suspicious patterns

crack down on money laundering

sheltered in London

overlapping

hindsight underlines blame

myriad scraps of info

sheltered

pressure must now tilt

scale of terrorists' ambitions

scraps of information

vital pooling of information

Islamist terrorist networks more entrenched

scale of ambitions

intelligence most deadly (new weapon)

crack down on organized crime

ringing the venue

in the face of repeated warnings

overseas tip-offs

swifter and tighter coordination

publics growing aghast

closing G8 airspace/ringing venue

intelligence is deadly new weapon

freedoms used to mask conspiracy

Tough on Camera

Tough on Camera
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23
Tough on Camera
29-Sep-01

9/29/2001
P

P

P

Britain must rise to challenge

glaring contrast

galvanise public opinion
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crack down on those preaching extremist hatred
uncover network that made London terrorist
haven

galvanise public opinion

Britain must rise to the challenge

stiffen response

using the law to crack down

root out terrorists in our midst

preaching extremist hatred

preaching extremist hatred

heart of conspiracy
end cynical exploitation of right of repeated
appeal

crack down

London terrorist haven of Western world

uncover network

root out the terrorists

promised fast-track expedition

London as terrorist haven of West

at the heart of the conspiracy

American fury at Dickensian pace

root out

Dickensian pace of British justice

spin their cases out at least as long as Pinochet

cynical exploitation

believed to head bin Laden's organisation

confident of confounding swift deportation

Dickensian pace of British justice

can spin their cases

silencing those who incite boys from Birmingham

hostile climate

Europe's solidarity with US melts

Europe's solidarity with US melts into nothing

spin cases

reluctant to stir resentment

pussyfooting of prosecutors

solidarity melts

blacken the name of Islam

terrorism thrives on propaganda

pussyfooting

Terrorism thrives on propaganda

blacken the name of all Islam

blacken Islam

stiffen response

Who defends Britain?

Who defends Britain?

24

24
Who defends Britain?

30-Sep-01

30-Sep-01

9/30/2001
P

P

P

tragic side effect of assault on America

joined the hunt

side effect of the assault on America

frontline target for retaliation

fanaticism versus freedom

joined hunt for bin Laden

fanaticism vs. freedom uneven at best of times

uneven contest

fight alongside the US

exploit every loophole in statute book

need for vigilance

turf warfare between the security services

vague talk

vague talk

slow business in the courts

slow business in courts

turf warfare

exploit every loophole in the statute book

habit of muddling through

muddling

Whitehall's wobbles

200

Whitehall's wobbles

matched

smacks of bureaucratic fudge

nervousness of British airlines

wobbles

remove recklessly such underpinning

latest Whitehall wheeze

daydreaming

frontline target

smacks of bureaucratic fudge

happily exploit openness

death row

cash-rich henchmen

plays into their hands

vague talk

happily exploit that openness

wheeze

ministers are daydreaming

remove recklessly underpinning plays into hands

smacks of bureaucratic fudge

muddling through

today's menace from terrorists

balanced against impairing freedoms

playing into their hands

Tunnel vision

Tunnel vision
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25
Tunnel vision

1-Oct-01

1-Oct-01

10/1/2001
P

P

D

tendency toward tunnel vision

wretchedness

draw comfort

statesmen today are blinded

difficult to draw comfort

everyday human activity ground to halt

life will not return to normal until vision is restored

noxious covering of dust/ashes

tendency toward tunnel vision

speculating on war against terrorism

tunnel vision

universal gaze turned toward New York

swept every issue from agenda

universal gaze turned towards NY

have eclipsed reports

halt collapse of world economy

state of distraction

what Commonwealth should stand for

everyday human activity ground to halt

eclipsed

business as usual

obscured by noxious covering of dust and ashes

speculating

swept every issue from their agenda

draw eyes to rest of world

underlined

statesmen blinded to other issues

universal gaze turned to NYC

swept issue from agenda

obscured by a noxious covering of dust

eclipsed reports

halt collapse

draw their eyes to the rest of the world

calling for business as usual

restore moral authority

Mugabe faced a strong push by Britain

the explosions in America

blinded by explosions in America

flouting the Harare principles

campaign against terrorism

return to normal

return to normal

times of loss or wretchedness

business as usual

restores something of its moral authority
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Against evil

Against evil

26
Against evil

2-Oct-01

2-Oct-01

10/2/2001
P

P

P

flung Bush's ultimatum back in his face

flung back in face

boot is on other foot

boot is on other foot

flung ultimatum back in face
chaotic heart of terror-ridden, travesty
state

chaotic heart of primitive, terror-ridden, travesty

chaotic heart of terror-ridden state

well-oiled armed machine

Taleban publicly slammed the door

hosts

calling shots Taleban fires

only force will prise it open

publicly slammed door

Taleban have publicly slammed the door

tear at roots of terrorism

vital impact

the long haul

taunt from Taleban to come and get your man

long haul

roots of terrorism

dangers of inaction now outweigh risks

tear at roots of terrorism

partners in guilt

given heart to Taleban's internal opponents

partners in guilt

Washington reticent to declare hand

medieval horrors/Khan's horde cruelty surpassed

declaring its hand

storm given heart to Taleban's opponents

bribed way to power

a taunt

military muscle

ruled more by terror than sword

medieval horrors

ruled more by terror than by the sword

compact reduces risk of post-Taleban vacuum

strike power

post-Taleban vacuum

forged from hope of help

post-Taleban vacuum

Afghanistan's bane

Afghanistan's bane

Afghanistan's bane

taunt

A Fatwa on Terror

A Fatwa on Terror

27
4-Oct-01

10/4/2001
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27
A Fatwa on Terror
4-Oct-01

P

P

P

seen spate of attacks

spate of attacks

the Establishment

West has no quarrel with Islam

set upon

extending the hand of tolerance to Islam

Islamophobia

determined assaults

West has seen a spate of attacks

opinion-makers

Islamophobia

those with no connection set upon

less vocal on essential first step

essential first step

assaults on prejudice

brought down those towers

counter the claims

conference denounced

besmirch all fellow believers

extending hand of tolerance

argument of hatred preached

counter claims of fanatics

reciprocal language

the enemies of understanding

win argument against hatred

Muted condemnation

Muted condemnation

stop recruitment of boys from Birmingham

confessional solidarity

Muslims in their midst

speak of extending hand of tolerance

enemies of understanding

Islam as a tolerant religion

hear similar reciprocal language

make revulsion explicit

in the name of Islam

confessional solidarity

Muslims in their midst

opinion-makers

enemies of understanding Christianity/Islam

forcefully condemned

it was less vocal

make revulsion explicit

opinion-makers

moderates are to win the argument

War of nerves

War of nerves
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28
War of nerves

5-Oct-01

5-Oct-01

10/5/2001
D

P

D

dispel absurd conspiracy theories circulating

lift malaise

court of public opinion

stiffen determination of most coalition leaders

faces

heart of the Muslim world

widespread panic spread across America

intelligence assembled

evidence hard on heels of Blair's warning
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signal normal life will not be disrupted

first stage of presenting information

room for negotiation

lift malaise now hanging over Western societies

hard on the heels

describing terrorists as bacteria

mass of compelling circumstantial evidence

terrible hours

pattern of meticulous long-term planning

appalling probability

interests on one hand
elements in encirclement being
interlocked

terrorists as bacteria

caught

ceasefire has broken down

turn on his country's protégés

lay out America's needs

fear feeds fear

instill same public commitment in House of Saud

courteous but plain language

lift the malaise now hanging

caught between interests on one hand

encirclement interlocked

under the pressure of its hardliners

public opinion menacingly hostile to US presence

move diplomacy forward

panic that spread

lay out US needs in courteous plain language

fear feeds on fear

move diplomacy forward

encirclement of Afghanistan being interlocked

dispel circulating theories

sufficient grounds for indictment

fear feeds on fear

widespread panic spread

culpable carelessness began to emerge
29

Just the beginning

Just the beginning

29
Just the beginning

7-Oct-01

7-Oct-01

10/7/2001
P

P

P

Sundance to our Butch Cassidy

glowing tributes

all the hallmarks of this work

straight out of Ian Fleming story

a mythical figure

straight out of Ian Fleming story

twisted millionaire mastermind holed up in hideout

straight out of Ian Fleming story

no country is beyond his reach

not a war in which you can negotiate

twisted millionaire mastermind

"Sundance to our Butch Cassidy"

shoring up American-led alliance

cells of fanatical followers

they came to a sticky end

came to sticky end

fresh attacks

jumping-off point

West has not lashed out

chilling

Israel refuses to lie low

marked return to normal

breaks up

America courts other Arab leaders

ring closing around Bin Laden

hailed

Mr. Bush has risen to the challenge

Afghanistan's cruel winter

shoring up

New anti-terrorist measures on cards
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humiliated as Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg

fragile situation

ring is closing around bin Laden

mistake we made in Gulf War

ring is closing

spawning of a new generation of followers

just reprisals about to start

choose martyr's fate

Taliban leaders showed their guile

urge White House to repulse Saddam

spawning

twisted millionaire mastermind

winning campaign

press ahead

purify the Islamic world
30

Another front

Another Front

30
Another front

8-Oct-01

8-Oct-01

10/8/2001
R

R

D

at stake are lives and livelihoods of all

necessity of speedy response

surprise like lightning--a necessity of war

megalomaniac quasi-fascist

that shattering day

that shattering day

share fanatical bigotry or murderous intentions

met terrible deaths

met their terrible deaths

global domination by neo-caliphate of extremists

an unlooked-for eloquence

information, the lifeblood of democracy

malign perversion of Islam ruling by fear

over tense weeks

putting whole of society in "brace position"

America bears greatest burden of leadership

veering

most crucial operations likely off-screen

lightning strikes before thunder gives out report

running out of time

that shattering day
veering yesterday between defiance and
blackmail

lifeblood

progress will be hard to chart
Afghanistan one corner of worldwide
canvas

sparse information

shattered the West's peace

lifeblood of democracy

hone rhetoric of readiness

diplomatic ground that has to be covered

putting whole society in brace position

balancing act

balancing act

hone rhetoric of readiness

off-screen

all arms of public life

one corner of worldwide canvas

worldwide canvas

no backing away

when freedom defeats fear

crumble

freedom defeats fear

shattered West's peace but not will

unimaginable only a month ago

burden of leadership
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31
The defeatist chorus

The defeatist chorus

31
The defeatist chorus

14-Oct-01

14-Oct-01

10/8/2001
P

P

P

doom-mongers are out and about

course of war hard to call

overcome by same jaundice as Jeremiah

hunt down

course of this war
fundamental weapons=clear-sighted
resolve

new role to play

fragile alliance

point to the growing hostility

mass photo-calls and anti-western grumbling

widen the war

promises to deliver "a new corpse"

flag-burning and jihad-mongering

unconventional conflict

school of defeatism

rallying Muslim opinion against great Satan

clear-sighted resolve

overcome by same jaundice as Jeremiah

give Japanese easy ride to Pearl Harbor

nurturing a wide alliance

will become a forgotten footnote

miscalculated like Japanese/US lacked resolve

ended their innocence

opens the way to direct American attacks

plight of people will become more acute

theocratic thuggery

the "great Satan"

allies' reluctance to stake everything

become a forgotten footnote

a long haul

no precipitate rush to widen war against terrorism

long haul

give Japanese easy ride to Pearl Harbor

September 11 ended their innocence

friendless

plight of people more acute

Afghans new start/free from perpetual civil war

history's losers

British will have a new role to play

rules by theocratic thuggery
challenge to him having peaked and faded
away

new role to play

battle for public opinion

reluctance to stake everything

nurturing a wide alliance

Airport insecurity

Airport insecurity
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Airport insecurity

17-Oct-01

10/17/2001
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17-Oct-01

P

P

P

wave of emergency legislation

beyond its reach

beyond the government's reach

airport insecurity

wave of emergency legislation

wave of emergency registration

take all possible steps to counter terrorism

tightened

possible steps to counter terrorism

responsibility split

visible measures

broken the rules

sterile areas

sensitive positions

aircraft as weapons

rules

Responsibility is split

sensitive positions in British airports

breaches threaten every citizen's safety

follows rules closely

sterile areas

aircraft as weapons

lax rules

makes mockery of placement of guards

beyond reach

sensitive time

lax rules

security tightened

sterile areas

under supervision

screening passengers

unvetted workers airside

unvetted workers airside

makes mockery

a mockery

security breaches threaten safety

hold baggage

highly visible armed guards

less visible measures

things beyond gov'ts reach

use aircraft as weapons

responsibility for security is split

highly visible policing

security breaches

follow the rules closely

Rock Solidarity

Rock solidarity
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33
Rock solidarity

22-Oct-01

22-Oct-01

10/22/2001
R

R

R

rock solidarity

touched hearts

messages touched the hearts

touched hearts of NY

stricken city

concert was largely the brainchild

stricken city

raucous, cathartic charity

will have moved America
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revivalist meeting as political rally
mountains of money/towers of steel/hearts of
gold

brainchild

revived his 1977 hit

unabashed patriotism

sentiment cloyed the airwaves

brainchild

moved America

this concert had many motives

NY's resilience, energy, unity

flanked

voicing America's contempt for terrorists

unabashed patriotism/conviction moved America

revived

reviving something of New York's

terrorist atrocities

Britain's solidarity

bruised zest and gusto

brought to US loss UK’s emotions (Diana)

Sentiment cloyed airwaves

mountains of courage

sentiment cloyed airwaves/schmaltz dripped

schmaltz dripped from stage

hearts of gold

reverence for city's heroes

city's heroes

raucous, cathartic concert

Britain's solidarity

revivalist meeting

schmaltz dripped from the stage

voicing America's contempt for terrorists

bruised zest/gusto

revivalist meeting

reviving something of NY's bruised zest and gusto

massive/modern defiance

Britain's solidarity
34

A man alone

A man alone

34
A man alone

25-Oct-01

25-Oct-01

10/25/2001
P

P

P

Blair saw his duty/course was fixed

see his duty

see his duty

support in wearying war against common enemy

rumbling debate

eradicating menace of regime

course was fixed/collision course

his course was fixed
finger pointed in the direction of bin
Laden

finger pointed in direction of bin Laden

breathed sigh of relief

starve networks of power

campaign that began on 9/11

many fronts

"academies of death"

hope that road will never turn to Iraq is reckless

starve networks

this long haul

logic puts Iraq and West on collision course

fractured country

coalition will dissolve

keep fingerprints off operations

roused

the road will never turn to Iraq

destroy credibility of no quarrel with Islamic world

settle old score

Britain could find itself alone
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starve transnational terrorist networks of power

living memory

fall of France

destroy academies of death

extend spatially

no proof positive

operating within friendless theocratic tyranny

Powerful figures

living memory

eradicating the menace

look under rock as hard as possibly can
Iraq able to keep fingerprints off
operations

Britain as alone as after fall of France

keep fingerprints off operations

evidence against Iraq were to emerge

battle doesn't have finite point

united view/balance of argument

settle an old score in Iraq

Nuclear network

Nuclear network

35

35
Nuclear network

26-Oct-01

26-Oct-01

10/26/2001

D

P

P

leaden shoe waiting to drop

chilling information

chilling information

chilling info

leaden shoe waiting to drop

leaden shoe waiting to drop

terrorise enemies of God

hinted

acquisition of weapons as "religious duty"

mastermind behind last month's attacks

extravagant claims

mastermind behind attacks

Chechen gangsters

agents move freely

the hunt

nuclear switches

hunt

confronted the horrors

bin Laden's source of supply

infiltrated

lift the spectre of nuclear terrorism

hunt

confronted with horrors

dirty bomb

start chain reaction

lift spectre

hard evidence

horrors of full-scale nuclear attack

primitive weapons

struggle must extend spatially

lift spectre of nuclear terrorism

hard evidence

extravagant claims

dirty bomb most primitive of nuclear weapons

What must be assumed

exposed to radiation poisoning

Speed/surprise essential

Downing Street is noncommittal
speed and surprise will be all the more
essential

hard evidence

Downing Street noncommittal

most primitive of weapons

Downing Street noncommittal

full-scale

assumes greater urgency

209

36
The Blair shuttle

The Blair shuttle

36
The Blair shuttle

2-Nov-01

2-Nov-01

11/2/2001
D

P

P

this conflict without front lines

gloss

put the best gloss on

terrorist threat not weather of future

left to insist

better to "get your hands dirty"

spokes of umbrella strong to withstand storm

conflict without front lines

his value to Bush is that of a conduit

orthodoxy against usurping Islam for violent ends

conduit/lightning conductor

even of a lighting conductor

value as conduit, lightning conductor

truth grapple w/ falsehood

truth must grapple with falsehood

truth must grapple with falsehood

brand of charm

diplomatic momentum

let events be driven by extremists

diplomatic momentum

sure that he is husbanding his authority

ended indolent self-satisfaction (Pearl Harbor)

secured private assurances

collective nervous breakdown

berates terrorists trying to hijack our religion

taking public drubbing

"trying to hijack our religion"

derives solely from capacity to destabilise

the Middle Eastern equation

a more positive gloss

road to safer world curves through northerly arc

form an inner ring

mend fences with Italy

calculated mixture of discipline and decisiveness

collective nervous breakdown

terrorist threat not weather of future

nexus of strategic co-ordination

nervous toleration

spokes of US umbrella to withstand storm

broader task of restoring order to world

refashioned

an a la carte coalition

refashioned structures of security

spokes of US umbrella withstand storm

nervous toleration

From New York skies

From New York skies
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37
From New York skies

13-Nov-01

13-Nov-01

11/13/2001
P

P

D
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only now returning to normal life

long-threatened further act

plane climbed for a take-off

reinforce sense of vulnerability/gripped the city

no early indications

returning to normal life

exacerbating bewilderment

no coincidence

let fear push patriotism/courage out of minds

all too possible an explanation

sense of vulnerability gripped the city
city/country facing random/indefinite
terror

facing random and indefinite terror
mysterious anthrax attacks spread through
America

returning to normal life

confidence suffered a further blow

vulnerability gripped city

wiped 200 points off the Dow Jones

wiped 200 points off Dow Jones index

facing random indefinite terror

level-headed response of mayor

not stop life over city coming to immediate halt

further blow

life over much of city coming to halt

outcry over sloppy inspections
challenge America's leadership up to White
House

level-headed response

check-in procedures not watertight

sloppy inspections/lax regulations

let fear push patriotism out of minds

weather collapse of business confidence

Congress stalled move

braced for further contraction

braced for further contraction

small comfort to New Yorkers

infiltrate workforce of baggage handlers

watertight
let fear push patriotism/courage out of
minds

Taleban suffered first serious setback

industry braced

lax regulations

long-threatened further act of terrorism

weather collapse

Congress has stalled the sensible move

38
One Sunday in 1941

sloppy inspections

38
One Sunday in 1941

7-Dec-01
R

38
One Sunday in 1941

7-Dec-01

7-Dec-01

Sara

Stacey

R

R

9/11 put Americans back in touch with date of
infamy

fear has ranged itself against freedom

slaughter of civilians

This does not feel like war

Pearl Harbor tipped scales

fear has ranged itself against freedom

fear has ranged itself against freedom

reluctant, isolationist US

set Islam against the West

September's slaughter of civilians

date which will live in infamy/date of infamy

humiliate American power

US never stronger than when it feels vulnerable

This does not feel like war

aligned the rest of the world on America's side

spend for victory, not dig for it

destroy its (America's) confidence
showing world's mightiest power to be
impotent

aim to humiliate Am. Power/destroy confidence

speech will deal

lethal weapon of willingness to die

set Islam against West

devastating attacks

Osama Bin Laden did not bargain for
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aligned the rest of the world on America's
side

showing world's mightiest power to be impotent

US reluctantly concluding

tiny bands of fanatical plotters
barely armed but with lethal weapon of willingness to
die
unfamiliar menace

September slaughter of civilians
al-Qaeda's aim to humiliate/destroy
confidence
showing world's mightiest power to be
impotent

these two devastating attacks
"remember the character of onslaught" valid
today

tiny bands of fanatical plotters
barely armed with lethal weapon of willingness to
die

on American soil

asked to spend for victory, not dig for it

Am. Paid heavily for failures

tiny bands of fanatical plotters

39

paid heavily for failures
tipped the scales

39
First things first

First things first

freedom from fear
people asked to spend for victory, not dig
for it

39
First things first

11-Dec-01

11-Dec-01

12/11/2001
P

P

P

darkness enveloped lower Manhattan

darkness enveloped lower Manhattan

darkness enveloped lower Manhattan

fanatics preaching hate engineered mass murder

aircraft as missiles

aircraft as missiles

rip apart fabric of civilised society

rip fabric of civilised society

engineered an act of mass murder

target was future of everyman

everyman

victims in their paths

rhythm of normality quietly returned

rhythm of normality quietly returned

rip apart the fabric of civilised society

grip of al-Qaeda on cities

impotence allayed by US pressure

future of everyman

no premature embrace of illusory peace

grip

rhythm of normality

miles to go before sleep/spared to carry blankets
British public would dearly love to declare war
over

match mood

grip of al-Qaeda on cities and towns

head force

Britain now moves to centre stage

centre stage

centre stage

countryside is alive with al-Qaeda

high profile peace role being generated

countryside alive

countryside alive

countryside alive with al-Qaeda fighters

dangerously invidious position

token international armed presence

enemies half-defeated take long time to clear out

huge scope for local "misunderstandings"

premature embrace of illusory peace
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leave Kandahar unchallenged

no premature embrace

miles to go before they sleep

dangerously invidious position

miles to go before sleep

pressure being generated

40
Not Correct

40
Not Correct

40
Not Correct

15-Jan-02

15-Jan-02

15-Jan-02

Sara

Stacey

P

P

D

bright side/sign NYC back on path to psychological
recovery

Sesame Street has a lot to answer for

kicking the stuffing out of each other

struggle against evil

look on the bright side
back on the path to psychological
recovery

better than a row about political correctness

embraced by entire community

kicking the stuffing out of each other

this pugnacious metropolis back on form

city that they defended can grant them this

in the style of a Benetton advertisement

triumvirate of white troopers
multiracial trinity in style of Benetton
advertisement

NYC back on path

Sesame Street has a lot to answer for

look on the bright side

a struggle against evil

Sesame Street has a lot to answer for
memorial to horror should reflect struggle against
evil

Benetton advertisement
glorious legend and inglorious reality of
Mafia

embraced by the entire community

base specious philosophies on racial lines

Italian community has given

Americans should be colour-blind

uniquely courageous urban army

Irish provided Murphia

fall back on fact and statistic

glorious legend and inglorious reality of Mafia

sounds innocent
traditions that grew from wave of
immigration
al-Qaeda may base its specious
philosophies

accident of the wave of immigration
uniquely courageous urban army
(firefighters)

public-spirited Irish provided Murphia
recognition of heroism on their own home ground
colours they are blind to appear in correct
proportions
accident of the wave of immigration

on their own home ground

race was motivating factor

city that they defended (firefighters)

memorial to horror

a Murphia of cops and firefighters
41

41
A world transformed

specious philosophies

A world transformed
9-Mar-02
3/9/2002

213

41
A world transformed
9-Mar-02

R

P

D

world caught breath in shock

world caught breath in shock

world caught breath in shock

ruthlessly contemptuous of life

transformation/transfixed by attacks

transfixed by the attacks

world transformed

ruthlessly contemptuous of life

attack on freedom itself

vulnerability of world's greatest power

unimaginable carnage

elusive Hydra-headed opponents

attack on freedom itself

myopically reluctant

root out regimes that allied with terrorists

diminishing of that collective horror

attacks revealed

turbulent, fractured apology of state

global menace must and can be beaten back

liberty to circulate

"academies of death"

elusive and Hydra-headed opponents

collective horror

starve international terrorists cells

America's will and capacity to root out regimes

global menace

raise game in response to emergency

turbulent, fractured apology for a state

elusive, Hydra-headed opponents

enemies within the gates

aligning to defend order against enemies at gate

root out regimes

deeply rooted historical suspicions

no neutral ground in fight

turbulent, fractured apology for state

Washington is being high-handed

transformation in American national mood

starve cells

an event receding into the past

duty and inclination met on 9/11

raise his game

puts Iraq on a collision course with West

9/11 not receding into past but continuing threat

no neutral ground

myopically reluctant

42
Coalition Politics

42
Coalition Politics

42
Coalition Politics

3-Mar-02

3-Mar-02

3-Mar-02

Sara

Stacey

P

D

P

smash terrorists determined to attack liberal dem
values

act of remembrance for victims of terror

victims of terrorism

arrogance born of rapid success

matters will develop

War on Terror

forceful and measure performance

campaign drawn to close

action against terror

work best in concert with coalition

idle talk

for blackmail or battle

mass terror

every corner of the planet
leaders to take on terrorist factions within
borders

response to friendly overtures

instruments of death

the hysterical coverage
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sentence and sentiment essence of Am. For.
Policy

nations smash terrorists determined

market for weapons of mass destruction

nations outside US should welcome

made it clear

stance that those outside US should welcome

US must not feel constrained

in the market for weapons

pushing al-Qaeda deep into mountains

plan a bit over the top

absolute essence of foreign policy

no immunity no neutrality

leaked

to smash terrorists

tackle contention directly

US had received

to attack liberal democratic values

must never control ultimate instruments of death

enormous emphasis

hysterical coverage

nations will desist

for blackmail or battle
there can be no immunity and no
neutrality

men with no respect for life

work best in concert with coalition

"men with no respect for life [...]"

43

a bit over the top

43
Intelligent intelligence

Intelligent intelligence

43
Intelligent intelligence

6-Jun-02

6-Jun-02

6/6/2002
P

P

P

confusion in America is a warning

far-fetched

unending struggle to improve vigilance

intelligent intelligence

painstaking reassessment

task still has far to go

re-examination of old assumptions

vital installations

security in mind

gossip picked up at mosque

leaving nothing to chance

scale of the confusion…coming to light

penetrate Islamic cells

first line of defence

Britain caught unawares

human failing led to the atrocities

burdensome new routines

MI6, the overseas arm

scale of confusion

evil men

chain of command

London as communications/financial capital

scale of confusion

intel can avert devastation of evil men

petty infighting

coming to light

burdensome new routines

good intelligence avert devastation of evil men

caught unawares

first line of defence

thwarted by fences and padlocks

came as shock

determined terrorism

burdensome new routines

overdue

infighting in two intelligence agencies

permanent loss of easy access

information yielded

gossip picked up at the mosque

clear chain of command

penetrate cells

confusion is warning

215

unclear and present danger

permanent vigilance
44

unclear and present danger
44

Security matters

Security matters

44
Security matters

8-Jul-02

8-Jul-02

7/8/2002
P

P

P

terrorism/lightning unlikely strike same twice

Terrorism, like lightning

Terrorism, like lightning

take heed of obvious timetable

matched more quietly

day passed off peacefully

immediate aftermath of the atrocities

day passed peacefully

take heed of the obvious timetable

live their lives in fear of terrorism

obvious timetable

pass on the slightest concern

fear of whipping up panic

transformed

bin Laden's home video efforts

weapons of an even more sinister nature

state of disrepair

demonstrate network not extinguished

residual memory of 1970s pub bombings

event to carry clout

event to carry clout

extinguished by engaging in spectacular activity

extraordinary precautions

dirty bomb

apparent end to bin Laden's home video efforts

ordinary life

campaigned aimed at inflicting casualties

bin Laden network in state of disrepair

residual memory

residual memory

passage of time led people to act like 9/10/01

weapons of sinister nature

weapons of sinister nature

conduct operations against democratic world

stepped up

Government has stepped up activities

ward off potential terrorist assault

whipping up panic

whipping up panic

we are used to terrorism

expect unexpected

obvious measures

exaggerate the chance

vigilance

tenuous information
45

45
One year on

One year on

45
One year on

11-Sep-02

11-Sep-02

9/11/2002
R

R

P
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battle over interpretation bitter

US destiny not to have ideology but to be one

threat undeniably evolved
bitter interpretation battle-how deaths
understood
transformative moment/became painfully
aware

indulgence ended on 9/11 unlikely revisited

importance rarely witnessed

dedicated to destruction of advanced world

prophesied

wake of Sept. 11
pattern of human activity being
overturned

remembrance doesn't equal failure to forget

in the wake of September 11

released from hold of Taleban

transformative moment rarely witnessed

enduring "normalcy"

core of tension between civilisations

life would never be the same

masked an underlying uncertainty

hard information

changed character of ordinary life
US citadel to be destroyed/advertisement for
progress

scale beyond conventional comprehension

suffered from an allergy to publicity

deeply troubled nation

balance of presumption

pattern of human activity overturned overnight

still technically hunting

legacy of Sept. 11 rests in three theatres

wake of 9/11

period of innocence and indulgence

war to be waged without fingerprints

Afghanistan not transformed into Sweden

many whispers but no hard information

US was advertisement for human progress

legacy of 9/11 in 3 theatres

hands on clock barely moved

other side of same coin

closer to cult leader than theological figure

balance of presumption

opportunistic dash to settle old scores

hands on clock barely moved since 9/11
affairs core of tension between civilsations
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in many spheres, it could be asserted
airlines did not collapse

The Times' Salient Figures by
Article

3

2

tempered by fire and changed

1 Terror for All

recover identity as young nation

9/12/2001 suffered an urban avalanche

turbulence

new truths of a changed world
true bolt from blue aimed to humble heart of nation
trying out JFK's shoes
treacherous political terrain
hatreds sit alongside/gentler arts

2 Still the Enemy

we are all Americans

9/13/2001 no melting into shadows/shroud preparations

sloppy intelligence

terrorism could hobble American power

jockeying

Schadenfreude

muddied/fuzzy policies
pavement carpeted with flowers
rivalries buried/Parisian sniping banished

sifting the rubble mountain

3 With one voice

9/14/2001 president uses words like pieces of wood

Replies of steel: Answers to
4 inevitable
criticisms of an inevitable
response

masked, dust-caked, bone tired, devoted
crews
anger/anguish more likely to mount than
subside

actor in drama whose first act is unfolding

towers the very opposite of Babel

clean their own houses of terrorist taint

silent dead of many lands speak to that truth

world divides into two camps/no middle way

Pakistan's corrosive political corruption

flexing of America's vast muscle

bells tolled yesterday

called to the colours

moving silence

9/15/2001 call spirits from dusty deep

make price of terrorism unbearable

unleashing corrosive cycle of violence
terror rots timbers on which civilised coexistence rests
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justice is civilisation's most potent weapon

shackles
America "freedom's home"
betraying democracy’s values
not shirk this slow, deliberate test of strength
democracy noisy, sceptical affair/fool's errand/Shakes/Hegel
5 This is a world war

bring to head struggle shadowing West
9/16/2001 fuel flame of terror

no going back to life before
Muslim "wild west"

hawks are true peacemakers

keeps head down

pressure to alleviate root causes of terrorism

fortress America was already moribund
Great Satan
strike heart
turning point in history (like Truman Doctrine)
global cop

6 The old war

invisible enemy without borders

bewildering range of circumstance

9/17/2001 found his voice and hit his stride

7 Pakistan's choice

standing shoulder to shoulder

mount leadership campaign

gravity of situation

notion of war/law rests on structure

character to rise to challenge

best placed to whisper words in right ears

parallel to our present times

growing Talebanisation of Pakistan

blunt demands

9/17/2001 preaching message of hate

face

growing grip of Islamic extremism

inspired by zealotry of cleric holding sway

cut off any room for manoevre

revealed the hypocrisy

run into wall of obscurantist militancy

hand over bin Laden to escape retaliation

tilt world opinion decisively toward India

international cover

grim political position
Pakistan's indulgence of Taleban
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8 Speed not haste

legions are invisible

track down

9/18/2001 how many heads the Hydra has

as networks regroup trail may go cold

melt into shadows of anarchic or outlaw lands

Kremlin suspicions of NATO designs

muderous networks hunted down
little real appetite for war
Islamist assailants have tentacles everywhere
flush of horrified sympathy
9 Back in business

fade away into outright recession

prolonged slump

9/18/2001 deliberate assault on symbol of nation

self-inflicted mistakes

form of economic cavalry

big boost

cushioned from aftershocks

make or break sentiment in markets

limit damage triggered by last week's atrocities

economic victims of terrorism

upstaged

formula
testing
robust efforts

10 In the air

the nation's life

global agreement

9/18/2001 stepped up their own vigilance

higher standards

stopping kamikaze terrorists

El Al set example

plane as bomb

chemical sniffer to detect explosives

recovering some of its position
immediate steps
fell sharply in value
laxity of the past
old habits
11 Terrorism at home

triumphalist bile fills airwaves

sleepers ready to strike
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9/19/2001 evidence is sifted

gave evil abundant opportunity

clearer the terrible truth becomes

turn upside down

exploit frameworks of freedom against freedom

play by the book

puzzle not pieced together

terrorism should have no hiding place

enemy within gate
12 Dig deep

spectacle of towers of civilised world plummeting
9/19/2001 scorched into collective consciousness

dig deep into pockets
slaughter used as weapon

replayed in flashback to newly insomniac world

humanitarianism at its most epic

world felt itself to be global village/terrorism is a leveller

humankind cannot bear much reality

gave up lives scaling fatal monoliths

assuage feelings

desire to restore life to city
glorious mundanity
abomination's wake
world waits for dust to settle/caught in obscene free-fall
13 United home front

extinguish all signs of normal political life
9/20/2001 slip into rebellion from one wing

political headaches
democracy's best retaliation against terror is
to thrive

temporarily lost stomach for fight

democracy itself under attack

political jousting

normal political life

dug from dust

West plans retaliation

hearts of public and politician

crude anti-gov't tactics from the other
slip into rebellion
lose little sleep
appear statesmanlike

14 It's the economy, still

avoidance of serious economic slump
9/20/2001 snatched defeat from jaws of any military victory
psychological blow struck by terrorists
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crisis bringing economic ruin to millions
Stability Pact not allowed to become sterility
pact
build military coalition

gov'ts appreciate danger they face
terrible blow
join int'l drive to avert slump
so-called war room/real war
collapse of WTC not world trade
15 Long war

White House's brusque insistence
9/20/2001 bin Laden's Afghan lairs

al-Qaeda academies of death

shed some post-Vietnam habits of thought

surgical strikes

caught by Achilles' heel

electronic battlefield

test of strength against terrorist Hydra

in the frame

mobilisation gathering pace

perilously unstable launching pad

Prime suspect: The Taleban are
16 playing
first step
out a deadly farce

staying America's hand

Taleban playing out deadly farce

time in hand/bargains to be struck

9/21/2001 freedom takes up cudgels against fear

speed far outstrips allied response to Iraq

marathon ahead

no avenue neglected

deadly force of express train bearing down

silence surrounds all military detail

riposte to carnage visited on America

utter necessity of this unwelcome war
Washington is gleaning intelligence

17 Back on the ground

country alive with troubled and legitimate
questions

Britain girds against present danger
9/22/2001 sworn to shred fabric of freedom

treacherous Afghan wastes on far side of world

enemy shorn of scruples

rhetoric rallying world against common enemy

not marching but tumbling into front line of war

standing shoulder to shoulder

speed high ground abroad/low road gov't treads at home

Britain standing in line of only two abreast

no shadow of doubt
shadowy al-Qaeda
lifted Blair's fatigue
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most likely third musketeer/France not fallen in line

18 It won't be quick

pouring fuel on flames of Islamic fundamentalism
9/24/2001 world standing edgily at brink of war

find excuses otherwise occupied when bullets
fly
alliances suffer stresses/strains in heat of battle

struck heart of America

Britain has shown deft hand/resolute eye

battle for world opinion

time for steady nerves/precise action
marathon effort to rid world of terrorist cells
pale compared to these mega-terrorists
fighting new kind of war/new kind of enemy

19 Layer upon layer

layer upon layer/layers of global support on core/this outer layer
9/24/2001 channel of communication too long clogged
tackling root cause of extremism

elimination of scourge of terrorism
common fears make common cause
tackling

Muslim world recoils instinctively from attack on fellow
diplomatic fence around Afghanistan
America's diplomatic footwork
won "shoulder to shoulder" backing
heterodox coalition
festering troubles of Middle East
20 Palimpsest

however fluid the chessboard now

starved of funds

9/26/2001 careless language costs lives
shared outrage

disgusted retreat from medieval theocracy
set to side Russia's anxieties about US
penetration

close gaps in this unconventional common front

ask countries to stand against terrorist menace

enemy of my enemy should be courted
palimpsest

balance that US and UK must strike
pragmatic layering of decisions co-operate
flexibly

intelligence-sharing script constantly rewritten

shift in the course of long campaign ahead
deftly handled
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21 Crouch, spring, crouch

elusive identikit of terror filling out

deliver up

9/28/2001 pockets of Pashtun heartlands

Taleban hurl defiance one day

Pentagon expects time to fray more nerves
close down terrorist cells/loopholes

sharp memories
moment intelligence coalesces will be swift
spring

US will not fire more than warning shot or two

dismantling

America is crouched
waiting game like no other
as tourniquet tightens it begins to pinch
22 Intelligence needed

evidence emerging of cells and agents/sleepers
9/28/2001 funding Jackal cunning/ slipped between aliases

apparatus of terror
growing aghast

intelligence by far most deadly new weapon

vital pooling of information

myriad scraps of info

hindsight underlines blame

mask terrible conspiracy of destruction

sheltered in London
scale of terrorists' ambitions
Islamist terrorist networks more entrenched
crack down on organized crime
overseas tip-offs
closing G8 airspace/ringing venue

23 Tough on camera

crack down on those preaching extremist hatred
9/29/2001 uncover network that made London terrorist haven
root out terrorists in our midst

galvanise public opinion
Britain must rise to challenge

American fury at Dickensian pace

heart of conspiracy
end cynical exploitation of right of repeated
appeal

Europe's solidarity with US melts into nothing

pussyfooting of prosecutors

blacken the name of all Islam

terrorism thrives on propaganda
stiffen response
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24 Who defends Britain?

Whitehall's wobbles

tragic side effect of assault on America

9/30/2001 smacks of bureaucratic fudge

joined the hunt

vague talk

turf warfare

habit of muddling through

fanaticism vs. freedom uneven at best of times

remove recklessly such underpinning plays into hands

exploit every loophole in statute book
frontline target
slow business in courts
daydreaming
latest Whitehall wheeze
happily exploit that openness

25 Tunnel vision

tendency toward tunnel vision

difficult to draw comfort

10/1/2001 swept every issue from agenda

statesmen today are blinded

universal gaze turned toward NYC

draw eyes to rest of world

eclipsed reports

speculating on war against terrorism

calling for business as usual

halt collapse of world economy

life will not return to normal until vision is restored

everyday human activity ground to halt

obscured by noxious covering of dust and ashes

restore moral authority
the explosions in America

26 Against evil

flung Bush's ultimatum back in his face
10/2/2001 chaotic heart of primitive, terror-ridden travesty of state

27 A Fatwa on Terror

long haul
partners in guilt

Taleban publicly slammed the door

declaring its hand

tear at roots of terrorism

boot is on other foot

compact reduces risk of post-Taleban vacuum
taunt

given heart to Taleban's internal opponents
medieval horrors/Khan's hordes cruelty
suppressed

Afghanistan's bane

ruled more by terror than sword

seen spate of attacks

muted condemnation
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10/4/2001 enemies of understanding between Christianity/Islam

make revulsion explicit

opinion-makers

confessional solidarity

less vocal on essential first step

hear similar reciprocal language
speak of extending hand of tolerance
counter claims of fanatics
Muslims in their midst
Islamophobia

lift malaise now hanging over Western societies

28 War of nerves

10/5/2001 caught between interests on one hand
fear feeds on fear
widespread panic spread across America

dispel absurd conspiracy theories circulating
hard on heels
encirclement of Afghanistan being interlocked
lay out US needs in courteous, but plain
language
move diplomacy forward

straight out of Ian Fleming story

29 Just the beginning

Sundance to our Butch Cassidy

10/7/2001 ring closing around Bin Laden

spawning

twisted millionaire mastermind holed up in hideout

shoring up American-led alliance
came to sticky end

that shattering day

30 Another front

met terrible deaths

10/8/2001 lifeblood of democracy

balancing act

one corner of worldwide canvas

off-screen
hone rhetoric of readiness
shattered West's peace but not will
greatest burden of leadership
freedom defeats fear

British have new role to play

31 The defeatist chorus

overcome by same jaundice as Jeremiah
give Japanese easy ride to Pearl Harbor

10/8/2001
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allies' reluctance to stake everything
no precipitate rush to widen war against
terrorism
September 11 ended their innocence
rules by theocratic thuggery
course of war hard to call
clear-sighted resolve
nurturing a wide alliance
become a forgotten footnote
long haul
32 Airport insecurity

sterile areas

wave of emergency legislation

10/17/2001 rules (lax/follows closely)

take all possible steps to counter terrorism

aircraft as weapons

unvetted workers airside

beyond reach

sensitive positions

makes mockery
responsibility split
visible
breaches threaten every citizen's safety
33 Rock solidarity

brainchild

touched hearts of NYC

10/22/2001 unabashed patriotism/conviction moved America
sentiment cloyed airwaves/schmaltz dripped

voicing America's contempt for terrorists

reviving something of NY's bruised zest and gusto

reverence for city's heroes
mountains of money/towers of steel/hearts of
gold

Britain's solidarity

stricken city

as much revivalist meeting as political rally
34 A man alone

Blair saw his duty/course was fixed

settle old score

10/25/2001 keep fingerprints off operations

Britain as alone as after fall of France

starve transnational terrorist networks of power
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living memory

destroy academies of death
hope that road will never turn to Iraq is reckless
finger pointed in direction of bin Laden
eradicating menace of regime
35 Nuclear network

leaden shoe waiting to drop

mastermind behind last month's attacks

10/26/2001 chilling info

extravagant claims

hunt

speed/surprise essential

horrors of full-scale nuclear attack

most primitive of weapons

lift spectre of nuclear terrorism
dirty bomb most primitive of nuclear weapons
hard evidence
Downing Street non-committal
36 The Blair shuttle

spoke of umbrella strong enough to withstand storm
11/2/2001 value as conduit, lightning conductor
truth must grapple with falsehood

this conflict without front lines
terrorist threat not weather of future
gloss
diplomatic momentum
berates terrorists trying to hijack out religion
refashioned structures of security
collective nervous breakdown
nervous toleration

37 From New York skies

only now returning to normal life

further blow

11/13/2001 reinforce sense of vulnerability that gripped the city

level-headed response

facing random indefinite terror

long-threatened further act of terrorism

outcry over sloppy inspections/lax regulation
braced for further contraction

weather collapse of business confidence
not stop life over city from coming to immediate
halt

let fear push patriotism/courage out of minds

wiped 200 points of DJIA
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Congress stalled move
38 One Sunday in 1941

fear has ranged itself against freedom
12/7/2001 September's slaughter of civilians

Pearl Harbor tipped scales
US paid heavily for failures

al-Qaeda's aim to humiliate US power/destroy its confidence

set Islam against the West

showing world's mightiest power to be impotent

aligned the rest of the world on America's side

tiny bands of fanatical plotters

this does not feel like war
9/11 put Americans back in touch with date of
infamy

barely armed but with lethal weapon of willingness to die
civilians asked to spend for victory, not dig for it
39 First things first

darkness enveloped lower Manhattan
12/11/2001 rip apart fabric of civilised society
target was future of everyman

aircraft as missiles
fanatics preaching hate engineered mass
murder
dangerously invidious position

rhythm of normality quietly returned
grip of al-Qaeda on cities
no premature embrace of illusory peace
miles to go before they sleep/spared to carry blankets
countryside alive with al-Qaeda fighters
centre stage

40 Not Correct

to look on the bright side/NY back on path to psychological
recovery
1/15/2002 multiracial trinity in style of Benetton advertisement

embraced by the entire community
city that they defended can grant them this

Sesame Street has a lot to answer for

kicking the stuffing out of each other

memorial to horror should reflect struggle against evil

uniquely courageous urban army

base specious philosophies on racial lines

glorious legend and inglorious reality of Mafia
recognition of heroism on their own home
ground
colour-blind/colours blind to appear in correct
proportions

public-spirited Irish provided Murphia
accident of the wave of immigration
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world caught breath in shock

41 A World Transformed

ruthlessly contemptuous of life

3/9/2002 elusive and Hydra-headed opponents

attack on freedom itself

America's will and capacity to root out regimes

diminishing of that collective horror

turbulent, fractured apology for a state

global menace must and can be beaten back

transformation in American national mood

starve cells
raise his game
9/11 not receding into past but continuing
threat
no neutral ground in fight
aligning to defend order against enemies at
gate
myopically reluctant

men with no respect for life mustn't control instruments of death

42 Coalition Politics

3/12/2002 smash terrorists determined to attack liberal democratic values

act of remembrance for victims of terror
plan a bit over the top
hysterical coverage
there can be no immunity and no neutrality
stance those outside US should welcome
in the market for weapons of mass destruction
for blackmail or battle
sentence and sentiment essence of US foreign
policy
work best in concert with coalition

43 Intelligent intelligence

scale of confusion

permanent vigilance

6/6/2002 good intelligence can avert devastation of evil men
burdensome new routines

caught unawares
clear chain of command
unclear/present danger
penetrate Islamic cells
infighting
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confusion
first line of defence

44 Security matters

terrorism/lightning unlikely to strike same place
twice
extinguished by engaging in spectacular
activity

take heed of obvious timetable
7/8/2002 fear of whipping up panic
weapons of an even more sinister nature

apparent end to bin Laden's home video efforts

residual memory of 1970s pub bombings

bin Laden network in state of disrepair
day passed peacefully
event to carry clout
stepped up

45 One year on

in the wake of 9/11
9/11/2002 transformative moment/importance rarely witnessed
US a citadel to be destroyed/advertisement for human progress

hands on clock barely moved since 9/11
bitter interpretation, battle how deaths
understood
affairs core of tension between civilisations
indulgence ended on 9/11 unlikely revisited
pattern of human activity overturned overnight
many whispers but no hard information
legacy of 9/11 in 3 theatres
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The Times of London Figural Categories
purpose

slaughter used as weapon

Civilised World

spectacle of towers of civilised world plummeting

Schadenfreude

crude anti-gov't tactics from the other

hatreds sit alongside gentler arts

democracy's best retaliation against terror is to thrive

world divides into two camps/no middle way

democracy itself under attack

America "freedom's home"

freedom takes up cudgels against fear

betraying democracy's values

sworn to shred fabric of freedom

clean own houses of terrorist taint

enemy shorn of scruples

democracies have made shackles for themselves

treacherous Afghan wastes on the far side of the world

justice is civilisation's most potent weapon

pale compared to these mega-terrorists

terror rots timbers on which civilised coexistence rests

common fears make common cause

form of economic cavalry

shared outrage

global cop

disgusted retreat from theocracy

run into wall of obscurantist militancy

balance that US and UK must strike

sleepers ready to strike

deliver up

gave evil abundant opportunity

crack down on organized crime

dig deep into pockets

end cynical exploitation of right of repeated appeal

assauge feelings

crack down on those preaching extremist hatred

gave up lives scaling fatal monoliths

happily exploit that openness

growing grip of Islamic extremism

fanaticism vs. freedom uneven at best of times

Muslim "wild west"

restore moral authority

ask countries to stand against terrorist menace

chaotic heart of primitive, terror-ridden travesty of state

Great Satan

ruled more by terror than sword

notion of war/law rests on structure

medieval horrors/Khan's hordes cruelty suppressed

international cover

enemies of understanding between Christianity/Islam

inspired by zealotry of clerics holding sway

Islamophobia

melt into shadows of anarchic/outlaw lands

Muslims in their midst

global agreement

freedom defeats fear

higher standards

aircraft as weapons

exploit frameworks of freedom against freedom

dirty bomb most primitive
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partners in guilt

September's slaughter of civilians

Afghanistan's bane

tiny bands of fanatical plotters

this conflict without front lines

barely armed but with lethal weapon of willingness to die

truth must grapple with falsehood

set Islam against the West

long-threatened further act of terrorism

aligned the rest of the world on America's side

rules by theocratic thuggery
nurturing wide alliance
let fear push patriotism/courage out of minds
rip apart fabric of civilised society
target was future of everyman
aircraft as missiles
ruthlessly contemptuous of life
attack on freedom itself
global menace must end and can be beaten back
turbulent, fractured apology for a state
aligning to defend order
only good intelligence can avert devastation of evil men
weapons of an even more sinister nature
affairs core of tension between civilisations
US citadel to be destroyed/advertisement for human
progress
men with no respect for life mustn't control instruments of
death
smash terrorists determined to attack liberal democratic
values
work best in concert with coalition
for blackmail or battle
there can be no immunity and no neutrality
memorial to horror should reflect struggle against evil
base specious philosophies on racial lines
recognition of heroism on their own home ground
this does not feel like war
fear has ranged itself against freedom
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life will not return to normal until vision is restored
purpose

everyday human activity ground to halt

Change/Time

that shattering day

recover identity as young nation

shattered West's peace but not will

tempered by fire and changed

September 11 ended their innocence

new truths of a changed world

last month's attacks

we are all Americans

only now returning to normal life

old rivalries buried/Parisian sniping vanished

facing random, indefinite terror

hawks are true peacemakers
fortress America moribund/shattered forever last
Tuesday

not stop life over city from coming to immediate halt
rhythm of normality returned
world caught breath in shock

no going back to life before

difficult to draw comfort

turning point in history (Truman Doctrine)

swept every issue from agenda

parallel to our present times

transformation in American national mood

limit damage triggered by last week's atrocities

diminishing of that collective horror

laxity of past

9/11 not receding into past but continuing threat

old habits

permanent vigilance

turn upside down

caught unawares

glorious mundanity

in the wake of 9/11

abomination's wake

hands on clock barely moved since 9/11

replayed in flashback to newly insomniac world

indulgence ended on 9/11 unlikely revisited

world felt itself to be global village/terror is a leveller

pattern of human activity overturned overnight

extinguish all sigs of normal political life

legacy of 9/11 in 3 theatres

so-called war room/real war

bitter interpretation, battle how deaths understood

shed some post-Vietnam habits of thought

transformative moment/importance rarely witnessed

utter necessity of this unwelcome war

world caught breath

fighting new kind of war/new kind of enemy

act of remembrance for victims of terror

heterodox coalition

this does not feel like war

intelligence by far most deadly new weapon

September's slaughter of civilians

calling for business as usual

9/11 put Americans back in touch with date of infamy

shed habits of thought
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careless language costs lives
script

palimpsest

Language, Literature, Drama

intelligence-sharing script constantly rewritten

President uses words like wood

Taleban hurl defiance

actor in drama whose first act is unfolding

caught by Achilles' heel

towers the very opposite of Babel

myriad scraps of info

silent dead of many lands speak to that truth

American fury at Dickensian pace

bells tolled yesterday

terrorism thrives on propaganda

moving silence

preaching extremist hatred

call spirits from the dusty deep
democracy noisy, sceptical affair/fool's
errand/Shakespeare/Hegel

smacks of bureaucratic fudge
vague talk
opinion-makers

found his voice and hit his stride

less vocal on essential first step

best placed to whisper words in right ears

muted condemnation

blunt demands

make revulsion explicit

preaching message of hate

confessional solidarity

tilt world opinion toward India

hear similar reciprocal language

upstaged

counter claims of fanatics

enemy within the gate

ravings of extremists blacken name of all Islam

triumphalist bile fills airwaves

dispel absurd conspiracy theories circulating

humanitarianism at its most epic

lay out US needs in courteous, but plain language

spectacle of towers plummeting

straight out of Ian Fleming story

humankind cannot bear very much reality

Sundance to our Butch Cassidy

replayed in flashback

twisted millionaire mastermind

in the frame

came to sticky end

al-Qaeda academies of death

one corner of worldwide canvas

Taleban playing out deadly farce

balancing act

silence surrounds all military detail

off-screen

rhetoric rallying world against common enemy

hone rhetoric of readiness

battle for world opinion

British have new role to play

channel of communication too long clogged

overcome by same jaundice as Jeremiah
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become a forgotten footnote
makes mockery
as much revivalist meeting as political rally
sentiment cloyed airwaves/schmaltz dripped
destroy academies of death
extravagant claims
berates terrorists trying to hijack our religion
miles to go before they sleep
fanatics preaching hate
centre stage
enemies at the gate
apparent end to bin Laden's home video efforts
legacy of 9/11 in 3 theatres
many whispers but no hard information
advertisement
sentence and sentiment essence of US foreign policy
plan a bit over the top
multiracial trinity in style of Benetton advertisement
Sesame Street has a lot to answer for
public-spirited Irish provided Murphia
glorious legend and inglorious reality of Mafia
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latest Whitehall wheeze
agent

Taleban flung Bush's ultimatum back in his face

Characters

Taleban publicly slammed door

flexing of America's vast muscle

given heart to Taleban's internal opponents

standing shoulder to shoulder

America bears greatest burden of leadership

Pakistan's indulgence of Taleban

shattered West's peace but not will

little real appetite for war

give Japanese easy ride to Pearl Harbor

Kremlin suspicions of NATO designs

unabashed patriotism/conviction moved US

the nation's life

touched hearts of NYC

El Al set example

reverence for city's heroes

West plans retaliation

Britain's solidarity

gov'ts appreciate danger they face

reviving something of NY's bruised zest and gusto

hearts of public and politician

stricken city

White House's brusque insistence

voicing America's contempt for terrorists
US not mountains of money/towers of steel/ but hearts of
gold

Washington is gleaning intelligence
Britain girds against present danger

Britain as alone as after fall of France

France not fallen in line

America's will

standing shoulder to shoulder

American national mood

Britain standing in line of only two abreast

mastermind

country alive with troubled and legitimate questions

Downing Street non-committal

Britain has shown deft hand/resolute eye

spoke of US umbrella

struck heart of America

Congress stalled move

world standing edgily at brink of war

grip of al-Qaeda on cities

America's diplomatic footwork

how many heads Hydra has

Muslim world recoils instinctively from attack on fellow

Islamist assailants have tentacles everywhere

set to side Russia's anxieties about US penetration

stopping kamikazi terrorists

America is crouched

terrorist Hydra

Taleban hurl defiance one day

bin Laden's Afghan lairs

Europe's solidarity with US melts into nothing

funding Jackal cunning

Britain must rise to challenge

elusive and Hydra-headed opponents

Whitehall's wobbles
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stance those outside US should welcome
in the market for weapons of mass destruction
hysterical coverage
city that they defended can grant them this
kicking the stuffing out of each other
uniquely courageous urban army
al-Qaeda's aim to humiliate US power/destroy its
confidence
showing world's mightiest power to be impotent
tiny bands of fanatical plotters
barely armed but with lethal weapon of willingness to die
civilians asked to spend for victory, not dig for it
Pearl Harbor tipped scales
US paid heavily for failures
set Islam against the West
aligned the rest of the world on America's side
9/11 put Americans back in touch with date of infamy
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level-headed response
act/agent

further blow

Body

(reinforce sense of vulnerability that) gripped the city

trying out JFK's shoes

no premature embrace

keeps head down

embraced by the entire community

strike heart
hand over bin Laden to escape retaliation
face
immediate steps
recovering some of its position
stepped up their own vigilance
lose little sleep
terrible blow
time in hand (bargains to be struck)
not marching but tumbling into front line of war
moment intelligence coalesces will be swift spring
sharp memories
slipped between aliases
heart of conspiracy
pussyfooting of prosecutors
daydreaming
boot is on other foot
speak of extending the hand of tolerance
caught between interests on one hand
beyond reach
taken all possible steps to counter terrorism
brainchild
keep fingerprints off operations
finger pointed in direction of bin Laden
living memory
leaden shoe waiting to drop
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speculating on war against terrorism
act/agency

declaring its hand

Games

taunt

jockeying

move diplomacy forward

not shirk this slow, deliberate test of strength

freedom defeats fear

make or break sentiment

hard on heels

prolonged slump

allies' reluctance to stake everything

testing

course of war hard to call

play by the book

rules (lax/follows closely)

puzzle not pieced together

settle old score

temporarily lost stomach for fight

raise his game

political jousting

no neutral ground in fight

avoidance of serious economic slump

burdensome new routines

snatched defeat from jaws of military victory

first line of defence

electronic battlefield

stepped up
sloppy intelligence, mistaken targets, missed
aims

test of strength against terrorist Hydra
marathon ahead
staying America's hand
riposte to carnage visited on America
marathon effort to rid world of terrorist cells
America's diplomatic footwork
won "shoulder to shoulder" backing
tackling
however fluid the chessboard now
deftly handled
waiting game like no other
vital pooling of information
overseas tip-offs
plays into hands
exploit every loophole in statute book
joined the hunt
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clear-sighted resolve
scene/act

visible

Vision/Shadow

hard evidence

flush of horrified sympathy fades

lift spectre of nuclear terrorism

muddied/fuzzied policies

gloss

no melting into shadows

wiped 200 points off DJIA

shrouding preparations

illusory peace

bring to head struggle shadowing West

darkness enveloped lower Manhattan

invisible enemy without borders

myopically reluctant

revealed the hypocrisy

unclear/present danger

legions are invisible

clear chain of command

melt into shadows

take heed of obvious timetable

terrorism should have no hiding place

petty infighting coming to light

clearer the terrible truth becomes

habit of muddling through

appear statesmanlike

colour-blind/colours blind to appear in correct proportions

no shadow of doubt

to look on bright side

shadowy al-Qaeda
Britain shown resolute eye

scene

elusive identikit of terror filling out

Natural Disaster

mask terrible conspiracy of destruction

suffered an urban avalanche

hindsight underlines blame

sifting the rubble mountain

blacken name of all Islam

masked, dust-caked, bone tired devoted crews

uncover network that made London terrorist haven

cushioned from aftershocks

tendency toward tunnel vision

evidence is sifted
world waits for dust to settle/caught in obscene freefall

universal gaze turned toward NYC
eclipsed reports

dug from dust

life won't return to normal until vision restored

noxious covering of dust and ashes

obscured by noxious covering of dust and ashes

spate of attacks

statesmen today are blinded by explosions in America

strong enough to withstand storm

draw eyes to rest of world

terrorist threat not weather of future

lift malaise now hanging over
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extinguished by engaging in spectacular activity
act/agency

terrorism/lightning unlikely to strike same place 2x

Science/Engineering

residual memory

tempered by fire and changed

notion of war/law rests on structure

turbulence
true bolt from blue aimed to humble heart of
nation

build military coalition
layer upon layer
this outer layer

no melting into shadows
fuel flame of terror

layers of global support
pragmatic layering of decisions cooperate
flexibly

gravity of situation

dismantling

limit damage triggered

apparatus of terror

big boost

scale of terrorists' ambitions

plane as bomb

remove recklessly such underpinning plays

chemical sniffer to detect explosives

refashioned structures of security

scorched into collective consciousness

engineered mass murder

mobilisation gathering pace

scale of confusion

deadly force of express train bearing down

accident of the wave of immigration

Pakistan's corrosive political corruption

speed far outstrips allied response to Iraq
pouring fuel on flames of Islamic fundamentalism
alliances suffer stresses/strains in heat of battle
galvanise public opinion
melts into nothing
slow business in courts
compact reduces risk of post-Taleban vacuum
no precipitate rush to widen war
wave of emergency legislation
responsibility split
speed/surprise essential
value as conduit, lightning conductor
diplomatic momentum
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widespread panic spread across America
act/agency

lift malaise now hanging over Western societies

Medical

spawning

make the price of terrorism unbearable

lifeblood of democracy

pressure to alleviate root causes of terrorism

sterile areas

growing Talebanisation of Pakistan

sensitive positions
reviving something of NY's bruised zest and
gusto

formula
fade away into outright recession

stricken city

fortress America was already moribund

eradicating menace of regime

triumphalist bile

starve transnational networks of power

desire to restore life to city

nervous toleration

economic victims of terrorism

collective nervous breakdown

self-inflicted mistakes

braced for further contraction

robust efforts

fractured

lifted Blair's fatigue

shock

political headaches

starve cells

psychological blow struck by terrorists
Stability Pact not allowed to become sterility
pact

myopically reluctant
penetrate Islamic cells

collapse of WTC not collapse of world trade

terrorism could hobble American power

join int'l drive to avert slump

day passed peacefully

surgical strikes

NY back on path to psychological recovery

elimination of scourge of terrorism
festering troubles of Middle East
too long clogged
starved of funds
fray more nerves
tourniquet tightens it begins to pinch
evidence emerging of cells
tragic side effect of assault on America
Whitehall wheeze
halt collapse of world economy
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act/agency

act/agency

Nautical

Rooting out/Closing in

turbulence
anger/anguish more likely to mount than
subside

pressure to alleviate root causes of terrorism
cut off any room for maneovre
murderous networks hunted down

terror rots timbers

track down

called to the colours

tackling root cause of extremism

time for steady nerves/precise action

diplomatic fence around Afghanistan

channel of communication

close gaps in this unconventional common front

shift in the course of long campaign ahead

close down terrorist cells/loopholes

US will not fire more than warning shot or two

as tourniquet tightens it begins to pinch

Pentagon expects time to fray nerves

Islamist terrorist networks more entrenched

long haul

closing G8 airspace/ringing venue

shoring up American-led alliance

root out terrorists in our midst

stiffen response

joined the hunt

long haul

tear at roots of terrorism

breaches threaten every citizen's safety

encirclement of Afghanistan being interlocked

unvetted workers airside

ring closing around bin Laden

wave of emergency legislation

holed up in hideout

Blair saw his duty/course was fixed

hunt

weather collapse of business confidence

capacity to root out regimes

turbulent
event to carry clout
timetable
bin Laden network in state of disrepair
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act/attitude
Responding to danger

scene

mount leadership campaign

Terrain

character to rise to challenge

treacherous political terrain

deliberate assault on symbol of nation

pavement carpeted with flowers

crisis bringing economic ruin to millions

bewildering range of circumstance

bargains to be struck

grim political position

find excuses otherwise occupied when bullets fly

as networks regroup trail may go cold

enemy of my enemy should be courted

slip into rebellion from one wing

growing aghast

perilously unstable launching pad

sheltered in London

no avenue neglected

frontline target for retaliation

treacherous Afghan wastes

fear feeds on fear

world standing edgily at brink

met terrible deaths

pockets of Pashtun heartlands

horrors of full-scale nuclear attack

turf warfare

chilling info

hope road never turns to Iraq is reckless

reinforce sense of vulnerability

dangerously invidious position

outcry over sloppy inspections/lax regulations

countryside alive with al-Qaeda fighters

spared to carry blankets

first step down long road

fear of whipping up panic

speed gov't takes in high ground abroad
low road gov't treads at home
NYC back on path
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The Times' Themes by Article
1

Terror for All
Before/After--Civilised/Uncivilised---Visible/Shadowy
9/12/2001
New truths of changed world yet to be seen
US tempered by fire and changed by ordeal
No single stroke will slay invisible enemies
Battle between terror and entire free world can only be met by standing shoulder to shoulder

2

Still the Enemy
Civilised/Uncivilised---Before/After
9/13/2001
Old rivalries buried; "we are all Americans"
West must establish beyond doubt that civilised world is able and determined to defeat religious
extremists and aggressive dictators anywhere they arise

3

With one voice
Civilised/Uncivilised---Before/After
9/14/2001
Never an American catastrophe, but the world's
World divides into 2 camps

4

Replies of steel: Answers to inevitable criticisms of an inevitable response
9/15/2001

Duty/Appeasement
Failure to strike will be trumpeted as proof of impotence
Foolish, immoral to shirk this slow, deliberate test of strength
5

This is a world war
New War/New Kind of Enemy
9/16/2001
9/11 brings to head the struggle that has shadowed the West for decades
New battlefield, different kind of conflict
When faced by such an enemy, hawks are true peacemakers
Constant pressure to alleviate root causes of terror
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6

The old war
Visible/Shadowy---New War/New Kind of Enemy
9/17/2001
War with invisible enemy without borders seems surreal

7

Pakistan's choice
Civilised/Uncivilised
9/17/2001
Musharraf must choose
Growing grip of Islamic extremism vs. democratic world

8

Speed not haste
Civilised/Uncivilised---Duty/Appeasement
9/18/2001
West must at least be equal to terrorists in the will to prevail
The more concentrated the targets, the better
Once first flush of horrified sympathy and common fear fades, allies may be tempted to treat this
monstrosity as a "one-off"

9

Back in business
New War/New Kind of Enemy
9/18/2001
Strong case for conventional free market principles being place to one side
Sustained, international intervention is required to maintain prosperity

10

In the air
New War/New Kind of Enemy
9/18/2001
Old habits hard to change
Best air safety enforced only by global agreement

11

Terrorism at home
Civilised/Uncivilised
9/19/2001
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West's most cherished values and legal traditions gave evil abundant opportunity
Puzzle not pieced together
Enemies within the gate
12

Dig deep
Before/After---Civilised/Uncivilised
9/19/2001
9/11 = humanitarianism at its most epic
Terrorism is a leveller
Never before has the world felt itself to be such a global village

13

United home front
Before/After--Civilised/Uncivilised
9/20/2001
Democracy's best retaliation against terror is to thrive
Circumstances demand measure of restraint
Hearts of public and politician alike are not in political jousting

14

It's the economy, still
New War/New Kind of Enemy
9/20/2001
Crisis bringing economic ruin to millions would snatch defeat from jaws of any military victory that free
world won
Collapse of world trade would bring almost as much satisfaction as collapse of WTC--must not be
allowed
Join international drive to avert slump

15

Long war
Duty/Appeasement---New War/New Kind of Enemy
9/20/2001
Afghanistan is a foretaste only of a vastly more ambitious campaign, waged the world over, in new kind
of total war
As US engages in struggle, it will require great steadiness
US will judge countries by their willingness to stay the same long course

16

Prime suspect: The Taleban are playing out a deadly farce
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Civilised/Uncivilised---New War/New Kind of Enemy
9/21/2001
On every front, through every channel, multi-faceted counter-terrorist alliance coming together
First step down very long road
Taleban playing out a deadly farce, unable to comprehend enormity of outrage
Taleban's stance demonstrates utter necessity of this unwelcome war
17

Back on the ground
9/22/2001

Duty/Appeasement
UK = a country alive with troubled and legitimate questions
UK standing in line of only 2 abreast--US's sole partner
UK girds against present danger
18

It won't be quick
New War/New Kind of Enemy--Duty/Appeasement
9/24/2001
US's measured response reassuring for a world standing edgily on brink of war
Allies have rallied with varying degrees of commitment
Fighting new kind of war against new kind of enemy
Time for steady nerves, precise action
This is a war without end and a war we can never be certain we have won

19

Layer upon layer
New War/New Kind of Enemy
9/24/2001
Place layers of global support on NATO core
Common fears make common cause
Tackling root cause of extremism in festering troubles of Middle East

20

Palimpsest
New War/New Kind of Enemy
9/26/2001
Balance UK/UK must strike = palimpsest, a political, military, and intelligence-sharing script that is
constantly rewritten
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However fluid the chessboard now, one constant is that in Middle East, careless language costs lives
21

Crouch, spring, crouch

9/28/2001
Visible/Shadowy
Elusive identikit of terror is filling out
Moment intelligence coalesces there will be swift spring--US is crouched--this is a waiting game like no
other
22

Intelligence needed
New War/New Kind of Enemy--Visible/Shadowy
9/28/2001
Freedoms of West have been used to mask a terrible conspiracy of destruction
Hindsight underlines blame but clarifies the need for action
New war demands new weapons--intelligence by far most deadly

23

Tough on camera
Visible/Shadowy---New War/New Kind of Enemy
9/29/2001
Uncover network that has made London terrorist haven of Western world
Terror thrives on propaganda and delay--both must end

24

Who defends Britain?
Duty/Appeasement---Civilised/Uncivilised---New War/New Kind of Enemy
9/30/2001
UK joined hunt for OBL so it became frontline target for retaliation
Fanaticism vs. freedom uneven contest
Need for greater security balanced against impairing our freedoms

25

Tunnel vision
Visible/Shadowy---Before/After
10/1/2001
Everyday human activity has ground to a halt
Tendency toward tunnel vision as universal gaze has turned toward NYC
Statesmen today are blinded by explosions in America--life will not return to normal until vision is restored
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26

Against evil
10/2/2001

Duty/Appeasement
Afghanistan only one battleground in long campaign
Dangers of inaction now outweigh risks
27

A Fatwa on Terror
Civilised/Uncivilised---Duty/Appeasement
10/4/2001
Essential first step from Muslim community = widespread and unambiguous condemnation of terrorists
and those who support them
Those complaining of prejudice should not be surprised by false Western assumptions if they do not
counter claims of fanatics

28

War of nerves
Civilised/Uncivilised
10/5/2001
Blair: defeat terrorists or be defeated
Fear feeds on fear
Success of Washington's war aims will decide outcome
All elements in encirclement of Afghanistan being interlocked

29

Just the beginning
Duty/Appeasement---New War/New Kind of Enemy
10/7/2001
OBL straight out of Ian Fleming novel
"Special relationship" is proving its worth
Not a war in which you can negotiate
So long as OBL is free, no country is beyond his reach and nobody is safe
Butch and Sundance came to a sticky end--US/UK must not

30

Another front
New War/New Kind of Enemy---Civilised/Uncivilised---Duty/Appeasement
10/8/2001

251

Hone rhetoric of readiness without creating unrealistic expectations or putting whole society in "brace
position"
Most crucial operations likely off-screen
Afghanistan only one corner of worldwide canvas
Pulverising of WTC shattered West's peace but not will
National interests of UK are directly engaged because at stake are lives and livelihoods of all
31

The defeatist chorus
Duty/Appeasement---Civilised/Uncivilised
10/8/2001
We are in for the long haul
West has resolve to win war
Prolonged campaign makes need to win battle for public opinion more important than ever

32

Airport insecurity
New War/New Kind of Enemy
10/17/2001
Rules are too lax
Breaches threaten everyone's safety

33

Rock solidarity
Before/After
10/22/2001
Send a message understood by millions
Celebrate NYC's resilience, energy, and unity
Massive and modern defiance

34

A man alone
10/25/2001

Duty/Appeasement
Blair saw his duty; his course was fixed
The struggle against global terrorists is "a battle that doesn't have a finite point"
Return to Iraq would divide Blair's party, his country, and his allies abroad
35

Nuclear network
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Civilised/Uncivilised---New War/New Kind of Enemy
10/26/2001
OBL--the acquisition of WMD "to terrorise the enemies of God" = "religious duty"
Hunt now assumes still greater urgency than before
Speed and surprise will be all the more essential/ The threat is even greater than was previously known
36

The Blair shuttle
Duty/Appeasement---Civilised/Uncivilised
11/2/2001
Part of Blair's value to Bush = conduit, even of lightning conductor
Needs to be sure he is husbanding his authority--and UK's--for times far harder than these
Not arrogance to assert values of civilised society, but necessity. Their defence requires calculated
mixture of discipline and decisiveness,
considered risktaking, and imaginative caution little mastered by post-Cold War leaders

37

From New York skies
Before/After
11/13/2001
New Yorkers believe that their city and country are facing random, indefinite terror
Life over much of city comes to immediate halt (with every scare)

38

One Sunday in 1941
New War/New Kind of Enemy---Civilised/Uncivilised
12/7/2001
September's slaughter of civilians had no basis in strategic calculation
Aim was to humiliate American power, destroy its confidence and set Islam against the West
Show the world's mightiest power to be impotent against tiny bands of fanatical plotters, barely armed
other than with the lethal weapon of their readiness to die
Struggle is frustrating for civilians because there cannot be a clearcut military victory and because it is
so much less clear what individuals can do

39

First things first
Civilised/Uncivilised---New War/New Kind of Enemy
12/11/2001
Terrorists desire to rip apart the fabric of civilised society. Their target was the future of everyman
"win the peace"
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UK, valiant but ancillary in Afghanistan, now moves to centre stage
No premature embrace of illusory peace--miles to go before they sleep
40

Not Correct
Civilised/Uncivilised---Before/After
1/15/2002
New York is back on the path to psychological recovery when its citizens are kicking the stuffing out of
each other
Al-Qaeda may base its specious philosophies on racial lines but Americans should be colour-blind
Injustice being done to this uniquely courageous urban army becomes clearer if one reverses the ethnic
model

41

A world transformed
Before/After---Civilised/Uncivilised--New War/New Kind of Enemy
3/9/2002
After 9/11, the world caught its breath in shock, disgust, and fear, transfixed by attacks
Attacks revealed vulnerability of world's greatest power and every society in which fanatics were at
liberty to circulate--an attack on freedom itself
Diminishing of that collective horror and helplessness due to the steady determination of US to beat
back global menace
Early days in global campaign, against elusive, Hydra-headed opponent, "that does not have a finite
point"
Blair has raised his game in emergency, asserted there is no neutral ground in fight
Blair's decisions yet to come immeasurably harder
Europe slow to accept 9/11 not as event receding into the past but part of continuing threat, and
slower to understand transformation in American national mood

42

Coalition Politics
New War/New Kind of Enemy---Civilised/Uncivilised---Duty/Appeasement
3/12/2002
The US must not feel constrained to act by the concerns of others but would still work best in concert
with a coalition
"Men with no respect for life must never be allowed to control the ultimate instruments of death." That
sentiment is the absolute essence of American foreign policy
There can be no immunity and no neutrality

43

Intelligent intelligence
New War/New Kind of Enemy
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6/6/2002
Security is unending struggle to improve vigilance and update intelligence--reexamination of old
assumptions
Only good intelligence can avert the devastation of evil men
44

Security matters
New War/New Kind of Enemy---Before/After
7/8/2002
We need to expect the unexpected
Ordinary life not affected since 9/11--simple passage of time led most people in most places to act as
they did on 9/10

45

One year on
Before/After---Civilised/Uncivilised
9/11/2002
9/11 was transformative moment of importance rarely witnessed--life would never be the same
Legacy of 9/11 in 3 theatres: America's relationship to the world; Islam's attitude toward rest of
humanity; central structure of international system
Innocence and indulgence that ended on 9/11 not likely revisited soon
Only at beginning of the attempt to understand what will be demanded of capitalist democracies
Hands on the clock have barely moved since 9/11
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The Times' Relevancy Ratings
Date

M

R

L

D

A

Mean

2

1.75

1.5

12-Sep-01

3

3

3

3

3

3

Y

Y

Y

13-Sep-01

3

2

3

2

3

2.6

Y

Y

Y

14-Sep-01

3

3

3

3

3

3

Y

Y

Y

15-Sep-01

2

0

3

1

1

1.4

15-Sep-01

3

2

3

2

3

2.6

Y

Y

Y

16-Sep-01

3

3

3

3

3

3

Y

Y

Y

17-Sep-01

3

2

3

2

3

2.6

Y

Y

Y

17-Sep-01

2

1

3

1

2

1.8

Y

Y

18-Sep-01

3

1

3

1

3

2.2

Y

Y

18-Sep-01

3

0

3

1

2

1.8

Y

Y

18-Sep-01

3

1

3

1

2

2

Y

Y

Y

19-Sep-01

3

0

3

1

3

2

Y

Y

Y

19-Sep-01

3

2

3

3

3

2.8

Y

Y

Y

20-Sep-01

3

1

3

2

3

2.4

Y

Y

Y

20-Sep-01

3

2

3

1

2

2.2

Y

Y

Y

20-Sep-01

3

2

3

1

3

2.4

Y

Y

Y

21-Sep-01

3

1

3

2

3

2.4

Y

Y

Y

22-Sep-01

3

1

3

2

3

2.4

Y

Y

Y

23-Sep-01

3

2

3

3

3

2.8

Y

Y

Y

24-Sep-01

2

1

3

0

3

1.8

Y

Y

24-Sep-01

1

0

1

1

0

0.6

25-Sep-01

1

1

3

0

2

1.4

25-Sep-01

1

0

1

0

0

0.4

26-Sep-01

2

2

3

0

2

1.8

Y

Y

26-Sep-01

1

0

1

0

1

0.6

Y
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27-Sep-01

2

1

3

1

3

2

Y

27-Sep-01

1

1

1

1

2

1.2

28-Sep-01

2

1

3

0

3

1.8

Y

Y

28-Sep-01

2

0

3

1

3

1.8

Y

Y

29-Sep-01

2

1

3

1

3

2

Y

Y

Y

30-Sep-01

2

2

3

2

3

2.4

Y

Y

Y

1-Oct-01

1

2

3

2

2

2

Y

Y

Y

1-Oct-01

1

1

1

1

1

1

1-Oct-01

2

1

2

0

3

1.6

2-Oct-01

2

2

3

0

3

2

3-Oct-01

1

1

2

0

2

1.2

3-Oct-01

1

1

2

0

1

1

4-Oct-01

0

0

0

0

0

0

4-Oct-01

0

1

0

0

1

0.4

4-Oct-01

2

2

3

1

3

5-Oct-01

2

1

3

2

5-Oct-01

1

0

0

6-Oct-01

1

1

6-Oct-01

1

7-Oct-01

Y
Y

Y

Y

2.2

Y

Y

Y

3

2.2

Y

Y

Y

0

0

0.2

2

1

1

1.2

0

1

1

1

0.8

1

3

3

2

3

2.4

Y

Y

Y

8-Oct-01

1

1

3

2

3

2

Y

Y

Y

9-Oct-01

1

1

3

0

3

1.6

10-Oct-01

0

1

2

1

1

1

11-Oct-01

1

0

3

1

3

1.6

Y

12-Oct-01

1

1

2

1

3

1.6

Y

13-Oct-01

1

2

1

1

2

1.4

14-Oct-01

1

1

3

1

3

1.8

Y

Y
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Y

15-Oct-01

1

0

1

1

0

0.6

15-Oct-01

2

0

3

1

1

1.4

16-Oct-01

1

0

2

0

3

1.2

17-Oct-01

2

1

3

1

2

1.8

17-Oct-01

1

0

2

2

3

1.6

18-Oct-01

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

18-Oct-01

1

0

1

0

0

0.4

19-Oct-01

1

0

3

0

3

1.4

19-Oct-01

1

1

1

1

3

1.4

20-Oct-01

1

0

2

0

1

0.8

20-Oct-01

1

0

1

0

0

0.4

21-Oct-01

1

1

2

0

3

1.4

22-Oct-01

2

2

3

3

3

2.6

22-Oct-01

1

1

1

0

3

1.2

23-Oct-01

1

1

1

0

3

1.2

24-Oct-01

0

0

1

0

1

0.4

25-Oct-01

0

0

0

0

0

0

25-Oct-01

2

2

3

3

3

2.6

26-Oct-01

1

1

2

2

3

1.8

28-Oct-01

1

0

3

1

3

1.6

29-Oct-01

1

0

2

0

1

0.8

31-Oct-01

0

0

0

0

2

0.4

31-Oct-01

0

0

2

1

2

1

31-Oct-01

2

0

3

1

2

1.6

1-Nov-01

1

0

3

2

1

1.4

2-Nov-01

1

0

3

2

3

1.8

3-Nov-01

0

0

0

0

0

0

Y

Y
Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

258

Y

3-Nov-01

1

0

2

0

3

1.2

4-Nov-01

0

1

2

0

0

0.6

5-Nov-01

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

6-Nov-01

1

0

1

1

0

0.6

6-Nov-01

0

0

2

0

2

0.8

7-Nov-01

1

0

1

0

2

0.8

8-Nov-01

1

0

1

2

0

0.8

11-Nov-01

0

0

2

0

3

1

13-Nov-01

1

2

2

2

1

1.6

13-Nov-01

2

2

3

3

2

2.4

15-Nov-01

0

0

2

0

3

1

16-Nov-01

0

0

3

0

3

1.2

17-Nov-01

1

2

2

0

1

1.2

17-Nov-01

0

1

2

0

1

0.8

18-Nov-01

1

0

3

1

3

1.6

18-Nov-01

0

0

2

0

1

0.6

19-Nov-01

0

0

0

0

0

0

20-Nov-01

1

1

2

1

2

1.4

20-Nov-01

1

1

2

1

0

1

22-Nov-01

1

0

1

0

0

0.4

24-Nov-01

1

0

1

0

0

0.4

24-Nov-01

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

24-Nov-01

1

0

2

0

1

0.8

27-Nov-01

1

0

3

0

1

1

27-Nov-01

0

0

2

0

0

0.4

29-Nov-01

0

0

0

0

0

0

1-Dec-01

0

0

0

0

0

0

Y
Y

Y

Y

Y
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3-Dec-01

1

0

2

1

1

1

3-Dec-01

0

0

0

0

0

0

4-Dec-01

1

0

3

1

0

1

4-Dec-01

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

5-Dec-01

0

0

0

0

0

0

7-Dec-01

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

7-Dec-01

3

3

3

3

3

3

8-Dec-01

0

0

3

0

3

1.2

8-Dec-01

0

0

0

0

0

0

11-Dec-01

2

2

3

2

3

2.4

13-Dec-01

0

0

3

0

3

1.2

13-Dec-01

0

0

0

0

0

0

14-Dec-01

0

0

0

1

0

0.2

14-Dec-01

0

0

3

1

1

1

17-Dec-01

1

0

2

1

0

0.8

18-Dec-01

1

0

1

1

1

0.8

19-Dec-01

0

0

0

0

0

0

22-Dec-01

0

0

1

0

1

0.4

26-Dec-01

0

0

2

0

0

0.4

27-Dec-01

0

0

3

0

2

1

29-Dec-01

1

1

3

1

2

1.6

30-Dec-01

1

0

1

0

0

0.4

31-Dec-01

1

0

3

0

2

1.2

31-Dec-01

0

0

2

0

0

0.4

2-Jan-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

3-Jan-02

1

0

3

0

3

1.4

5-Jan-02

1

0

2

2

2

1.4

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
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6-Jan-02

1

0

0

0

0

0.2

10-Jan-02

1

0

3

0

3

1.4

11-Jan-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

12-Jan-02

1

0

1

1

0

0.6

14-Jan-02

1

0

0

0

0

0.2

15-Jan-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

15-Jan-02

1

2

3

2

2

2

16-Jan-02

1

0

3

0

1

1

17-Jan-02

1

0

3

0

3

1.4

19-Jan-02

0

0

2

0

2

0.8

22-Jan-02

0

0

3

0

3

1.2

26-Jan-02

0

0

2

0

2

0.8

28-Jan-02

1

0

2

0

3

1.2

29-Jan-02

1

0

3

1

3

1.6

Y

31-Jan-02

1

1

3

0

3

1.6

Y

3-Feb-02

0

0

2

0

1

0.6

4-Feb-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

5-Feb-02

0

0

2

0

3

1

8-Feb-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

9-Feb-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

9-Feb-02

0

0

2

0

0

0.4

14-Feb-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

15-Feb-02

0

1

2

1

0

0.8

16-Feb-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

18-Feb-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

23-Feb-02

0

0

3

0

0

0.6

25-Feb-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

Y

Y
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Y

27-Feb-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

2-Mar-02

0

0

3

0

2

1

4-Mar-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

5-Mar-02

0

0

3

0

3

1.2

6-Mar-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

7-Mar-02

0

0

2

0

0

0.4

8-Mar-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

9-Mar-02

3

3

3

3

3

3

10-Mar-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

11-Mar-02

1

0

1

0

1

0.6

12-Mar-02

2

0

3

2

3

2

13-Mar-02

0

2

1

0

0

0.6

15-Mar-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

19-Mar-02

0

0

3

0

0

0.6

21-Mar-02

0

0

2

0

1

0.6

21-Mar-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

22-Mar-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

23-Mar-02

0

0

3

0

0

0.6

25-Mar-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

28-Mar-02

1

2

3

0

2

1.6

29-Mar-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

30-Mar-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

31-Mar-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

31-Mar-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

2-Apr-02

0

0

3

0

2

1

4-Apr-02

0

0

2

0

0

0.4

5-Apr-02

0

0

2

0

0

0.4

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
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7-Apr-02

0

0

3

0

0

0.6

10-Apr-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

11-Apr-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

11-Apr-02

0

0

2

0

0

0.4

16-Apr-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

17-Apr-02

0

0

3

0

2

1

24-Apr-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

26-Apr-02

0

1

2

0

1

0.8

9-May-02

0

0

2

0

1

0.6

10-May-02

0

0

3

1

2

1.2

13-May-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

14-May-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

15-May-02

0

0

2

1

1

0.8

17-May-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

18-May-02

1

0

2

1

1

1

18-May-02

0

0

2

0

0

0.4

19-May-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

20-May-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

23-May-02

0

0

2

0

1

0.6

23-May-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

24-May-02

0

0

2

0

2

0.8

24-May-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

25-May-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

27-May-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

30-May-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

31-May-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

4-Jun-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2
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3-Jun-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

6-Jun-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

6-Jun-02

1

2

3

2

3

2.2

12-Jun-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

19-Jun-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

23-Jun-02

1

0

2

1

3

1.4

24-Jun-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

25-Jun-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

26-Jun-02

0

0

2

0

0

0.4

4-Jul-02

0

0

1

0

1

0.4

6-Jul-02

1

0

2

0

3

1.2

8-Jul-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

8-Jul-02

2

3

3

3

3

2.8

16-Jul-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

19-Jul-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

25-Jul-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

27-Jul-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

29-Jul-02

1

0

2

1

1

1

30-Jul-02

0

0

3

0

1

0.8

31-Jul-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

3-Aug-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

4-Aug-02

0

2

2

1

1

1.2

7-Aug-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

8-Aug-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

10-Aug-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

15-Aug-02

0

1

2

0

3

1.2

18-Aug-02

0

0

3

0

0

0.6

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
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20-Aug-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

23-Aug-02

0

0

1

0

0

0.2

26-Aug-02

0

0

3

0

0

0.6

31-Aug-02

0

0

2

0

0

0.4

1-Sep-02

0

0

2

0

0

0.4

3-Sep-02

0

0

0

0

0

0

6-Sep-02

0

1

3

0

1

1

7-Sep-02

0

0

2

0

0

0.4

8-Sep-02

0

0

2

0

0

0.4

11-Sep-02

3

3

3

3

3

3

0.4

1.7

0.5

1.2

AVG

0.71

Month

Y

Y

34

45

Average
2

1.75

1.5

9/12/2001

10/11/2001

1

25

30

33

10/12/2001

11/11/2001

2

2

6

10

11/12/2001

12/11/2001

3

3

3

5

12/12/2001

1/11/2002

4

0

0

2

1/12/2002

2/11/2002

5

1

1

4

2/12/2002

3/11/2002

6

1

1

1

3/12/2002

4/11/2002

7

1

1

3

4/12/2002

5/11/2002

8

0

0

0

5/12/2002

6/11/2002

9

1

1

1

6/12/2002

7/11/2002

10

1

1

1

7/12/2002

8/11/2002

11

0

0

0

8/12/2002

9/11/2002

12

1

1

1
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Y

Somalia 1993
Tower of Babel
“bells tolled”—John Donne
Thomas Hobbes—“common power
to keep men in awe”
Niccolo Machiavelli
William Shakespeare
Bertrand Russell
Carl von Clausewitz
Georg Hegel
1998 bin Laden World Islamic Front
Harry Truman
Truman Doctrine
Libya 1986
Berlin bombing 1986
Moammar Gadaffi supporting
Islamic terror
Lockerbie
Gadaffi arming the IRA
Great Satan
Omaha Beach
Thirty Years’ War
1648 Treaty
Rome
Thomas Jefferson
Islamic pirates in Middle Ages
Barbary States
1970’s hijackings
James Baker
Savings and Loan Scandal
Tony Blair to UN 1998
T.S. Eliot
Bill Clinton 1992 election
1994 California earthquake
Stability Pact—currency
Osama bin Laden leaves Sudan 1996
Tony Blair’s deal with the PIRA
IRA terror
1998 US sanctions on Pakistan
Iran/Iraq war
Soviets in Afghanistan
US State Dept 2000 report on Iran
and terror
Taliban takeover of Afghanistan
US Paris Embassy bombing plot
Genoa G8 summit

Historical References by Number
5 or more
Pearl Harbor 10
African Embassy bombings 6
Gulf War/Kuwait 16
2 or more
Cold War 4
USS Cole 3
World War II 3
Kosovo 3
Hydra 3
John Kennedy/Cuban Missile Crisis
1962 3
Franklin Roosevelt 2
Bill Clinton/Osama bin Laden 1998 2
Masood assassination 2
Ronald Reagan 2
Margaret Thatcher 2
Nazis 2
Israel/Palestine Conflict 2
Slobodan Milosevic 2
Vietnam 2
George H. W. Bush 41 2
Chechnya 2
1
17th century—30 Years’ War
WWII scrap metal collecting
Japanese invasion of China WWII
Dhahran bombing 1996
Northern Ireland conflict
Durban Conference on Racism
Mikhail Gorbachev
Berlin Wall
Ayatollah Khomeini in France 1970’s
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British Ambassador in Cairo
answering charges of UK not
extraditing terror suspects
Agosto Pinochet
Charles Dickens
Genghis Khan
Afghan King Shah
Ian Fleming
Butch Cassidy/Sundance Kid
Nuremburg Trials
Iwo Jima—famous photograph
Bosnia
Falklands War
Edward Heath—worry over oilfields
Gulf War
Book of Jeremiah
Lord Healey—opposed to Kosovo
campaign
General Tojo
Princess Diana
Woodstock
Fall of France 1940
1993 WTC bombings
Iraq boots IAEA/UN 1998
UN Resolutions 686 and 687
David Bowie 1977 “Heroes”
Robert Frost’s “miles to go”
1970’s IRA pub bombings
1999 deal between Chechens and Osama bin Laden
Enlightenment
Reformation
Clinton Era
Richard Hofstadter
The Wasteland—Eliot
Henry IV—Shakespeare
Winston Churchill’s “special relationship”
The Psalms—“enemies in the gates”
FDR’s “date which will live in infamy”
FDR’s “freedom from fear”
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